

RESILIENCE

# Violent Extremism and Resilience in South Africa Workshop Series

## SYNTHESIS REPORT

**Report authored by Leigh Hamilton, Programme Officer**

**February 2018**


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INTRODUCTION

# ABOUT THIS REPORT

Violent extremism is a transnational security issue that impacts nearly every country in the world. South Africa has yet to experience any significant acts of religiously motivated attacks; however, South Africans have been recruited to international terrorist organizations, including ISIS. These individuals, radicalized online, represent a small percentage of South Africans exposed to such propaganda. Those who currently use South Africa as a place to operate safely may eventually evolve to carrying out domestic attacks. At the same time, Al Shabaab has been able to inspire attacks in Mozambique, which shares a porous border with South Africa. Despite these recent trends in terrorism, there is little dialogue about how to respond to threats or develop resilience in Southern Africa. Resilience in this context refers to building the capacity of people, groups or communities to rebut and reject proponents of extremism and radicalism and the ideology they promote.

In response to this need, ALPS Resilience, in partnership with the British High Commission, the Swedish Embassy and the American Embassy, held a series of workshops in 2017. The "Violent Extremism and Resilience in South Africa" series consisted of three workshops, with the ultimate goal of providing a platform for sustained engagement, learning, dialogue and problem-solving between key stakeholders (community leaders, subject-matter experts, violence prevention practitioners, national government, policy-makers, international stakeholders and potential donors) on fostering resilience to violent extremism in South Africa. Each session built on the outcomes achieved during the prior workshop, building a solid foundation of collaborative relationships for preventing violent extremism (PVE) projects in the future. The objectives of the workshop series, included the following:

(i) Define violent extremism in the South African context and map current preventive efforts;
(ii) Facilitate knowledge sharing between experienced policymakers and violence prevention practitioners and workshop participants on domestic and foreign threats, South Africa's vulnerabilities, and key lessons in preventing violent extremism;
(iii) Facilitate dialogues on how government, police and other national security stakeholders can put PVE into practice, advocating for violence prevention and encouraging problem-solving;
(iv) Sustain engagement between key stakeholders to strengthen South Africa's network of subject matter experts and create funding opportunities for original research; and
(v) Promote the possibility for partnerships and collaborative PVE projects in South Africa.

Over the course of the series, more than 90 participants representing international governments, national and local government, NGOs and universities met to discuss and collaborate on various topics related to PVE in South Africa. Workshop activities included discussion sessions, mapping exercises, keynote speeches and panels, as well as the creation of an action plan that identified key areas for further research and targeted advocacy.

This Synthesis Report provides summaries of workshop activities, presentations, key themes and outcomes from the discussions. It also details the participants' recommendations for moving forward with PVE in South Africa.

The aim of this document is to provide a basis for sustained engagement between key stakeholders at this critical juncture, where we can prevent violent extremism instead of countering it. With the help of our partners, ALPS Resilience is committed to driving conversations around how South Africa should respond to this phenomenon, developing solutions to more holistically deal with violent extremism at home and ultimately implementing PVE projects on the ground.

## KEY MESSAGES

- The term radicalization is problematic because it carries with it "connotations of condemnation." Interventions that target "radicalized" individuals are doomed to fail from the outset because they focus on one aspect of extremism: violence. They fail to recognize that extremism has a non-violent side, which is rooted in the *conviction* that a person holds.W

- Extremism cannot be divorced from the context that fosters it. Identity, social cohesion and national unity are critical topics. Solutions to the problem of extremism must be based on context, and they must be indigenously created. External solutions to problems that have been imposed on the community by foreign actors are not a viable option.

- If you want to deal with violent extremism in South Africa, which is very specific, then you must deal with violence more holistically. As long as socio-economic issues in South Africa are not addressed, there will continue to be violence. At the core of the "extremist" counter-narratives that have emerged in South Africa are service delivery and economic participation. Extremism in South Africa does not exist in a vacuum. It is intimately linked to perceptions of the state, the self and the other. It originates along the fault lines of social, economic and political exclusions.

- Believing that South Africa is immune from terrorist threats because of its non-interventionist foreign policy is short-sighted. South Africa cannot isolate itself from international events. Instead, it is important to understand how South Africa is vulnerable to attack from foreign terrorist groups and from home-grown, right-wing extremists. It is impossible to understand extremist threats in South Africa without analysing extremist threats in the region. Incidents related to extremism in SADC countries (e.g. Tanzania and Mozambique), and delayed or inappropriate responses to those incidents, put South Africa at risk.

- Using UNDP's framework for assessing risk of terrorism at the country level, South Africa could be categorized as an "at-risk" country. It has been linked to transnational violent extremist networks such as Al Shabab, al Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS. There is also evidence to suggest that South Africa serves as a logistical hub for transnational violent extremist networks.

- Civil society has an important role to play through helping government to define its role in preventing violent extremism. It can assist by conducting research and hosting events through which public and private sector actors can discuss key issues and problem solve.

- Understanding extremism means engaging at the community level, but engaging community voices takes time and resources. Support for original research needs to be prioritized. This workshop series represents a critical first step in creating a network of individuals and organizations who will work together on PVE research, strategy and implementation.

WORKSHOP I

23 FEBRUARY 2017

# ABOUT THE WORKSHOP

The British High Commission and ALPS Resilience co-hosted the workshop "Violent Extremism and Resilience in South Africa" on 23 February 2017 at the British Residence in Cape Town, South Africa.

The workshop objective was to bring policymakers, international stakeholders, practitioners, researchers and community stakeholders together to discuss the current state of violent extremism and resilience in South Africa. The expected outcomes were greater clarity regarding the current state of violent extremism in South Africa, the development of a nascent South African network of subject-matter experts and practitioners and the promotion the possibility for partnerships and collaborative preventing violent extremism (PVE) projects in South Africa.

The workshop included briefings from three keynote speakers and three subsequent discussion sessions that addressed the state of violent extremism in South Africa, identified current research and interventions and brainstormed how civil society and government can play a more proactive role in preventing violent extremism. 25 participants representing international governments, local government, NGOs and universities engaged in mapping exercises, break-away sessions and round-table discussions on these topics.

## KEY OUTCOMES

- Group exercises defined extremism in the South African context and mapped actors working on prevention linked to violent extremism and xenophobia.
- Participants collaborated on an action plan that identified key areas for further research and targeted advocacy.
- Relationships built during the workshop laid the foundation for a network of PVE experts and a forum of institutions that are committed to future collaboration on the topic in both research and practitioner capacities.
- Discussions were tailored to enable the transition from research to implementation of projects.

# MESSAGES FROM KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

## Peter Boxer

***Deputy High Commissioner at the British High Commission***

What is extremism? The UK Government's definition of extremism is "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs." People that use violence to oppose the shared values of a society are "extremist."

The UK's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy, which is potentially the best national CVE policy in place right now, uses a cross-governmental approach to promote four pillars: pursue, protect, prepare, and prevent. The UK's main challenge is tackling the twisted ideologies that distort religions – not a single religion per se. The key lesson to take from the UK's experience is that the resilience of communities, open discussions and transparency, and international partners are all critical elements of CVE.

## Jasmine Opperman

***Senior Analyst at the Social Adaptation and Acceptance Initiative***

What is the current state of violent extremism in South Africa? First, there are a number of key challenges that emerge when we speak about CVE:

- The term "radicalization" is problematic because it carries with it "connotations of condemnation." Interventions that target "radicalized" individuals are doomed to fail from the outset because they focus on one aspect of extremism: violence. De-radicalization interventions often fail to recognize that extremism has a non-violent side, which is rooted in the conviction that a person holds.

- The demand for de-radicalization requires a group of experts to address the concerns and demands from concerned families. This is extremely sensitive because families do not want their children's future destroyed by the intervention.

- Trust from the families is a significant challenge to overcome. You need to establish a friendly, non-judgmental relationship with the youth.

- A major issue is the lack of support and collaboration from government. The government does not see violent extremism as a local issue. This stems from a misdiagnosis of extremism. The focus is on how prone South Africa is to an attack, but this overlooks the non-violent precursors to an attack. ISIS has clearly been in communication with teenagers in this country. Their strategy relies on initial contact with individuals, after which they slowly formalize their presence. When this footprint expands and becomes more formalized, the next step is execution of attacks. Therefore, the opportunity for an attack in South Africa is increasing.

Government cannot take certain roles in de-radicalization because it cannot be a "referee and a player at the same time." We need to see policies made by government so far as part of the problem. The youth that are recruited are not "mad men and women." They are acting out of a conviction. A de-radicalization program needs to shift this conviction. The contact with ISIS plants a seed with the target/victim that grows into an obsession. They feel included in something greater than themselves. The shift from a conviction to a violent act is often when the radicalized person loses their sense of inclusion, the "high", and feels isolated, the "low". De-radicalization programs ideally need to be implemented during their "high" period, but families usually do not pick up on the issues until the downward emotional movement, the "low". De-radicalization programs need to make youth feel important independently of the sense of belonging to the feeling of inclusion that is cultivated by extremists

## Dave Bax

***Director of ALPS Resilience***

Government and multilateral and international organizations have not taken the lead in addressing extremism in South Africa. Currently, it is unclear if there is someone in government dealing with counter-extremism. This ambiguity is telling of how low a priority these matters are on the state's agenda, especially considering the Secretary-General's call for all member states to create comprehensive national PVE policies.

In light of this challenge, civil society has the opportunity to play an essential role. By presenting the issues to government, civil society can draw public sector actors into the discussion and offer them the space and opportunity to lead. This workshop series represents a critical first step in creating a network of individuals and organizations who will work together on PVE research, strategy and implementation.

When dealing with extremism, there is a clear need to foster community resilience. We need to offer alternatives to people's current circumstances and alternatives to people's perceptions of where they can find adventure. We need to better understand youth. We need to remember that we are dealing with reasonable and logical people when we speak about the leaders of extremist groups like ISIS – we cannot conflate "radicalized" and "crazy."

When we deal with extremism, we should deal with all forms of extremism: anti-Semitism, Islamic extremism, Islamophobia, right-wing extremism and xenophobia. We should do this for two reasons: a) we may never get the resources necessary to tackle each stream of extremism separately; and b) tackling all forms of extremism together removes the sense of targeting any one community and allows these various communities to see a fellowship and to mitigate the sense of isolation that has a negative impact on community resilience.

# MAPPING EXERCISE

## Violent Extremism (VE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) in South Africa

Participants were asked to define extremism in the South African context and map actors currently working on the prevention of violent extremism in the country. The questions below were used as prompts to guide the conversation, and the participants' responses are summarized.

### Who are the main instigators of extremism in South Africa? Why are these instigators vulnerable to extremist ideology?

Xenophobia across racial and age groups is astounding. South Africa is preoccupied with this labelling exercise of recognizing attacks on foreigners in the country as "xenophobic", which, in many cases, the government refuses to do. This is distracting, in some ways, from looking at the **drivers causing xenophobic violence:**

- The State's failure to deliver democracy is blamed on foreign Africans in South Africa rather than the ruling party. There have been clearly recurring xenophobic attacks since the mid-1990s, when Apartheid ended and South Africa became a nation for immigrants. Moreover, since the end of Apartheid, South Africans have not focused on the interracial trauma and violence within the country.

- Xenophobic attacks intensify when the economy is stagnant. We often see people mobilize in response to the economic situation.

- Education plays a huge role in extremism because ignorance is the base of stereotyping. Consider South Africa's history with the Quota Act and the Alien Act. We see how history repeats itself with marginalizing communities based on their identity. The ignorance of the Constitution and the rights it extends to foreigners also feeds into the issue of marginalization. We could use the Constitution as a common denominator to prevent people from "othering."

There are **three main frameworks** to consider why some people in South Africa are vulnerable to extremism, specifically xenophobia:

- **Political:** Xenophobia can be traced back to Apartheid where the State promoted the idea that social, political, and economic circumstances were worse elsewhere on the continent. Ultimately, we see this discourse retained where South Africans see themselves as superior to the rest of the continent. Members of the political elite tend to make this worse – they sell a nation-building narrative and undermine continental identity.

- **Economic:** Local level resource constraints make it difficult for South Africans to start small businesses. In some instances, such as domestic work, foreigners are preferred to South Africans. In many instances, foreigners are willing to work for less than South Africans, which increases grievances with foreigners. If this was primarily about identity, we would see more death – xenophobia is ultimately an issue about resources.

- **Social:** We see a reluctance to engage with these issues. There is a suppression of information about these issues, and those who talk about them are accused of "fear-mongering."

Xenophobic violence is different in many ways from other forms of extremist violence. Extremism seems to be the realm of middle class, educated youth. This is different from gang violence in South Africa, where we mostly see the participation of disaffected, poor youth. However, there

may be potential **links between xenophobia and other forms of extremism** that we should explore:

- Research into attacks on Somali spaza shops showed that police responded in a delayed manner, and often re-traumatized the victims. In response, the Somali shop owners turned to alternative forms of security.
- Collective violence (by groups like Pagad) often starts as a response to the lack of policing and eventually leads to engagement in terrorist attacks. This pattern may offer a link to xenophobia, i.e. collective xenophobic violence ultimately may lead to extremism.
- All forms of extremism might be considered fear of the "other". Immigration and mass communication has reinforced the need in South Africa for a national identity, which is then expressed through an "us" versus "them" narrative.

## Who is currently working on preventing violent extremism in South Africa?

**Institute of Security Studies (ISS)** conducted a study with semi-structured interviews where they spoke to a range of stakeholders, including government and academics, to gauge what they saw as a threat in South Africa in terms of extremism. They found that some stakeholders did not view VE as a real threat in South Africa. There was also a range of respondents who considered VE a cause for concern in South Africa, one that requires the establishment of preemptive frameworks and mechanisms. There was a recognition that much more needs to be done to be better prepared to prevent VE in South Africa. In this instance, the government needs to better communicate how they are responding to the threat of VE in South Africa.

***This workshop series represents a critical first step in creating a network of individuals and organizations who will work together on PVE research, strategy and implementation.***

*- Dave Bax*

**Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR)** is looking at CVE in other African countries. In South Africa, IJR measures levels of trust in government, people's value of the Constitution, national unity and identity. All of these factors could play into extremism One way to do this is through dialogue. IJR has dialogue teams on the topics of agriculture and schools, where the theme of often identity emerges.

**Social Adaptation and Acceptance Initiative (SAAI)** is working at an individual-level with South African youth exposed to extremist ideology.

# BREAK-AWAY SESSION

## The Role of Government in Preventing Violent Extremism

During the break-away session, the participants were broken up into three groups. Each group was tasked with brainstorming how the South African government could prevent violent extremism. Group 1 focused on the security sector, Group 2 focused on parliament and Group 3 focused on other departments.

| Government sector | Roles and responsibilities |
|---|---|
| **Security Sector** | • The sector needs to regulate access to weapons.<br>• Government should focus on strategic use of community organizations, policing forums and neighborhood watches. These local-level organizations are more attuned to the specificities of their areas. The state should support and enable these bodies, but the state itself should not be the main body involved.<br>• Police need to ensure safe and private spaces to make people feel comfortable reporting issues to them. We also need to consider training interventions for metro police. Metro police seem to be more receptive to other models of training than SAPS, and therefore they could respond more appropriately to extremist violence.<br>• Government needs to investigate alternative ways to respond to individuals that are radicalized – imprisonment does not seem to be the solution. There is also a need to address other anti-social behaviors that may escalate to extremism. |
| **Policymakers** | • Policy from government should be consistent and continuous. Civil society and media can aid policymakers by framing the issues for government in a coherent way.<br>• We could also think about a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. |
| **Other Departments** *(e.g. Basic Education, Health, Social Development and Women)* | • Other departments should be responsible for utilizing education as a means to prevent violent extremism, specifically, civic education, parenting courses and teacher training.<br>• If government is disinterested, there is scope for civil society to step in. Past experiences in collaborative efforts between government and civil society have highlighted important challenges and lessons learned in this area:<br>• **IJR's "Respect for All" program:** The pilot project was donor funded and eventually presented to the Department for Basic Education to train teachers to address issues related to racism and social cohesion. Once there was government buy-in, resources became a massive issue. The project model intended to host big training initiatives in each province with multiple contact sessions with teachers. Instead, it was a centralised process with some teachers trained as trainers and then sent back to their respective provinces to train their teachers.<br>• **South African Holocaust and Genocide Foundation's (SAHGF) education training program:** In 2007, the Holocaust became a compulsory part of school curricula. The SAHGF team saw a gap in teacher training. In order to address this gap, SAHGF launched a program in Kwa-Zulu Natal without consulting the Department for Basic Education. After realising the flaw in their approach, SAHGF has since revisited their relationship with the regional Department for Basic Education. They started a consultation process in order to determine the needs of the Department and how the Holocaust Centre could address those needs. The resulting program divides responsibility between the two entities—the Department is responsible for the logistical costs of the training workshops and the Holocaust Centre assumes responsibility for the rest of the inputs. Thousands of teachers from all provinces attend this training where they receive professional development through official accreditation and learn classroom management strategies. The success of the program is due largely to the sense of true partnership and collaboration between government, civil society, and the teachers themselves. |

WORKSHOP II

17 MAY 2017

# ABOUT THE WORKSHOP

The Swedish Embassy and ALPS Resilience co-hosted the workshop "Violent Extremism and Resilience in South Africa" on 17 May 2017 at the Swedish Residence in Pretoria, South Africa.

The workshop objective was to bring together key participants, including government, to discuss violent extremism in South Africa and to hold an initial conversation about how government, police and other national security stakeholders can put PVE into practice. PVE in South Africa is still in its nascent stages, and the workshop provided an invaluable platform for key stakeholders to engage with government and one another on this important issue.

The workshop comprised of two keynote speeches and three subsequent discussion-based activities that addressed current extremist threats in South Africa and potential institutional responses to those threats. 31 participants, representing international governments, national government and NGOs, engaged in a Q & A session with the keynote speakers, small break-away groups and a collaborative round-table discussion on these topics.

## KEY OUTCOMES

- Keynote speakers outlined the current threats and vulnerabilities facing South Africa from foreign terrorist groups and home-grown, right-wing extremists, and expanded upon the discussion of problematic terminology, for example, "radicalization" and "de-radicalization".

- Group exercises explored how civil society can assist government in PVE, highlighting the significance of further research. We need a better understanding of VE threats in South Africa and how they fit into broader patterns of violence here before we can begin to offer indigenous solutions.

- Dialogues underscored the importance of implementing PVE programs for South Africa that espouse indigenous solutions to our specific context at this juncture where we can still prevent, as opposed to counter, extremism.

# MESSAGES FROM KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

## Jasmine Opperman

***Senior Analyst at the Social Adaptation and Acceptance Initiative***

What are the current extremist threats in South Africa? This analysis is based on nine de-radicalization programs conducted on South African soil, as well as personal interviews with extremists. The motivations of these extremists were not influenced by South African foreign policy, so we cannot believe that our non-interventionist foreign policy will protect us from an attack. "Connotations of condemnation attached to radicalization" are not helpful. At the same time, "terrorism" is losing its cogency as a concept. We must engage with "extremism."

The truth is that South Africa cannot isolate itself from the international situation. South Africa cannot question whether we can expect an attack – instead we must ask how vulnerable South Africa is. In fact, our globalized communications make us more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. South Africa's vulnerability to religious extremism is an evolutionary phase in expansion. South Africa has moved from a place for terrorists to rest and regroup, to a place where there is an organized footprint ideally situated as a fall back for supporters from the Caliphate, which is imploding. Our vulnerability means we need to start focusing on the non-violent forces of radicalization as well. Right-wing extremism is constant in South Africa – a receding threat with high impact. The second generation of these right-wing extremists should make us consider lone wolf tactics.

There is no formal de-radicalization program in South Africa, but we can draw from SAAI's work to discuss how to de-radicalize individuals. The core component of working on the "soft-side" of de-radicalization is trust and giving support to the families. We need to focus on the self-actualization, on what draws the individual to extremism through the first three phases of the conviction continuum before they carry out attacks. Parents are too scared to call the police because they want to protect their children. Ideally, we should form partnerships to intervene before behavioural change – but detection is usually late. What should we do about this?

Moving away from the individual level analysis of radicalization, where is South Africa with regards to violent Islamic extremism? Conviction does not recognize nationality. South Africa now receiving calls for organized recruitment cells. However, there is no need for well-established cell structures for an attack. The Islamic State is looking for successes – and it may score points wherever it can.

So where do we go from here? Cooperation is key. We need to understand what's happening in South Africa on the non-violent side of radicalization. We need to be pre-emptive and proactive. And we need to trust that we all share the same agenda.

## Na'eem Jeenah

***Executive Director of the Afro-Middle East Centre***

What are potential institutional responses to violent extremism in South Africa? First, we should understand that there are major problems with our terminology. "Extremism," "violent extremism" and "countering violent extremism" are all problematic.

Second, we should consider violent extremism in South Africa and institutional responses to it historically. Pre-1994, violent extremism in South Africa involved political violence targeted at civilians. While some found this defensible, it raises the question of whether violence against civilians as a tactic is ever justified? This is complicated and shows the nature of extremist violence in South Africa. Post-1994, there have been two main extremist threats: PAGAD and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. How did the South African state deal with this? Intelligence, criminal investigation and good prosecution.

Third, we should consider the current context of violence in South Africa more broadly. South Africa experiences high levels of violence beyond the criminal: violence related to service delivery protests, violence related to strikes, violence related to xenophobia, etc. The push/pull factors are socio-economic. Is there an opportunity for political violence? Yes, especially in the upcoming elections. Therefore, the South African context is a violent one. If you want to deal with violent extremism in South Africa, which is very specific, then you must

# Q&A SESSION WITH KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

**Who is "radicalized" and how should the state react to individuals who are "radicalized"?**

*Na'eem:* Before we can target anyone, we have to have a grasp on what the problem is. What about our Constitution? It could give us an idea of what we need to defend, and therefore narrow our scope of what is "extremist."

**What is an indigenous solution?**

*Na'eem:* There is no "plan" for an indigenous solution, but we know we have to consider SA's history: political violence pre-1994, current violent context, massive problems of socio-economic distribution and national inclusivity.

**Could you elaborate more on the importance of youth?**

*Na'eem:* 2/3 of recruits are youth (30 or under). But that means 1/3 are not youth! However, it is undeniable that youth are more susceptible to extremist ideology. Therefore, we need solutions that are tailored more to youth.

Participant Comment: The problem with youth is also a psychological and neurological problem, not just one of socio-economic issues or inclusivity. Self-esteem plays a large role, and we have to consider where the youth are getting their self-esteem from. The problem with youth is also one of affirmation and one of masculinity, which we could say is in crisis.

It is undeniable that youth are more susceptible to extremist ideology. 2/3 of recruits are youth. Therefore, we need solutions that are tailored to youth.

**What are the common features of de-radicalization programs?**

*Jasmine:* An important feature is utilizing the support of parents, immediate family and community. At no stage do you convince the individual that their ideology is "wrong." You rather focus on what brought them to the point of radicalization and focus on turning back the clock, "self-realization" and "resetting." Trust is very important. And you must remember that de-radicalization is a time-consuming process that does not end.

deal with violence more holistically.

While there is no current threat of violent Islamic extremism in South Africa, there is recruitment. Approximately 100 South Africans have been recruited to join ISIS as fighters, teachers and families. Many have returned, and some have been forcibly returned by border patrol. South Africa's strategy for returnees is one of persuasion not persecution. Returnees are briefly interrogated, not prosecuted. Some are under surveillance. In order to defuse their beliefs, we defer to education. This is a good strategy as long as Muslim communities – specifically leadership – are also working to prevent radicalization and recruitment.

What can civil society do? To follow and promote the actions of other countries is woefully problematic. We need our own indigenous strategy. Ideological contestation is important, but leaders of Muslim communities are unfortunately not equipped to deal with countering narratives and deterring ideological extremisms.

Moving forward: As long as socio-economic issues in South Africa are not addressed, we will continue to have violence. We will not be able to stem the recruitment of individuals or fundraising for groups. We also need to address the national question of inclusivity. We need a relevant forum between government and civil society to regularly discuss this topic. This is important but may not happen before December due to internal ANC struggles over the next leader of the ruling party. Should we stop talking about de-radicalization, which carries negative connotations, and draw on the concept of politicization? South Africa needs politicized individuals! "De-radicalized" has negative connotations in part due to failed programs across the globe, and we need indigenous solutions to this problem. Instead of de-radicalizing, we should "re-radicalize" for constructive purposes, such as strengthening democracy.

# BREAK-AWAY SESSION

## The Role of Government and Civil Society in Preventing Violent Extremism

During break-away sessions, small groups of participants discussed the role that civil society can play in supporting

government to prevent violent extremism. The questions below were used as prompts, and the responses are summarized.

### How can civil society support government in preventing violent extremism in South Africa?

Civil society can assist government by conducting research. We need a better understanding of VE threats in South Africa and how they fit into broader patterns of violence here before we can begin to offer indigenous solutions. We also need better research on identified threats, specifically recruitment and the return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). While key stakeholders will never agree unanimously on threats and potential solutions, civil society can provide a common knowledge base that addresses with the complexity at hand to build consensus around competing ideas.

In South Africa, there is a disconnect in knowledge regarding violent extremism between the "experts" and the public. Civil society can contribute to educating the public on violent extremism, engaging communities on this issue and ultimately building trust – though this, of course, will not be easy. Civil society can perform other activities on the "soft-side" of PVE such as cultivating social cohesion and inclusivity to prevent marginalization and the failures of integration that we see in Europe. Civil society can also address some socio-economic issues that create discontent.

### How can we utilize existing government frameworks in counter-terrorism, social cohesion and nation-building to develop responses to violent extremism?

We recognize that there are limitations to government's engagement with this issue. Government may be keeping a low profile on purpose in certain instances, and so it is up to community leaders and civil society to PVE. That means, however, that we need to have more conversations around coordination, cooperation and information-sharing. The National Development Plan may provide an existing framework to shape our responses.

## KEY THEMES ON "PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SOUTH AFRICA"

**Evidence:**

- Development of evidence base that takes from the top and the bottom(picking up the "weak signals").
- How do we share evidence between government, civil society and the people?
- How do we build on the evidence base?

**Context:**

- High levels of violence and crime (yet low levels of extremism).
- History of political violence that was considered "extremist."
- Massive socio-economic inequality.
- Drawing on the lessons of experienced violence prevention practitioners and other violence prevention programs in South Africa.

**Drivers:**

- Socio-economic.
- Cohesion (national and social cohesion; unity; belonging; integration versus assimilation).

**Engagement:**

- How do we speak to South Africans about violent extremism?
- How much do communities know about terrorism and violent extremism? The role of education is important here.
- How do we work with communities and individuals?
- Who does the engaging? Should it be government or should civil society share the burden?
- Who drives the agenda?
- Are we engaging in international dialogues?
- TRUST, TRUST, TRUST.

**Coordination and Cooperation:**

- Government, civil society and community-based organizations need to work on this issue. There needs to be dialogue.
- Information-sharing and role-sharing.
- Hard v. soft approaches.
- Accountability is key.

# WORKSHOP III

10 OCTOBER 2017

## ABOUT THE WORKSHOP

On 10 October 2017, ALPS Resilience hosted a workshop on violent extremism and resilience in South Africa. The workshop objective was to provide participants with a better understanding of violent extremism in the South African context while promoting continued dialogue and partnership between key stakeholders on preventing violent extremism in the region.

35 participants representing civil society, national government (National Prosecuting Authority and Police) and international stakeholders listened to four panellists, whose diverse backgrounds offered the participants a holistic analysis of national and transnational extremist threats. This brief contains summaries from those presentations and highlights key themes for continued engagement.

The workshop was the third instalment in ALPS Resilience's violent extremism workshop series. It built upon our previous workshops co-hosted with the British High Commission Resilience on 23 February 2017 in Cape Town and with the Swedish Embassy on 17 May 2017 in Pretoria.

### KEY OUTCOMES

- Keynote speakers outlined different frameworks for viewing and responding to extremism, including UNDP's framework for assessing risk of terrorism at the country level, through which South Africa could be categorized as an "at-risk" country.
- Discussions defined extremism in the context of post-Apartheid South Africa, examining vulnerability in terms of larger national issues, namely social cohesion and the breakdown of the vertical social contract.
- Participants reiterated the need for implementation of PVE programs that address the underlying causes of radicalization and address peoples' vulnerabilities to recruitment as an urgent priority.

# WELCOME REMARKS

## Leigh Hamilton
***Program Officer for ALPS Resilience***

Violent extremism refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support the use of violence to achieve ideological, religious, political or socioeconomic goals. Of course, we need to begin with a disclaimer that the terminology around extremism is highly problematic. We only need to look at the recently leaked report from the FBI declaring "black identity extremists" a violent threat to the US. Our assessment of extremist threats must always be doctored with considerations for human rights and civil rights, including the freedom of speech. Nonetheless, today it is impossible to discuss international peace and security without considering extremist groups and the threats they pose. Indeed, along with climate change, extremism is likely to be the most enduring global concern of our century.

Experts agree that South Africa is not immune from extremist threats. In the context of high inter-personal and criminal violence, however, few organizations are focusing on how global extremism is affecting domestic security. Citing South Africa's non-interventionist foreign policy, key stakeholders have been cautious about developing a robust response. Regional security issues and domestic challenges including massive inequality, low social cohesion and corruption are well researched but not understood as potential drivers or indicators of extremism.

It is true that South Africa has yet to experience any significant acts of violent Islamic extremism. However, 60-100 South Africans have travelled to the Middle East to fight alongside ISIS. These individuals, radicalized online, represent a small percentage of South Africans exposed to such propaganda. While global events make it imperative to understand how religiously motivated extremism affects South Africa, stressing Islamism may be short-sighted when extremism in South Africa should be understood in all its forms (anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, the far-right, xenophobia, etc.). Understanding the broader issues of identity, social cohesion and national unity as they relate to extremism is imperative in minimizing "otherness" and fostering inter/intra-faith peace.

Engaging directly with communities who may be affected by violent extremism has remained a challenge. There is a lot of dialogue at the community level about the issue of extremism. Given the opportunity speak directly to national government, policy-makers and potential donors about the issues facing their communities, leaders of the Muslim organizations we approached eventually declined. In their opinion, presenting on behalf of their communities in front of of government and police would do more harm than good by breeding mistrust. Instead of a platform for dialogue, the workshops could be seen as an intelligence-gathering opportunity.

**This feedback proved valuable in shaping the panel, and it provided us with important lessons for moving forward:**

1. Extremism cannot be divorced from the context that fosters it. Identity, social cohesion and national unity were seen as the more important topics. This message also came through in our first two workshops in a slightly different iteration: solutions to the problem of extremism must be based on context, and they must be indigenously created. External solutions to problems that have been imposed on the community by foreign actors are not a viable option.

2. Understanding extremism means engaging at the community level, but engaging community voices takes time and resources. Support for original research needs to be prioritized.

## Dave Bax
***Program Director for ALPS Resilience***

The purpose of these workshops is not to impart startling knowledge or to offer magic bullets to the participants, but rather to bring together as many of the various actors within the PVE community as possible and create a network of practitioners who can support each other. We wish to engender a sense of community amongst all organizations and individuals who attend these functions, and we want to understand as a community how we can move ahead on this extremely sensitive subject. From our perspective, the most striking issued today it is just how little we know about radicalism within Southern Africa and South Africa specifically. We know that there are already radicalized individuals and possibly radicalized communities within the country, yet we do not have definitive information on where they are, who they are or how they are

behaving. In other words, we do not have a scope or scale of the problem.

Deeply concerning is not knowing which communities are vulnerable to radicalization and the location of high and low-risk populations. To this end, ALPS Resilience is looking to undertake mapping exercises within South Africa. The outcome of these mapping exercises would be the identification of communities at risk of radicalization, which brings with it the opportunity to engage with those communities in preventive measures before they are radicalized. As you all aware, early intervention in the radicalization process is the least expensive and most effective option. If we are not prepared with responses to radicalization, then extremist ideology flourishes and it becomes even more challenging to address the eventual possibility of violent attacks. Moreover, by that point, the costs of combatting terror increase exponentially.

Alongside the issue of home-grown, online motivated extremism and the return of fighters from Syria and Iraq is the southward movement of al Shabaab or al Shabaab-inspired elements. This movement southward along the east coast of Africa, which has come to light over the past few months, includes radicalisation within countries such as Tanzania. More ominous are the recent attacks in Mozambique on two police stations on 28 August 2017 south of Nampula and 5 October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia Municipality, which killed three police officers. According to local sources, both attacks are attributed to al Shabaab-inspired elements. These attackers displayed traditional revolutionary tactics, where poorly armed revolutionaries overpower police officers and then loot weapons from the police station. In the October incident, the men then used the looted weapons to rob a bank. These attackers appear to be local, yet have self-identified as working in the name of the Koran. With indigenously radicalized actors in Mozambique, South Africa is one porous border away from the problem. There are multiple pressures and tensions currently in Mozambique between the government and opposition groups, and it is often the case in Africa for radicalized groups to take advantage of such opportunities to expand influence. The development of large gas fields in Northern Mozambique is increasing these tensions. Using the experience of Niger Delta as an example, we know that the benefits of such developments need to trickle down to the local community to ensure that piracy, radicalism and criminality are not fuelled.

ALPS Resilience is planning to establish projects in Mozambique and Tanzania as soon as possible to map the situation with the aim of helping all actors to understand, and address at an early stage, the radicalization issues in Southern Africa. While South Africa has seen no clearly identified extremist threats in the immediate future, this situation may be changing as the seeds of radicalization are being sown in our neighbours. We need to be addressing these issues well before they germinate by identifying the communities at-risk and ensuring they have the resources to refute the propagators of radicalization. This will ensure that Southern Africa, and specifically South Africa, is not blighted by the extremist violence of West and East Africa.

# MESSAGES FROM PANELISTS

## Stephen Buchanan - Clarke

***Institute for Justice and Reconciliation***

"Recent trends in violent extremism and terrorism in Africa"

As we examine recent trends in violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, we should not divorce South Africa from the rest of the continent, as we often do. Using UNDP's approach of risk of violent extremism, we can break the continent's countries down into three categories:

1. Epicenter countries:
    - Violent extremist groups are already present and enacting regular attacks against the government and civilian populations.
    - Groups are well entrenched with significant sources of funding, expansive networks, and relatively effective recruitment strategies.
    - E.g. Nigeria, Mali and Somalia.

2. Spillover countries:
    - Suffer the effects of violent extremists operating in a neighboring country.
    - Experience regular violent attacks (including cattle raids and land-razing).
    - Experience the effects of increased numbers of refugees whose presence can feed into pre-existing tensions and conflicts.
    - E.g. Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Niger.

3. At-risk countries:
    - Have small populations exhibiting some signs of radicalization and isolated attacks or incidents.
    - May exhibit some of the same socio-economic and governance factors as "epicenter" and "spillover" countries.
    - E.g. Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

The issue with the UNDP model is that it looks at risk geographically (in expanding concentric circles). As we've seen with massive migration flows and recruitment online, the geography of at-risk countries cannot be determined by proximity to epicenter countries. This assertion is supported by the data. While the peak of people dying from terrorism between 2014-2016 is in 2014, the number of countries to experience at least one death from a terrorist attack during that period increases each year. What does this tell us? The purely military approach to epicenter countries moves terror around instead of solving the problem. We see an increase of spillover countries and at-risk countries.

## We can use case studies to further support this assertion.

1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region:
    - The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2010, has claimed the lives of roughly 22,000 people.
    - Since 2014, under the leadership of President Buhari, an overhaul of Nigeria's counter-insurgency strategy and improved regional coordination under the Multi-National Joint Task Force has severely diminished the group's ability to hold territory within Nigeria.
    - However, since 2014, the group has expanded their operational footprint in the neighboring Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region, including Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Collectively, these countries have experienced a 145% increase in terrorist attacks between 2014-2015.
    - The root causes of insurgency remain largely unaddressed while massive displacement and destruction across the North has seen a rise in intercommunal violence and exacerbated ethnic divisions. We have created a negative peace.

2. Al Shabaab in East Africa:
    - Al Shabaab emerged in 2005 as an insurgent group against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. However, over the last decade, the group has expanded into Kenya and Tanzania, and launched attacks in Uganda.
    - The group has steadily lost ground over the past six years to the now 22 000 strong AMISOM forces deployed in Somalia.
    - However, in recent months, al Shabaab has increased its attacks on African Union bases, Somali government facilities, targets in neighbouring Kenya, and for the first time, also launched attacks in the northern Puntland autonomous region. There is also concern over the revival of collaboration between al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

3. AQIM in the Sahel:
    - Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) formed in Algeria in 2006, after the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat declared allegiance to al Qaeda central.
    -
    - Since then, the organization has been particularly active in Northern Mali, taking advantage of the region's porous borders and illicit networks to run its operations.
    - Operation Serval and other military interventions have had some success in disrupting their operations in Mali, however, the group has responded by expanded their area of operations and carried out attacks in the Cote d' Ivoire and Burkina Faso with the intension of stretching French military capabilities.
    - This grouping poses a considerable threat to stability and security across the region but especially Mali, Niger, Cote d' Ivoire and Burkina Faso

While national or regional frameworks for preventative measures to violent extremism have been developed, they have not been implemented effectively. This includes SADC. Unfortunately, we do not yet have a good understanding of how to identify and promote resilience among specific "at-risk" communities; how recruitment and radicalization occurs at the local and individual level; and, what is becoming increasingly important, how recruitment occurs over the internet.

South Africa is an at-risk country. It has been linked to transnational violent extremist networks such as

Al Shabab, al Qaeda and, more recently, ISIS. There is evidence to suggest that South Africa serves as a logistical hub for transnational violent extremist networks. Factors that make South Africa attractive in this way include its role as a transport, business and communications hub on the continent; the ease of travelling on a South African passport relative to other African passports; high levels of corruption; high levels of internet connectivity and a well-established telecommunications sector; its proximity to illicit and unregulated trade networks in the region; and low levels of corporate awareness of terrorism funding mechanisms.

There are also threats of terrorism from local organizations with local grievances. The far-right today is not as organized and cohesive as it was, and therefore not as much of a threat. However, there are small groups who espouse far-right ideologies based on principles of racial segregation hostile to transformation and co-existence. The success of nationalist and right-wing political parties in Europe and the rise of the Alt Right in the US may serve to reanimate the far-right in South Africa.

## Barend Prinsloo

***North-West University***

"Nation-building in SA according to the intelligentsia: failures, threats and opportunities"

In academia, we use frameworks to help us understand violence. Examples include Liberalism and Realism. We can also use identity politics as a framework. More specifically, we can look at the concepts of nationalism and multiculturalism in South Africa to understand our risk for political violence. In South Africa, we see the failure of multiculturalism (not conforming to the dominant cultural identity). At the same time, there is no singular dominant national culture. Instead, there are divergent understandings of identity espoused by the elite (the decision-makers, who generally create the national identity) and the intelligentsia (individuals enrolled at universities). States become more vulnerable to political violence when its various elite and societal groups are increasingly fragmented.

In order to investigate how the elite and intelligentsia construct national identity in South Africa, the concept of national identity is broken into indicators in five categories: Idealism, Rationalism, Revolutionism, Social Identity and Realism. The South African Government's policies around the creation of a national identity can be found in the Pre-amble of the Constitution, Chapter 15 of the National Development Plan and the 14th Appendix of the MSTF. While the elite still espouse a non-racial "rainbow" nation, there are obstacles that prevent the elite's vision from materializing: cultural equality, cultural inclusiveness, equal prosperity for all cultures and cultural supremacy. Overall, the intelligentsia do not support the elite's conceptualization of a national South African identity. "Fees must fall" is a prime example of what can happen when there is tension between the two groups. Minority groups will take special measures to protect their own cultural identities and interests.

While the government is attempting to construct nationalism among the populace, this policy direction is not accepted by the intelligentsia. The government's reaction to this rejection is securitization, which is deeply problematic. This situation is unsustainable and may lead to further political violence. The focus should not be on emphasizing similarities between people, but on de-emphasizing the differences between groups within the population.

## Masana Ndinga-Kanga

***Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation***

"Defining Extremism in the context of post-Apartheid South Africa"

What do we mean by extremism? Extremism is the mode of communication about an underlying experience driven by social, economic, political and religious views. Those characterized as extremist often experience multiple levels of marginalization and have complex relationships with vertical and horizontal power structures. Extremism then is the mode of mobilization around that marginalization. The argument that follows is that addressing violent extremism means addressing the conditions that make it a viable mode of communication in the social contract.

The social contract is the agreement between states and society on their mutual roles, rights and responsibilities. In post-Apartheid South Africa, service delivery and the realization of rights, justice and equality form a large part of the social contract. The currency of "rainbowism" is intricately linked to the capacity of the state to delivery of services to all people. The fact that the state is unable to deliver services to certain groups leads to a fractured cohesion. What we see in South Africa are emerging counter-narratives to the espoused political narrative of "rainbowism" based on how

people are actually experiencing the state. Service delivery protests can be understood as a mode of communication over grievances.

"Rainbowism" doesn't work. "Extremist" counter-narratives that have emerged include white alienation, neo-black consciousness, marginalized voices and minority groups (though it can be difficult to understand these as extremist when their grievances are legitimate). The core conflict issues are service delivery and economic participation. Extremism in South Africa does not exist in a vacuum. It is intimately linked to perceptions of the state, the self and the other. It originates along the fault lines of social, economic and political exclusions.

Social contracts, both vertical and horizontal, become useful frameworks for understanding extremism. When social contract between state and society breaks down, the horizontal social contract determines the scope of the response against the state ("the smoke that calls"). In addition, frustration with the vertical social contract articulates itself a breakdown in the horizontal social contract (as interpersonal racist encounters, right-wing politics, xenophobic attacks, etc.). In South Africa, the legitimate marginalization is used for local politicians to further their needs with violence. The issue is that they use the violence against the "low hanging fruits" in a conflict – those already most vulnerable (refugees and foreign migrants).

### We can be done?

**Short-term: Eliminate the immediate utility of violence**

- Strengthening local government is paramount
- Unanimous condemnation of "othering" by local government
- Appropriate use of police services

**Medium-term: Ensure that legitimate needs are addressed**

- Get IDP process right
- Open and collective budgeting and use of state resources
- Integrated community policing mechanisms

**Long-term: Structural changes**

- Education and employment
- Accountability
- Justice over development?

## Peter Knoope
*Clingendael*

"What are the drivers that attract individuals to join ISIS?"

The dominant strategic approach to counter-terrorism since 9/11, which has cost 15 million dollars per hour, is not working. Securitization and military responses have largely failed (and had we spent the money on conflict transformation, the world would be a different place). While ISIS is experiencing military defeats in Iraq and Syria, it does not mean that they are finished. It simply means that they are moving to places like Afghanistan and Africa. What attracts individuals to join ISIS? Why have 40,000-50,000 people from all over the world joined ISIS?

Google will tell you that explaining recruitment is specific to geography; the response to a mix of local grievances and frustration with international victimhood; involves the perception of exclusion (economic, cultural, historic); and is triggered by a small incident at first, which morphs into a larger collective humiliation and "us" versus "them" polarization. Individuals experience a disturbed relationship between themselves and the state and are attracted to ISIS by the proposition of power, influence, future and relevance, and comradeship (and in some instances money, social pressure or coercion).

The real explanation is time. Extremists have a different vision of this basic concept. Time evokes the unfinished business of the past and the export of colonial domination into modern state institutions and the international development paradigm. Past traditions offer stability and collective, yet localized, identities constructed around religion and culture. Modernity threatens to destroy these identities and replace them with ideas of secular progress. Modernity is individualistic, market-driven, international, unavoidable and unaccountable. It offers no horizontal social contract, but rather isolation. Boko Haram is about the rejection of a religion and culture that was imported. Boko Haram, "education is evil," refers to the imposition of Christian education on Muslims in Nigeria.

Post-colonial independence, in theory, offered liberation, political identity, solidarity and perspective. In reality, post-colonial Africa is characterized by disappointment, de-legitimization of the state, and

the disconnect between the citizen and the state. Failures of the state have driven a resurgence in tribalism and reversion to traditional identities. The bankruptcy of modern justice systems has also been an important driver. Extremist groups are easily able to gain public support by fulfilling the social contract that the state has largely ignored. Providing support through financial, religious, infrastructure, education and service delivery initiatives has allowed them to penetrate everywhere.

### We can be done?

- Reconnecting state and citizens (state security versus human security);
- Work with resilient majority and civil society;
- Reintroduce values as guiding principles for social contracts. ?

# Q&A SESSION WITH PANELISTS

**Why do Niger and Nigeria have such different experiences with violent extremism? Does it have to do with differing perceptions of their respective security sector (with mostly positive perceptions in Niger and mostly negative perceptions in Nigeria)?**

The survey data used to understand perceptions of the security sector is now outdated (from 2014), so it does not help us answer questions around the extremist developments in the region since 2015. However, we can say that police in Niger do a good job overall, and it does matter if police are the same ethnic or religious group as the communities they populate.

**Aren't the UNDP classifications for extremist risks too static? Is there a way that the UNDP can provide for some measure of flexibility?**

UNDP categories are problematic, but it is a starting point for the conversation. Spillover and at-risk countries don't necessarily make sense given current vast migration patterns and online recruitment strategies. Years ago, a small incident in Northern Tanzania would remain isolated. That is not so today.

**Have there been successes in CVE on the continent?**

One is example is **a radio broadcast show in Northern Nigeria**, which was able to reach an incredible amount of people in their local language (the first ever to do so). It has now been expanded to include Cameroon and Niger. The radio broadcast is a celebration of indigenous cultures and provides people with a sense of pride in their own culture. It is an example of working with the resilient majority and civil society to counter extremist narratives, where the amount of people reached is incredible. Boko Haram defectors who preach against the group are also very effective.

There are also plenty of good **best practices:**

- **Early warning** is imperative. The earlier you intervene, the better. Once people get into the extremist mindset, it is hard to change them.
- **Identify the recruiter.**
- **Work with local leaders** to counter-message. You need to connect leaders from the state with local leaders and build good relationships between them. **There has to be trust between the government and local communities** so that the communities will go to the government and talk to them if there are issues.

**What lessons do these successes offer for South Africa?**

- Removing the low-hanging fruit, specifically arms.
- Identify the psycho-social actors in the community who have legitimacy. These are not the usual suspects (elderly women, male youth).
- Place an emphasis on justice, but litigation should be the final resort. Rather pursue capacity-building of local government to deal with justice issues.

**Early warning is imperative. What about early childhood intervention, such as proactive self-esteem workshops?**

Early warning and early action is important. Trusted government presence in communities is important. However, we need to stress that – if there is a real grievance – it needs to be addressed.

In South Africa, look at the **Integrated Crime Prevention Strategy (Department of Social Development)**, where community policing forums cannot necessarily meet with Department of Social Development of Department of Basic Education. This is a problem. When you prevent, you need to get all Departments involved. Find out who the most responsive change-makers are. Is it local, provincial or national governments? Don't forget the importance of gender and communicating with the women in extremist groups.

# THE WAY FORWARD

## STRATEGIC PLANNING

During the first workshop, participants collaborated on an action plan to further the PVE agenda in South Africa. It has been modified below to reflect the recommendations of participants from the second and third workshop, which were gathered during discussion sessions and feedback surveys.

| Priority Actions | Considerations |
|---|---|
| **Establish a forum or working group** of subject-matter experts and key stakeholders. | • What is the identity of the forum? No one is really looking at the issue of extremist violence, and that could be a niche (as opposed to xenophobia, which many people work on).<br>• Develop a shared agenda, a common objective and a shared understanding of the problem.<br>• Fill it with the right people.<br>• Work together by forecasting scenarios and identifying potential entry points for intervention. |
| **Conduct key research** on the drivers of VE in South Africa, international best practices regarding PVE and other types of successful interventions in South Africa. | • An understanding of the profile of potential violent extremists is needed. The socioecological model used by WHO can help understand violence.<br>• We need to understand which communities are most at-risk. Baseline research is needed to establish which communities are the most susceptible to extremism and why.<br>• It might be worth considering commissioning someone to do a research paper on VE in South Africa. The research paper then becomes the starting point that brings people together. |
| **Conduct follow-up workshops**. | • Hold workshops on specific topics that South African government representatives and violence prevention practitioners identified as areas where they need more information, such as understanding online recruitment.<br>• Sustain the engagement and opportunities for like-minded people to network.<br>• Address the community level - Use solutions that communities and NGOs propose and align them with the Constitution and the National Development Plan. Indigenous solutions to indigenous problems.<br>• Join conversations at the international level. |
| Ideally, we would **develop an integrated framework** for preventing violent extremism in South Africa in partnership with government. | • Best practices suggest that PVE must be multi-sectoral with buy-in from several government departments, bringing together traditional security actors with educators, health care professionals, etc. |

## CONCLUDED REMARKS

In investigating transnational and domestic extremist threats, it is clear that the relationship between the citizen and the state is central. The state's ability to deliver services and foster an inclusive national identity impacts how resilient communities within the state are to extremist ideologies. In South Africa, where the state has failed in its vision of "rainbowism" and over half the country remains in poverty, we are vulnerable to extremist threats. In 2018, ALPS Resilience will host another workshop series on violent extremism to continue providing a platform for learning and dialogue on this important topic. Parties interested in partnering should contact our Program Officer, Leigh Hamilton, for further information (Leigh@resilience.africa).

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