ALPS RESILIENCE

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

A Rapid Risk Assessment Concerning the Resilience of Vulnerable Communities against Violence

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Contents

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

Acronyms

ALPS	ALPS Resilience
BRAVE-14	Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism Scale
CCM/CUF	Chama Cha Wananchi or Civic United Front
CEEI-UJC	Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais - Universidade Joaquim Chissano (Centre for Strategic and International Studies – Joaquim Chissano University)
ENH	Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (National Hydrocarbons Company)
FDS	Forças de Defesa e Segurança (Defence and Security Forces)
GIATOC	Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime's
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (National Institute of Statistics)
ISCAP	Islamic State Central Africa Province
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
MRM	Montepuez Ruby Mine
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics - Tanzania
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

Executive Summary

In recent years, the eastern region of Southern Africa has gained attention as at-risk to violent extremism. ALPS Resilience (ALPS) has been monitoring the situation closely. However, firm information has been scant and means to reliably understand the rise of Islamic extremism in the region has been limited. In this context, ALPS has developed a survey tool that measures the risk and protective factors of communities to violent extremism. In its first round – conducted in Pwani, Tanzania and Nampula, Mozambique – and covered in this report, the survey can be used to guide social and community resilience programming to prevent violent extremism; can inform our understandings around pathways to support violent extremism; and can build on pre-existing community resilience at the community-level. The survey offers an important tool in the fight against the rise of violent extremism in the region, and – following this proof of concept survey – can be scaled up and utilized in other districts and provinces in the region.

Regional Context

A combination of historical grievances tied to perceptions of socio-economic, political and resource marginalization, as well as inter/intra religious and ideological tensions in Northern Mozambique and Tanzania, have created favourable conditions for extremist ideologies to take root in both countries. In addition to these push/pull factors, porous borders and illicit trade networks between the two countries have enabled the growth and spread of extremist sentiments in the region. In Tanzania, this likely played a role in violence committed by an underground group targeting government and ruling party officers between 2015 and 2018, which left feelings of insecurity among authorities and civilians alike. Over 40 people were killed, many in the Pwani Region of Tanzania, and a securitized response in the form of a harsh police crackdown, including enforced curfews, did not prevent the continuation of brazen attacks. In Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province in Mozambique that borders Tanzania, a group of men seemingly affiliated with an enigmatic fundamentalist Muslim group, *Ansar al-Sunna,* began a stream of attacks on Mozambique's Defence and Security Forces (FDS), infrastructure and civilians in October 2017. The attacks are still ongoing in 2019. They have been gruesome, and the violence has terrorised communities. Compounding this issue, government responses to the violence in Mozambique have including human rights abuses and censorship.

There are many explanations for the emergence and development of these violent attacks; and it is likely that most of them hold some truth. Many analysts suspect one or more of the following interrelated claims:

- The socioeconomic marginalization of rural communities in Cabo Delgado and Pwani led to the rise of religious extremism within Muslim communities.
- Conflict and grievances over the exploitation of natural resources through extractive industries in Cabo Delgado, such as mining and liquefied natural gas production, are now expressing themselves through violent attacks.
- Organized criminal activity has sustained violent extremist groups in Pwani and Cabo Delgado.
- The violence is linked to militant groups in neighbouring African countries.

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

The Study and Recommendations

In 2018 and 2019, in an effort to understand drivers of resilience against and risks of violent extremism among young people in the regions affected by the attacks, ALPS Resilience began the study "Rapid Risk Assessment and Resilience of Vulnerable Communities against Violence." The study utilizes an attitudinal survey tool adapted from Michelle Grossman and Michael Ungar's Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (or BRAVE-14) measure for the Southern African context. In 2019, the first round of the adapted survey was implemented in four districts in Nampula province, Mozambique – Erati, Lalaua, Mecubúri and Memba - and in the district of Kibaha in Pwani Region, Tanzania. Unlike conventional approaches, which aim to identify the root causes that push or pull individuals towards violent extremism, this survey identifies the sources of resilience that individuals and communities draw upon, that enable them to withstand and recover from adverse situations. As the first adaptation of the BRAVE-14 measure in an African context, and a measure of resilience that can inform programmatic interventions that build upon communities' assets, the survey is an innovative and important tool in preventing violent extremism.

Overall, the survey found high levels of resilience in the five districts in which the study took place. It also provided greater insight into which factors of cultural identity and connectedness, bridging capital, linking capital and nonviolent beliefs and behaviours build resilience against radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups among specific groups in the two regions. Resilience factors pinpointed in the disaggregated and subfactor findings included:

- Very strong nonviolent beliefs and behaviours in the sample populations;
- Strong bridging capital among Muslims and Catholics in the four districts in Nampula, indicating that continued interfaith trust, confidence, support and engagement can play a strong role in both groups' resilience during this challenging time;
- Strong bridging capital among Swahili language speakers in Pwani;
- Strong trust in authorities and community organizations, agency within the community, and access to resources outside of the community (i.e., linking capital) among the populations in both regions, especially among active members or leaders of community organizations and longstanding residents in Kibaha; and
- Strong cultural identity and connectedness among the Wazaramo ethnic group and Swahili home language speakers in Kibaha and among all four districts in Nampula.

Risk factors identified from the data include:

- The proximity of cyclone-affected areas, such as the Erati and Memba Districts in Nampula, to the epicenter of the attacks;
- Low involvement in group activities among Nampula respondents;
- Censorship in and around Nampula;
- Inequality in northern Mozambique; and
- Potentially low cultural identity and connectedness among Wakwere and smaller minority groups in Kibaha.

Based on the findings of this study, ALPS Resilience recommends tailored responses based on the disaggregated overall and subfactor BRAVE-14 scores in each district, as well as two broader responses in both regions.

- Firstly, asset-based community development should be aimed at (1) mitigating the threats and challenges that face northern Mozambique and Pwani and (2) building upon the uncovered, existing resources of resilience uncovered in five sites through this study.
- Secondly, violence prevention programming in the region should draw from each community's strong nonviolent tendencies.

A Survey of Communities at Risk of Violent Extremism in Tanzania and Mozambique

1 Introduction

Violent extremism remains a significant threat to international peace and security and no country is immune to its impact. This holds true for countries across the African continent. A combination of historical grievances tied to perceptions of socio-economic, political and resource marginalization, as well as inter/intra religious and ideological tensions in Northern Mozambique[1] and Tanzania, have created favorable conditions for extremist ideologies to take root. In addition to these push/pull factors, porous borders and illicit trade networks between the two countries have enabled the growth and spread of extremist sentiments in the region.

As one of Southern Africa's few organizations focused on developing strategies for preventing violent extremism (PVE) in Southern Africa, ALPS Resilience (ALPS) began tracking violent attacks occurring in the Northern Provinces of Mozambique and the Pwani region of Tanzania in 2017. ALPS concluded that research comparing protective and risk factors for young people's resilience to violent extremism in the communities experiencing the attacks was required. In 2018, building on valuable lessons learnt from a pilot survey conducted in Cape Town and through generous support from our donor, ALPS designed a survey with this objective in mind. ALPS adapted Michelle Grossman and Michael Ungar's survey – the Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (or BRAVE-14) measure – for the Southern African context.[2] The resultant attitudinal survey was implemented in Nampula province, Mozambique and Pwani province, Tanzania. Unlike conventional approaches, which aim to identify the root causes that push or pull individuals towards violent extremism, this survey identifies the sources of resilience that individuals and communities draw upon, that enable them to withstand and recover from adverse situations.

As the first adaptation of the BRAVE-14 measure in an African context, and a measure of resilience that can inform programmatic interventions that build upon communities' assets, the survey is an innovative and important tool in preventing violent extremism.

This report contains the findings of the study "Rapid Risk Assessment and Resilience of Vulnerable Communities against Violence." Young women and men in communities often seek opportunities to invest their potential, they are often negatively affected by poverty, marginalization, unemployment and under-employment, and often find themselves lacking the necessary literacy, capabilities, and skills to overcome these issues. This makes them a vulnerable target of recruitment by violent extremist groups that exploit their frustrations and vulnerability. In light of this, the youth (15-35) of Mozambique and Tanzania were chosen as the primary survey population.

The results of the survey enable ALPS to systematically identify existing resilience resources and vulnerabilities among youth in districts of Nampula as well as the Kibaha district of Pwani, allowing for future projects to strengthen these resources of resilience. ALPS Resilience hopes to use these results to build community partnerships that support civil society organizations and local NGOs' efforts to develop effective, meaningful, evidence-based, youth-focused activities. In addition, these findings may be used to support sustainable ways of identifying communities' resilience resources and vulnerabilities over the long-term. Lastly, the survey is a strategic tool to help guide the implementation of programs focused on strengthening resilience to violence amongst young people and communities. There is much evidence that community-based approaches are highly

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[1] Pirio, Pittelli & Adam, 2018.
[2] Grossman et al, 2017.

effective for building resilience in the most violent of settings;[3] however, they remain an underutilized resource, particularly in the arena of violent extremism. It is essential to adopt an approach that raises awareness amongst community leaders and policymakers surrounding resilience; how it pertains to their specific or unique circumstances; and how sources of resilience, resist factors of radicalization and reduce propensities to violent extremism.[4] The results of this survey can critically inform community leaders and policymakers in doing so.

After Section 1 (introductory section) here, the report is broken down into the following sections:

Section 1 provides an overview of the risk factors to violent extremism and sources of resilience that increase protection against or reduce the risk of radicalization. This is followed by a brief description of the regional contexts of Cabo Delgado and Nampula province in Mozambique and the Pwani region of Tanzania.

Section 2 presents a situational analysis of the study areas, outlining the onset of violent extremism in Mozambique and Tanzania, theories behind its emergence and the risk factors that have enabled and/or exacerbated violence in both regions.

Section 3 explains the research methodology utilized for this survey and includes a description of the BRAVE-14 measure and how it was adapted to the African context. The section concludes by detailing the sample populations and any limitations to the study.

Section 4 presents fieldwork progress and challenges met in the field.

Section 5 provides a demographic breakdown of the survey respondents, all aggregated and disaggregated BRAVE-14 scores, and additional results.

Section 6 builds upon the results discussed in Section 5 to highlight the emerging findings of this round of the survey.

In conclusion, **Section 7** offers recommendations and suggestions for future programmatic responses.

1.1 Violent extremism and resilience

Violent extremism is a highly contentious and contextualized phenomenon. As such, it has been defined in various ways by global and national governing bodies. In this report, violent extremism is defined according to the UNESCO definition, as "the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals."[5] Violent extremist movements promote these ideas and actions and wield (or strive to wield) considerable social, cultural, political and even economic power in a community or society.

Risk factors for violent extremism almost never stand alone. A multitude of situational and socio-cultural factors – for example, bad governance, grievances and perceived victimization, religious and ethnic divides, and socio-economic discrimination and marginalization – must align to cause a violent extremist movement to develop.[6] In addition, individual factors – such as identity, sense of belonging, cognition, and socialization

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[3] Mirahmadi, Farooq & Ziad, 2010.
[4] Longstaff et al, 2010.
[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2018.
[6] Allan et al, 2015.

around violence as productive - may prompt someone to join an extremist group and perhaps even to commit acts of violence on its behalf.

Resilience *against* violence is the capacity of family ties, social networks and both formal and informal leadership to prevent and counter incidents of violence.[7] Resilient communities find it easier to adopt new processes, norms, and strategies for conducting their lives and new societal relationships in response to violent shocks, aggression, or brutality. This ability to 'bounce back' can help communities prevent, mitigate, or recover from violence.[8]

A crucial gap in research on resilience to violence has been the collection and analysis of statistically valid data to provide scientific evidence for how young people operationalize resilience to violent extremism through their everyday, multilevel social and institutional interactions. Most previous studies have focused on community-level vulnerabilities to violent extremism and radicalization and on the push and pull factors that influence one person's trajectory toward or away from violent extremism.[9] However, an ecological view, focused on how characteristics of one's social environment can either lead to or diminish involvement in violent extremism, allows for greater focus on the resources and capacities that have helped communities, particularly youth, to reject extremist narratives and social influences.[10] Grossman et al. found that resilience to violent extremism could be understood by examining five strengthening factors: 1) cultural identity and connectedness; 2) bridging capital; 3) linking capital; 4) violence-related beliefs and 5) violence-related behaviors. The factors are described briefly below:

- Strong **cultural identity and connectedness** are characterized by familiarity with one's own cultural heritage, practices, beliefs, traditions, values and norms; knowledge of mainstream cultural practices, beliefs, traditions, values and norms if different from own cultural heritage; having a sense of cultural pride; feeling anchored in one's own cultural beliefs and practices; feeling that one's culture is accepted by the wider community; and feeling able to share one's culture with others.
- **Bridging capital** is characterized by trust and confidence in people from other groups; support for and from people from other groups; strength of ties to people outside one's group; having the skills, knowledge and confidence to connect with other groups; valuing inter-group harmony; and active engagement with people from other groups.
- **Linking capital** is characterized by trust and confidence in government and authority figures; trust in community organizations; having the skills, knowledge and resources to make use of institutions and organizations outside one's local community; and ability to contribute to or influence policy and decision making relating to one's own community.
- Resilient **violence-related behaviors** include willingness to speak out publicly against violence; willingness to challenge the use of violence by others; and rejection of violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts.
- Resilient **violence-related beliefs** include the degrees to which violence is seen to confer status respect and is normalized or well-tolerated for any age group in the community.

These factors all increase an individual's protection against – and reduce their risk for – radicalization and involvement in violent extremist behaviour. Actors in regions vulnerable to violent extremism who hope to implement preventative programming that builds communities' resilience require information about each of

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[7] Walwa, 2018:125.
[8] Van Metre, 2016.
[9] Grossman et al, 2017.
[10] Weine, 2013.

these factors. If the strength of each of these factors can be determined together with local residents, interventions can be purposively designed to build on community resources where they are robust and to reinforce weaker their sociocultural assets where it is needed.

1.2   Regional Context

In 1998, Tanzania experienced its first large-scale terror attack when bombings of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam as well as Nairobi, Kenya killed an estimated 224 people.[11] Since then, Tanzania has been described as a country of peace and stability when compared to its regional neighbors, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda.[12] Nevertheless, Tanzania has experienced a rising number of militant Islamist attacks since 2012. In Mozambique, an insurgency has been emerging since October 2017, with violent attacks being committed at an increasingly rapid rate. In both countries, especially in Mozambique, the attackers have not been easy to identify. Victims in both regions have typically been state actors, such as police and security forces and political officials. However, in Mozambique and since 2018, civilians have increasingly become targets of attacks. The violence is focused in rural areas of Southern, coastal Tanzania and Northern, coastal Mozambique. It is possible that the attackers on either side of the border shared by Tanzania and Mozambique are affiliated groups that have been in contact with one another and perhaps even share personnel or ideologies. Indeed, it seems probable that they have had contact with through both regulated and unregulated migration. Government responses in each country have also been similar: restricting the rights of civilians and harshly cracking down on alleged extremists.

In addition to the recent violence, both regions are plagued by narratives of socio-economic and political marginalization, weak institutions and poor governance. These tensions have been framed in polarizing religious terms: the social, economic and political marginalization of Muslims and Islam provide favorable conditions for extremist groups to exploit.

1.2.1   Pwani, Tanzania

In Tanzania, between 2015 and 2018, violence committed by an underground group (called "bandits" in official press briefings) targeted government and ruling party officers left feelings of insecurity among authorities and civilians alike. The period was characterized by killings of civilians, government and party officials, police and military personnel, as well as by robberies and abductions.[13] Criminal acts potentially related to the violence included poaching, bank and mobile money shop robberies.[14] Most recently, in February 2018, three people, including a police officer, were killed by a group of bandits at a farm and forestry levies collection centre at Jaribu Mpakani in Pwani Region. In April of the same year, eight police officers who were deployed there from Morogoro Region to bolster security were ambushed and killed as they were returning to their base from patrol. In mid-June 2018, a local leader and two villagers in Nyamisati village, Kibiti District, Pwani were abducted and shot at by unknown gunmen. Two weeks later, the chairman and executive officer of Mangwi Village, also in Kibiti, were killed in cold blood by armed men, according to sources in the area. The killers also shot and blinded the chairman of a sub-village and a former Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)[15] ward chairperson was shot dead outside his home in Nyambunda village.

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[11] Counter-Extremism Project, 2019.
[12] LeSage, 2014: 1.
[13] Jingu, 2018:96.
[14] Ibid., 94.
[15] CCM is the dominant ruling party in Tanzania

The total number of those killed in the area since 2014 has risen to over 40 people, according to The Citizen newspaper. The list includes local government leaders, local CCM leaders, police officers and civilians. At the height of the attacks in 2017, then Home Affairs Minister Mwigulu Nchemba established a special police zone in Kibiti in a bid to deal with the crisis head on.

A securitized response in the form of a harsh police crackdown, including enforced curfews, did not prevent the continuation of brazen attacks. Security forces eventually scattered elements of the group and pushed them into Mtwara, a neighbouring region of Pwani to the south which borders Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Through a series of arrests, the network of the group became visible to police, who claimed that many of the youth committing crimes in Kibiti were coming from Tanga, Pwani's neighbouring region to the north.[16]

The group committing the attacks was never officially linked to violent extremism: public statements by security services and political leaders framed incidents as criminal, but not terrorist.[17] The group never claimed allegiance to a terrorist group. Community stakeholders have also expressed greater concern with "politically motivated violence, criminality, and conflicts over land" than with violent extremism.[18] However, the United States Department of State considered the attacks in 2017 to be "terrorist incidents."[19] The perpetrators have also been linked to violent attacks occurring in Mozambique that have been considered terrorist.

Most of the attacks have occurred in **Pwani**, an Eastern coastal region of Tanzania that is peculiarly decentralized. Pwani is characterized by insular communities that lack a strong, connecting regional hub. This isolates its inhabitants both economically and politically. Socio-political warning signs of attacks in Tanzania existed long before the violence began in 2015, when criminal activities in the region increased between 2004 and 2014.[20] Analysts attempted to flag the threat of "militant Islamist attacks" and potential damage they may cause to peace and stability, with local and regional conflict heightening the risk of extremism, to no avail.

Pwani Region forms one of 31 administrative regions of Tanzania. It is sub-divided into seven districts with a total population of 1 098 668, according to 2012 national census data.[21] Primary activities in the region are centered around agriculture (subsistence and commercial farming), including maize, cassava and cashew nuts which form part of Tanzania's major agricultural exports.[22]

Unorthodox, fanatical Islamic doctrines began to gain popularity at least a decade before the attacks in Tanzania began.[23] A radical group called *walokole wa Kiislamu* ("Islamic revivalist") emerged and attempted to encourage new followers through preachers, including in Pwani.[24] Their radical teachings caused conflict in mosques and led *walokole wa Kiislamu* to separate themselves from mainstream mosques. The increase in sectarianism between Ansar, Shia and Sunni Muslims helped the group retain followers from various sects.[25] Their grievances were further fueled by other religious groups preaching intolerance against them.[26] It is this group that has been

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[16] Dang, 2019:13.
[17] Eriksen, 2018:32.
[18] Dang, 2019:1.
[19] United States Department of State, 2018.
[20] LeSage, 2014:1.

[21] Dataforall, 2019.
[22] Nkonya, & Barreiro-Hurle, 2013: 5-6.
[23] Jingu, 2018:95.
[24] Ibid., 96.
[25] Walwa, 2018:131.
[26] Jingu, 2018:96.

linked with *Ansar al-Sunna,* after several instances of migrants from Tanzania with ties to *walokole wa Kiislamu* being arrested in relation to the illicit economy and/or the attacks in Mozambique.[27]

Strengthened by these sectarian divisions, the new *walokole wa Kiislamu* mosques primarily recruited, indoctrinated and militarily equipped youth.[28] However, people of all genders have played a role.[29] Young men in the group are responsible for fighting, recruitment and surveillance at target places and high-traffic areas. Women are wives, informants and recruiters. Children who join the organization are trained for these roles. Most members are responsible for gathering intelligence in some capacity. Many elders have not embraced their new teachings; however, they are undermined by youth and the minority of older people who agree with the new sect. Youth have been indoctrinated to respect elders less and to follow the violent beliefs of the group.[30] Some older women who work as *Kungwi*, preparing girls for adulthood, are part of the group and have allegedly socialized girls and young women to the ideology. In cases like these, existing social roles have reinforced these new roles and decreased suspicion.[31]

Finally, little local security and peace infrastructure in Pwani has impeded the state security's ability to "interact with communities and gather intelligence."[32] In the past, Muslim Tanzanian communities' strong cohesion made for a powerful early warning and response mechanism. They were guided by the moral teachings of their leaders and "maintained a united front."[33] However, divisions within the community have eroded that power, making Muslims who feel marginalized by their former religious communities vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by *walokole wa Kiislamu.*

With conditions in Pwani similar to those in Mozambique (detailed in section 1.2.2), potential explanations for the violence (albeit to a lesser degree) are also similar. These theories are explored below, in Section 2. Given these similarities to Mozambique, as well as the activities of the radical group *walokole wa Kiislamu* in Pwani and concerns over the terrorist nature of the violent attacks between 2015 and 2018, the region was chosen for this study investigating resilience to violent extremism among youth. More details regarding the area selected and the methodology of the research are in Sections 3 and.4

1.2.2   Northern Mozambique context

Porous borders, endemic poverty, and proximity to South African markets make Mozambique's population vulnerable to organized criminal elements.[34] Conflictual political flare-ups, narco-trafficking, human smuggling, and trade in illicit/endangered animal products also threaten stability and security in the country and surrounding region. Despite their historical importance to Mozambique's narratives of nationalism and liberation, the northern provinces have lagged developmentally from the rest of the country. According to data gathered from the 2014/15 household budget survey, the Northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia are significantly less educated, poorer, and less likely to have viable economic opportunities than the Central and Southern provinces.[35] Although life expectancy in the region is growing,

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[27] Haysom, 2018.
[28] Jingu, 2018:96.
[29] Ibid., 101.
[30] Walwa, 2018:132.
[31] Jingu, 2018:102.
[32] Walwa, 2018:130.
[33] Ibid., 104.
[34] OSAC, 2017.
[35] World Bank Group, 2018: 23

inequality is increasing as well – despite the gap between rich and poor decreasing throughout the South of the country.[36]

Compounding the inequalities faced by Mozambique's Northern provinces, on 5 October 2017, a group of men seemingly affiliated with an enigmatic fundamentalist Muslim group, *Ansar al-Sunna*,[37] began a stream of attacks on Mozambique's Defense and Security Forces (FDS), infrastructure and civilians in Cabo Delgado that are ongoing in 2019. Following the first attacks, members of the sect moved into the bush, from which they attack isolated villages along the coast. In 2018, the brutality and quantity of the attacks intensified, and the group became more organized.[38] Since the first attack, over 200 people have died from violence in six districts of Cabo Delgado, and many more have been injured.[39] Most of the violence has taken place in districts situated along the province's northern coast.[40] The group's tactics have included bands of six to ten militants burning houses, attacking vehicles and murdering civilians using machetes, axes and, in some cases, AK47s.[41] The attacks have been gruesome: some victims have been dismembered and beheaded post-mortem,[42] and some killings have left evidence of organ trafficking.[43] Men, women and children have been executed and, in some cases, women have been kidnapped. The violence has disrupted schools and terrorized communities.[44]

The attacks seem to be strategic, moving closer and closer to urban centres. Some attacks have targeted fishing villages, where the attackers have made use of boats to approach through nearby rivers. Other, more recent attacks have included public transport (carrying passengers), private trucks, and motorcycles.[45] In late April 2019, Cyclone Kenneth flattened parts of Cabo Delgado, particularly along the coast. Following the cyclone, the insurgents began attacking health workers and supply trucks and stealing humanitarian aid.[46] The highest single death toll of the insurgency so far has been a highway ambush on 31 May 2019, when a truck was bombed and insurgents fired shots, killing 16 people.[47] The FDS had been responding, but unsuccessfully and with considerable human rights violations of suspected insurgents. In addition to threatening the livelihoods, safety and security of Cabo Delgado residents, these attacks threaten Mozambique's long-term strategy for democratization and development.[48]

It is important to note that the motivations behind these attacks and the background of *Ansar al-Sunna* are not well-understood. The majority of the information presented regarding the group is based on well-evidenced theories, but little concrete knowledge exists regarding their funding streams, formation, make-up and motives. On the most basic level, it has been difficult for journalists and authorities to confirm whether some of the attacks have actually taken place. However, this uncertainty does not negate the need to measure and support the resilience of surrounding communities to recruitment and indoctrination efforts of *Ansar al-Sunna*, as one component of a greater strategy to prevent future attacks.

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[36] Vines, 2019.
[37] Also known as *Ansaru-Sunna*, meaning 'defenders of tradition' (Haysom, 2019:3), as well as *Al-Shabaab* (meaning 'the youth'; not linked to Al-Shabaab in Somalia), *Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamo*, *Ansar al-Sharia*, *Al Sunna wa Jama'ah*, and *Swahili Sunna*.
[38] Morier-Genoud, 2019.
[39] Mawar & Omar, 2019c.
[40] Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2018.
[41] Omar, 2019a.
[42] Mawar & Omar, 2019b; Omar, 2019d.
[43] Mawar & Omar, 2019c; 2019e.
[44] Carta de Moçambique, 2019c.
[45] Carta de Moçambique, 2019f.
[46] Omar, 2019d.
[47] AFP-JIJI, 2019.
[48] Louw-Vaudran, 2019.

Estimates of the size of the group vary depending on sources, from around 300 to as high as 1200. Reports say that adherents have a uniform and distinctive appearance, wearing white turbans, robes and long black shorts; shaving their hair; and sporting large beards. Some reports indicate that most of the Mozambican members of are from the Mwani ethnic group, who are particularly affected by coastal resettlement due to the extractive industry.[49] Others member seem to be young immigrants from Tanzania, Somalia and the Great Lakes Region. Various origin stories exist about the group, including conflicting reports that they originated locally in Cabo Delgado and that they came to Mozambique from Kibiti, Tanzania. It seems that the members are trained both locally – sometimes by disaffected police officers and security guards – and externally in Tanzania and the Great Lakes Region by militia chiefs hired by al-Shabaab in Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia.[50] They are 'armed with white weapons to symbolize jihad'.[51]

Following over four months of intensified violence in the area, a cyclone ripped through Cabo Delgado and Nampula in April 2019, devastating thousands of lives in the northern provinces. Cyclone Kenneth negatively impacted the agricultural sector, food security and critical infrastructure in the region, including roads and bridges that link rural towns. This includes energy production, as Cahora Bassa Hydro-electric facility – a major source of energy in the Northern region of Mozambique and the greater Southern African region – suffered damages that impacted the entire region.[52] Preliminary data from the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) shows that Cyclone Kenneth caused 43 deaths, 94 injuries and affected 249,984 people in Cabo Delgado and left the population exposed to cholera and other health risks. In Nampula, 3527 residents from Erati and Memba Districts were also affected.[53] The economy was left extremely vulnerable, which could impact the severity of the insurgency as well. In the current aftermath, the region struggles with unstable fishing market; fields destroyed by rains and insurgents burning them; skyrocketing product prices; outages in telecommunications infrastructure and electricity; and demolished housing.[54] A long recovery period, along with potential mismanagement of humanitarian funds,[55] does not bode well for the security of the region.

There are many explanations of the insurgency's emergence and development; and it is likely that most of them hold some truth. Many analysts suspect one or more of the following interrelated claims:

- The socioeconomic marginalization of rural communities in Cabo Delgado led to the rise of religious extremism within Muslim communities.
- Conflict and grievances over the exploitation of natural resources through extractive industries, such as mining and liquefied natural gas production, are now expressing themselves through violent attacks.
- Organized criminal activity has sustained the group and made the government complicit in its survival.
- The insurgency is linked to militant groups in neighboring African countries.
- Government responses to the violence, including human rights abuses and censorship, have increased anti-government sentiments in communities vulnerable to marginalization and isolation, shielded the group from exposure, and likely legitimized ideological claims around using violence to achieve its goals.

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[49] Mwani means 'beach.'
[50] Fabricius, P. 2018.
[51] Fabricius, 2018.
[52] African Development Bank Group, 2019.
[53] Omar, 2019d; *Carta*, 2019e.
[54] *Carta*, 2019d.
[55] Bata, 2019.

Although the survey conducted in this study seeks to measure young people's resilience against violence-related beliefs and behaviors, it is important to recognize that resilience factors (i.e. youth and communities' cohesion, socio-political capital and perceptions of violence) occur in a wider context that may exacerbate these factors. Therefore, each of the above-listed risk factors will be explored to paint a picture of the socioeconomic, cultural and institutional trends that are interwoven with the findings of the survey.

1.2.2.1   About Cabo Delgado, Mozambique

The province in which the attacks are taking place, **Cabo Delgado**, is the most isolated province in the country. It is the furthest north, lacks infrastructure linking it to the more economically active South, and faces intense economic and educational inequalities. It has a total population of 2 320 261.[56] Historically, early settlements in Cabo Delgado traded with the Arab world and neighbouring regions of present-day Tanzania, allowing for the spread of the Swahili language and the Islamic faith in the region.[57] Islam remains prevalent (58.72%) in the province, before Catholicism (39.34%), Protestantism (1.6%) and Zionism (0.33%).[58] The coastal province also holds historic significance to Mozambique and to the dominant ruling party, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front, hereafter Frelimo), as one of the centres of Mozambican nationalism and the liberation movement. In 1964, a raid by Frelimo of a Portuguese administrative post in Chai, Cabo Delgado, marked the beginning of the armed struggle against the colonial regime. During this period, the Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa were a stronghold for Frelimo, providing support during the formative stages of the liberation movement in the form of a rural network through which critical supplies, strategic information and recruits to Frelimo flowed between the region and neighbouring Tanzania.[59] To this day, the Northern provinces remain a strong political base for Frelimo, which continues to be the dominant political party in Mozambique. However, rising dissatisfaction and growing support for the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (National Resistance of Mozambique, hereafter Renamo) threaten this dominance.[60]

Economic activities such as transportation and manufacturing industries are largely concentrated in the port city and Cabo Delgado's provincial capital, Pemba. Smallholder subsistence agriculture and a small-scale fishing industry remains the mainstay of the province.[61] However, with the discovery and future extraction of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique is predicted to boom economically over the next decade. This could transform the economy of the province. However, local populations are less optimistic about this opportunity: marginalization and potential inequitable distribution of revenues threaten the stability and livelihoods of communities in the province. The issues surrounding LNG in Cabo Delgado are explored more fully in section 2.1.2. In addition, a pre-existing illicit economy ranging from the mining of precious stones, illegal logging, drug smuggling, wildlife and human trafficking, have exacerbated an already volatile environment.[62] Together, a combination of poverty and inequality; a lack of basic service delivery; extractive mining activities; and illicit transnational criminal networks have compounded social and economic grievances making it a rich recruiting environment for violent extremist groups in Cabo Delgado. A lack of competent and

[56] National Institute of Statistics, 2019:16
[57] Bonate, L. 2010: 574.
[58] National Institute of Statistics, 2019a.
[59] Isaacman, A., & Isaacman, B., 1983.
[60] Mozambique News Agency, 2015.
[61] Anadarko, 2014.
[62] Pirio, G., Pittelli, R & Adam, Y. 2019

transparent institutions and accountable processes have further contributed to the rise of the militant group and weakened the province's ability to respond to it.[63]

In the face of recent attacks and destruction by Cyclone Kenneth, interfaith relations in Cabo Delgado have come to light. Relationships built between Muslims and Catholics in the city of Pemba, for example, are nothing new. One priest from the Maria Auxiliadora Catholic Church, which housed 1000 displacees of different faiths after the cyclone, explained that, "Cyclone Kenneth is not the first calamity to bring people of different faiths together in the province. When the Islamic extremists intensified their attacks on local communities last year, Muslims and Christians organized joint prayer meetings and opened an inter-faith dialogue center."[64] These strong relationships have the potential to bolster resilience against shocks from both violent attacks and natural disasters.

Given the volatile situation caused by the attacks over the past two years, Cabo Delgado was the originally intended study site for this project. However, as described in section 4.1.1, ALPS was unable to access Cabo Delgado for this round of the survey. We have since resolved these issues and developed networks and partners in Cabo Delgado. Therefore, we are able conduct the survey in Cabo Delgado in subsequent rounds.

1.2.2.2   About Nampula, Mozambique

With an estimated 5 758 920 inhabitants, **Nampula** is the most populous province in Mozambique, divided amongst 2 965 843 951 (51.5%) women and 2 793 076 (48.5%) men.[65] As of 2007, Catholicism was the predominant religion (46.83%), followed by Islam (45.05%), Protestantism (6.32%) and Zionism (1.8%).[66] Originally called Moçambique during Portuguese colonial rule, Nampula city served as a strategic military base for the Portuguese in the fight against Frelimo during the Mozambican War of Independence. Upon independence in 1975, Mozambique was adopted as the country's new name and the national capital relocated to Lourenço Marques, present day Maputo. The province was renamed Nampula – derived from the name of a traditional leader, Whampula and the regional capital of the same name.[67]

Regarded as "the Capital of the North," Nampula is the commercial hub of the region, with Nacala Port and the Nacala railway system serving not only the northern region, but also landlocked Malawi and Zambia.[68] Furthermore, Nampula has an international airport with direct flights to South Africa, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. Nevertheless, with markets concentrated in Nampula city, wealth is skewed in a largely peri-urban/rural province whose primary economic activity revolves around subsistence agriculture. As a result, poverty remains one of the highest in provinces such as Nampula (65%), well above the national average (48.4%).[69]

While attacks have not yet occurred in Nampula, authorities are concerned that some Mozambican-born attackers in Cabo Delgado are coming from the province, leaving the region at-risk should attacks expand. Additionally, the province is far more accessible to researchers than Cabo Delgado, given both the risks posed by the attacks and censorship imposed by the security regime (discussed further in section 2.4.2 and section 4.1.1). As such, the initial round of the survey implemented in this study was conducted in Nampula.

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[63] Vines, 2019.
[64] Associated Press, 2019.
[65] National Institute of Statistics. 2019b.
[66] National Institute of Statistics. 2019a.
[67] Republic of Mozambique2019.
[68] Africa Ports, 2019.
[69] World Bank Group, 2018: 23

Photo 1 Nampula Province

2 Situational Analysis

2.1   Land and Resources in northern Mozambique

Over the past two decades, natural resources have proven their great potential to improve Mozambique's economy and uplift many in resource-rich northern provinces from poverty. These resources include minerals, such as rubies in Cabo Delgado, to more recently discovered natural gas deposits off the Indian coast of the province. As news of these discoveries spread, the interests of international businesses in Mozambique multiplied. Year-on-year foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country's extractive industry rose from USD 1.2 billion in 2000 to USD 38.5 billion in 2017. While the mining sub-sector has received the most investment in the past decade, new investments in liquified natural gas (LNG) are switching those trends in favor of the natural gas sub-sector.[70] However, residents struggling to make ends meet in Cabo Delgado have, so far, failed to see the benefits of these gains themselves. Insecure land rights[71] pose a threat to residents' stability and to the burgeoning natural resource industry in the region. Local distrust and negative perceptions of powerful figures attempting to push locals from their own land has already spurred protests in Palma. If residents are not included in the natural resource economy - through legal pathways for artisanal miners, job training for opportunities in LNG or other innovative solutions for inclusion - they may develop deep grievances around these economic developments. Natural resources may be a catalyst for residents concerned about being forcibly relocated from their land by these big investments, missing out on jobs they are yet not skilled to do, or losing their livelihoods in illegal extractives. Lack of justice for local communities in these new developments could lead to additional recruitment to *Ansar al-Sunna's* militant activities or other challenges in the region.

2.1.1   Mining in Cabo Delgado

Ruby mining in the Montepuez District of Cabo Delgado may be one of the industries causing tensions in the area. Both government officials and researchers believe that the rise of *Ansar al-Sunna* is directly linked to the removal of artisanal miners[72] from ruby fields.[73] Firstly, illegal ruby mining by locals and migrants on Montepuez Ruby Mine (MRM) land, owned by British company Gemfields, has led to accidents and been a common destination of labour trafficking.[74] Miners operating illegally live in precarious economic conditions and may also be subjected to abuse by formal mining operations, such as Gemfields. It is no secret among jewel auction houses that rubies mined from the Namanhumbir area of the MRM ruby deposit were labelled "blood rubies" in 2017.[75] Even miners and residents who are not involved in illegal activities are not necessarily safe: the company's security forces have also been accused of committing human rights abuses against Montepuez residents and miners' property.[76] Recently, the company settled a legal case in which it compensated victims of

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[70] Chilingue, 2019c.
[71] Pirio et al., 2019.
[72] Miners operating without a legal permit.
[73] Pirio et al., 2019.
[74] *LusaNews*, 2019b; 2019d.
[75] Maolela, 2019.
[76] Pirio et al., 2019.

abuse (including 273 cases which involved murder, beating and/or burning property) and resettled thousands of citizens from the MRM deposit.[77]

2.1.2   Oil industry in Cabo Delgado

Although the oil industry is just emerging in Cabo Delgado, it has great potential to further increase tensions in the region, if the industry fails to operate in harmony with communities' best interests. Time will tell whether the natural gas exploration consortium about to commence the largest LNG project in Mozambique's history, Rovuma Area 1, will operate accordingly. Anadarko, an American oil company, is leading the consortium, holding 26.5% of the investment. The National Hydrocarbons Company (ENH), Mozambique's state oil company, holds 15%. Other holdings are owned by companies in Asia, including Mitsui (of Japan) which holds 20%.[78] However, Anadarko was recently bought by Occidental Petroleum and plans to sell its assets in Africa. Therefore, Total of France will take over leadership of the project at the end of 2019. The project's final investment decision of the Mozambique LNG Project (as the consortium's project is officially called)[79] The project will now advance to the infrastructure construction phase, with sights set on extraction, liquefaction and export operations beginning in 2024.

The potential of the liquified natural gas industry to transform Mozambique's economy is immense, if the risks are effectively counter-balanced and citizens can reap the benefits of its revenues. Standard Bank predicts that LNG in Rovuma alone will attract between USD 27 and 32 billion in FDI to the country.[80] Depending on the capital goods investment (CAPEX) scenario, LNG from Rovuma could increase the country's growth rate from 4% to between 4.8% and 5.4%.[81] The project will directly create about 21,800 jobs, mostly in construction, as well as indirectly create jobs through various value chains and reinvestment activities.[82] Analysts have called for extractive industry revenue to be invested in the poorest populations at mineral extraction sites.[83]

At a seminar organized by the Bank of Mozambique and the International Monetary Fund in March 2019, President Filipe Nyusi said that Mozambique can earn approximately USD 49.4 million in state revenue over the life of several natural gas exploration projects.[84] The president noted the risks: natural gas is not renewable; revenues will depend on the volatility of the international market; and, as long as the country maintains a large infrastructure deficit, it will struggle to receive much money at once.[85] However, the Mozambican state wields considerable control over these outcomes; it regulates and holds shares in several projects in the oil and gas sector, including Rovuma Area 1.[86] At the seminar, the president also presented a three-part plan for LNG to benefit all Mozambicans:

- *Saving:* Modelled on Sovereign Funds created by other countries, these savings may be used as a buffer if international gas prices drop and will also be used when the gas runs out.
- *Channelling funds to state budget:* A proportion of the revenues will be allocated within the state's current budget, specifically towards financing infrastructure and social projects.

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[77] Carta de Moçambique, 2019a.
[78] *LusaNews*, 2019f.
[79] *Carta*, 2019i.
[80] Fim de Semana, 2019.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Chilingue, 2019c.
[84] Chilingue, 2019c.
[85] Chilingue, 2019c.
[86] Ferrão, 2019.

- *Economic diversification*: The Mozambican government will also focus on strengthening other sectors in the Mozambican economy, especially the agricultural sector, thereby preparing for shocks in the oil industry and the inevitable depletion of resources.

In addition to this plan, a national law requiring local peer-to-peer competition, local contracting and local labour in the oil industry in Mozambique may eventually come into effect. The law has been debated in government since 2007, with some businessmen lobbying ministers not to support it.[87] Essentially, it remains to be seen whether Mozambique can avoid the resource curse.

The leaders of the Mozambique LNG Project have acknowledged the deep losses to communities that both physical and economic displacement by the project could cause. They have also emphasized the potential the project has at the micro-level to transform the local economies and build communities resilience. It has developed a multi-volume resettlement plan that aims to "undertake resettlement in a manner that gives physically and economically displaced households the opportunity to improve or at least restore their livelihoods and standards of living."[84] The plan was developed through comprehensive consultation and engagement with communities, in accordance with – and perhaps even beyond – the requirements of Mozambican policy. The plan responds to both the settlement and livelihood needs of people affected by the project due to (1) territorial displacement from land that served housing or economic purposes, (2) loss of access to marine environments that disrupts fishing industries, and (3) relocation of evictees to host communities.[85] Additionally, as part of corporate responsibility not linked to displacement, the project has supported a participatory health education initiative in Palma and community-led capacity-building within the education sector in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Maputo.[86]

However, resettlement is surrounded by both perceptions and realities of diversion of funds for the displaced; insufficient payment for land; no compensation for locals' previous investment in orchards; and the loss of livelihoods and social ties for resettled households. Additionally, resettlement in Mozambique has extremely poor cultural connotations. Under Portuguese colonialism, the Portuguese military used "villagization schemes" to re-settle and control rural populations. Mozambique's current land tenure system leaves resettled smallholders vulnerable to capture of land by elites. These potentially conflictual elements are further exacerbated by tension among locals over whose land is whose. Pirio et al. suggest that the attacks on local communities may be "revenge killings motivated by the disputes over land access and perceptions of social status."[88]

If community leadership, ownership and participation in the resettlement processes remain as robust as they were in the development of the resettlement plan, and if more opportunities arise for their inclusion in the Mozambique LNG Project that demonstrate that the resettlement by Anadarko is not akin to the villagization schemes and other abuses that communities have suffered, it could effectively mitigate the risk that compounding grievances from the project could have of facilitating recruitment to *Ansar al-Sunna*. If not, given the insurgent group's current momentum in the region, there is a risk that suffering communities may see the group as an effective outlet for expressing their grievances and changing their situations outside of the pathways to recourse provided by the project. Already, recurrent attacks by the militant group in Cabo Delgado pose great risks to the Rovuma Area 1 project. Violent incidents will affect multinational corporations' abilities to establish and license operations in the region,[87] especially after workers building the LNG installations in Cabo Delgado were victimized, presumably by *Ansar al-Sunna*, in February 2019.[88] And local communities will struggle to associate the violence they are experiencing with anything other than the beginning of foreign financial

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[87] Chilingue, 2019b.
[88] Pirio et al., 2019.

interest in the extractive industry near their homes.[89] However, since the insurgency has only attacked workers, and not investment, the plan continues to be to increase security as necessary.[90]

Other threats to destabilization around Cabo Delgado's LNG production include secretive activities by security role player Frontier Services Group. The Hong Kong-based firm is run by Blackwater founder Erik Prince. Frontier Services Group partnered with ENH a few months ago and has been hired to strengthen security and logistics around the new Rovuma Area 1 project.[89] However, Prince has ties to abuse by the US military during the Iraq war, the Chinese and Venezuelan states and natural resource industries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This has caused speculation over whether it is in Prince's security company's best interests to contribute to destabilization in the region.[90]

2.2 Organized crime in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique

Apart from the legal side of the natural resource economy, organized crime in the illicit economy of minerals and more has allowed *Walokole wa Kiislamu,* and *Ansar al-Sunna* to thrive.[91]

In Tanzania, Pwani and surrounding regions already had a history of organized crime;[92] so, it was likely easy for *walokole wa Kiislamu* to obtain funding through the illegal poaching, logging and charcoal businesses, especially in the Selous Game Reserve.[93] It has also been found that profits from the cashew industry have funded illegal activities. Furthermore, *walokole wa Kiislamu* bribed communities with illegal resources (charcoal) and leveraged existing conflicts of class and land, especially in the Rufiji River Basin, to gain the confidence, complicity or silence of communities.[94] In a context of abuse of power by police and government officials, who have greater class status and manage natural resources, it was not difficult for the group to obtain local complicity.[95] Additionally, the group only resorted to violence when the government cracked down on its illicit economic activities.[96]

In the case of Cabo Delgado, this may have even helped the group emerge. However, much of the research findings available about organized criminal activities has not been verifiable. This section contains unconfirmed information, mainly from the findings of the GIATOC's report Mozambique's vulnerabilities to organized crime.[97]

It is unclear how *Ansar al-Sunna* is being financed. According to Pereira et al,[98] the group earns between 3 and 30 million USD per month through the illegal trade of minerals, logging, drug trafficking and wildlife poaching. This seems highly unlikely, given the rudimentary weapons used by the group and description of their appearance. Therefore, instead of *Ansar al-Sunna* controlling a major contraband trade, it is believed that they have benefited from the opportunities the extensive illicit economy in the region provides. An in-depth study

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[89] *Carta*, 2019j.
[90] Mosse, 2019.
[91] Haysom, 2018; Eriksen, 2018:32.
[92] Eriksen, 2018:32.
[93] Jingu, 2018.
[94] Ibid., 99.
[95] Ibid., 98.
[96] Haysom, 2019:20.
[97] Haysom, 2018.
[98] Pereira et al, 2018.

on criminal networks in east and southern African coastal regions identified northern Mozambique as particularly vulnerable, especially Cabo Delgado as it is furthest north. Poorly policed borders and patrolled waters have allowed for a significant local heroin-trafficking economy to emerge in the province facilitated by high levels of corruption.[99]

Illegal activity by *Ansar al-Sunna* has included wildlife poaching, drug trafficking, illegal mining and human smuggling.[100] Attempts to reduce smuggling and illegal trade have thus far been unsuccessful. In addition to the illicit economy, the GIATOC has found that small businesses across both Cabo Delgado and Nampula potentially provide donations, laundered through an international mobile money transfer service called Taaj Money, which is not registered in Mozambique.[101] Most of these donations have been traced through Mogadishu and Dubai to Khartoum, Sudan, where some of *Ansar al-Sunna's* members are attending university. In 2018, according to the GIATOC's findings, about 50 Mozambican students, including from Nampula and Cabo Delgado, attended the International University of Africa in Khartoum.[102] Like most foreign students at the university, they received financial support from Muslim benefactors through Taaj Money, due to economic sanctions preventing money transfers between Sudan and other countries.

Unemployed and undereducated youth are particularly vulnerable to participating in illegal trading activities. *Ansar al-Sunna* offers them employment, scholarships or cash for joining the movement.[103] Their training in other countries is also funded by the insurgent group. It seems that the group also offers loans; however, apparently, men who take interest-free loans are obliged to assist when the movement calls on them.[104] Those who do not repay the debt or answer when called to join in a fight make themselves, their families and their villages targets for attacks. Allegedly, it is these men who are frequently reported beheaded in the aftermath of a gruesome attack. However, information about the funding sources of *Ansar al-Sunna* is still surrounded by many questions, and this information requires deeper investigation.

Corruption, illicit trade and extremism have reinforced one another in northern Mozambique.[105] It is a deadly cycle: bad governance and corruption have allowed rule of law and service delivery to decline and failed to increase livelihood opportunities. Naturally, this has led to the marginalization and exclusion of the population of Cabo Delgado. With neither hope of change nor an appropriate place to express grievances, vulnerable individuals (especially unemployed youth) likely feel that the militant group's ideology justifies their emotions and that their social connections with the group have given them greater senses of belonging than, say, their nationality or religion. The group sustains itself on and provides jobs to people within the illicit economy.[106] When government officials themselves take bribes to facilitate the movement of illicit goods across borders, corruption increases; this bad governance continues to fuel the downward spiral of the region.

Ansar al-Sunna may be "more economically and socially embedded than previously believed and may now rely on an organized collection of donations" across Cabo Delgado and Nampula. [107] While illicit flows in the region and their connections to *Ansar al-Sunna* are still under investigation, the consequences for Mozambique would

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[99] Haysom et al, 2018.
[100] Haysom, 2018.
[101] Ibid., 18.
[102] Ibid., 19.
[103] Ibid., 17.
[104] Ibid., 18.
[105] Ibid., 13.
[106] Ibid., 13.
[107] Ibid., 1.

be multitudinous, beginning with porous land and sea borders.[108] The Mozambican government's potential complicity in the illegal economy could also undermine its legitimacy and erode law and order, allowing the militant group to flourish. These dynamics present opportunities for insurgents to make livelihoods while living in extremely isolated areas. Based on the current situation, the illicit economy will likely continue to grow, taking the insurgency with it. This could make northern Mozambique a base for attacks in places further afield and could assist in the expansion of other criminal networks in the process.

2.3 Migration & international links between militant extremists in Tanzania, Mozambique and elsewhere

There may be strong parallels between the emergence, youth recruitment mechanisms, involvement in the illicit economy, ideological justifications and sectarianism of *Ansar al-Sunna* and the background of the *walokole wa Kiislamu* group in Pwani, Tanzania:

> *"Although we cannot say for certain that all this activity – stretching right up to Kenya – is linked, there is certainly cause for concern. These could be independent developments, shaped by similar pressures, with disaffected groups finding the obvious ways to raise funds in their local economies... But if this is the case, we should at least be asking why there has been an increase in attacks by these groups (in Tanzania) and the emergence of a new militant group (in Mozambique) in the same period, in a cross-border region linked by trade, language and religion."[109]*

Exchange between Muslim clerics and communities in Tanzania and Mozambique is common, so it is unsurprising that radical Muslim Tanzanians and Mozambicans connected with one another across the border in the 2010's. Moreover, it could have been anticipated that some radicals from Tanzania who feared the strong security response of the Tanzanian government in 2015 and 2017 would flee to Mozambique.[110] Of the roughly 450 people who have been rounded up in dragnet arrests in relation to *Ansar al-Sunna* activity, around 45 are Tanzanian, 4 Somalis, 3 Ugandans, 1 South African, and 1 Gambian. Currently, 131 of those arrested are being tried on terrorism charges by a special military court in Pemba. For example, in September 2018, 50 Tanzanians were among 180 suspects in a trial over attacks in Cabo Delgado. The detainees were allegedly also responsible for 2016/2017 murders of police officers and administrative officials in Pwani, and 104 of them were caught attempting to cross into Mozambique from Tanzania.[111] The detainees were accused of "homicide, use of prohibited weapons, crimes against state security, and public disorder."[112] In response to claims that attackers were travelling between Tanzania and Mozambique, the FDS has strengthened Mozambique's border with Tanzania with greater surveillance and border control.[113] Additionally, it entered into an agreement with the Tanzanian People's Defence Force in early July 2019 to carry out joint operations related to the insurgency in the border area of the Rovuma River.[114]

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108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Morier-Genoud, 2019.
111 AFP, 2018.
112 Human Rights Watch, 2018b.
113 *Carta*, 2019h.
114 *Carta*, 2019k.

In December 2018, claims that foreigners were implicated in the insurgency intensified when Mozambican prosecutors named three non-Mozambicans, Andre Hanekom (South African), Chafim Mussa (Tanzanian), and Adamu Nhaungwa Yangue (Tanzanian), among the insurgent group's leaders. The group faces charges of murder, crimes against the state and inciting civil disobedience, among a slew of other offences. According to the charge sheet, all of the suspects, except Hanekom, "confessed that the group intends with their armed actions to create instability and prevent the exploitation of natural gas in Palma, and later create an independent state, which annexes the districts of the northern region of Cabo Delgado and the south of Tanzania."[115] The prosecution alleged that the individuals are tied to at least five separate attacks, and that Hanekom was responsible for the group's logistics, including payment of monthly salaries equivalent to $160 and provision of medicines. In response to the news from Mozambique, then South African Foreign Minister Sisulu called upon the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (also known as the Hawks) to investigate the arrest of Hanekom. Hanekom died in 2019 following a dramatic capture and hospital stay.

There is further evidence that migration beyond Mozambique and Tanzania is fueling the insurgency. In 2018, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) detained three Mozambicans linked to attacks in Cabo Delgado. In Uganda, the ambassador to Tanzania and Mozambique, Richard Kabonero, said that Uganda is trying to extradite six Ugandan suspects linked to a camp in Mocímboa da Praia. In a more recent incident, in June 2019, local authorities in the DRC detained 12 Mozambican youth on suspicion of involvement in terrorist groups. The young people were allegedly meant to receive military training in the DRC and then return to Cabo Delgado. Some of the detainees were from Macomia and Montepuez, and others were from Nampula.[116] Unfortunately, the ability of Mozambique's National Migration Service (SENAMI) to deal with the migrancy aspects of the insurgency must be doubted, given ongoing revelations of corruption within the service.[117]

In addition to migration between Mozambique and Tanzania, the prospects of either developing a business around oil and mining, or illegally exploiting those resources, has brought many newcomers, both documented and undocumented, to northern Mozambique from Tanzania, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Asia.[118] Unfortunately, this has also placed migrants in Cabo Delgado at risk of xenophobic sentiments and action. In May, the General Commander of the Police, Bernardino Rafael, and more recently President Nyusi, blamed foreigners – especially Tanzanian and Congolese nationals – for the financing of attacks and joining the militant group.[119] While is unclear how xenophobia may affect *Ansar al-Sunna*, it is possible that vigilante or mob justice may become another dimension behind the violent attacks. Despite the government's irresponsible speculation, *Ansar al-Sunna* insurgents have allegedly attended training in other African countries, deepening the group's ties with extremist networks outside of Mozambique. However, it is not yet clear to what degree the group has links to regional/international terrorist organizations.

In a (perhaps unsurprising) twist, the Islamic State claimed (IS) responsibility for an attack on the FDS in Metubi in Mocímboa da Praia on 3 June 2019, under the banner of the so-called Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP).[120] Before this, alleged ISCAP attacks were limited to the DRC. The first was in April 2019, when ISIS claimed an attack in the DRC, declaring it the "Central Africa Province" of the caliphate."[121] IS's contested claim about the attack in Metubi comes at a time when, despite the destruction of the physical caliphate, the individuals and ideologies that inspired it and the resources that financed it. There have been

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[115] Ritchie, 2019.
[116] *Carta*, 2019g.
[117] Omar, 2019f.
[118] *Carta*, 2019h.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Alfonso, 2019; Opperman, 2019.
[121] Postings, 2019.

unconfirmed links between ISCAP and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Congolese rebel group linked to an al-Qaeda ally. During this time, the Ugandan anti-terrorism authority raised concerns that the ADF had trained Ugandans in northern Mozambique, who then returned to Kampala.[122]

The Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), which is part of the FDS, stated that IS's June 2019 claim was untrue. Several analysts also refuted the claim but acknowledged the gravity of the claim itself. **Mohamed Yassine**, professor at the Higher Institute of International Relations of Mozambique (ISRI), stated that IS would not target Mozambique because their purpose is to reinstate sharia in supposedly Islamic countries; but Cabo Delgado and the rest of Mozambique are secular, and Islam is not practiced by a majority in Cabo Delgado.[123] Yassine stated that, if IS were to carry out an attack in Mozambique, it would require assistance from more "local" groups, such as Al-Shabaab or Boko Haram; but these groups do not have 'organic' ties to IS. **Saíde Abibe**, a researcher studying violence in northern Mozambique, stated that the attacks in Cabo Delgado are locally rooted, and refuted the IS claim as 'mere propaganda.'[124] **Dr. Fernando Jorge Cardoso**, an Africa specialist at the Centre for International Studies (CEI-IUL) at the University Institute of Lisbon, acknowledged that "some Islamist groups in Mozambique" may feel represented by IS, but that does not mean that there is movement of armed IS fighters to the region.[125] The propaganda does, however, benefit both IS and *Ansar al-Sunna*. **Jasmine Opperman**, Director of the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium in South Africa, explained that IS wants to reinforce the notion that it has not been defeated, despite its implosion.

Essentially, IS wants its followers to know that it sees Mozambique fitting into its strategy. It will likely make similar claims in the future.[126] Indeed, on 3 July 2019, IS once again claimed an attack in Nangade district, Cabo Delgado, which took the lives of seven individuals.[127] So, while it is debated whether the IS is active in Mozambique and whether it actually carried out the attacks, it is clear that the claim will draw attention to the region, potentially attracting new recruits and resources to *Ansar al-Sunnah*.

While Nampula is further from the border, its proximity to Cabo Delgado, and deep scars from armed political conflict between Renamo and Frelimo,[128] make it vulnerable to future insurgent activity facilitated by weak borders and migration from across the country. As mentioned above, some youth from Nampula have already been caught attempting to receive military training abroad and return to *Ansar al-Sunna* in Mozambique. Other youth from the province may also be funded by *Ansar al-Sunna* to travel abroad to study at the International University of African in Khartoum, Sudan.[129]

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[122] Daily Monitor, 2019.
[123] *Lusa News*, 2019e.
[124] *Lusa News*, 2019e.
[125] AFP-JIJI, 2019.
[126] Opperman, 2019.
[127] AFP, 2019.
[128] Lawyers without Borders, 2019:15.
[129] Haysom, 2018:19.

2.4 State responses to violent extremist phenomena in Cabo Delgado and Pwani

In both regions, and more so in Cabo Delgado, abuse by authorities of journalists and alleged insurgents has been uncovered on multiple occasions. These abuses demonstrate the regions' wider vulnerabilities to corruption and human rights violations.

2.4.1 Human rights abuses

Along with gross human rights violations committed during attacks by the insurgents themselves, human rights abuses by police and military in both regions have also become a clear challenge in efforts to defeat the groups. In the detention of suspected *Ansar al-Sunna* members, security forces have physically and institutionally abused suspects since August 2018.[130] FDS soldiers on the ground have allegedly detained people arbitrarily before handing them over to police, tortured them and carried out extra-judicial killings in isolated areas, such as forests.[131] People accused of carrying out attacks have also been tortured to the point of paralysis, head trauma and even death while in prison.

In August, suspects in attacks in rural areas of Cabo Delgado's Nangane district were detained in the woods and, rather than being taken to jail, were brought to military barracks and questioned.[132] Some were killed. FDS soldiers in Macomia district have also confirmed killing suspects on "orders from superiors."[133] These allegations emerged in Pemba in September 2018, during the trial of a large group of Mozambicans and foreign nationals suspected of carrying out attacks. These violations were said to be taking place in isolated rural areas, where higher-level orders could be denied. The police also denied questioning individuals in military barracks. However, in November, the Mozambican National Human Rights Commission sent a team to the prisons where defendants in suspected insurgent cases are held. The team documented severe overcrowding, where prisoners had to sleep standing up, and other human rights abuses. President Nyusi has publicly condemned previous alleged security force abuses against suspected Islamist insurgents, but no one has been held to account.[134]

Additionally, there has been evidence of vigilante justice in Cabo Delgado, where villagers take matters into their own hands and murder suspected insurgents without any form of a trial or investigation.[135] Without following procedures according to Mozambican laws, mob justice can also become a violation of suspects' human rights.

Similar circumstances have raised concerns in Pwani, Tanzania. Local communities have become aware of executions of suspects by police and security forces.[136] They worry about securitized and extrajudicial responses

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[130] Human Rights Watch, 2018b.
[131] Mawar, 2019.
[132] Human Rights Watch, 2018a.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Mawar & Omar, 2019d.
[136] Dang, 2019:1.

to violent extremism. They also lack trust in the police due to widespread corruption, abuse of authority, and excessive use of force.[137] Community policing by the Tanzanian Police Force is impeded by "a lack of resources, inconsistent application, and an overemphasis on intelligence gathering."[138] Without strong relationships, "community policing efforts to prevent violent extremism can easily become elaborate informant programs open to abuse."[139] The police and communities need a shared understanding of VE and greater trust; otherwise community policing could play a role in increasing VE.

2.4.2   Censorship

In Cabo Delgado, the provincial government has imposed growing limitations on journalists and to government officials' roles around the issue of the attacks. Government administrators have been intimidated as a means of keeping information about the attacks from leaking to the public. Turnover and transfers between departments have also been reduced in order to limit the functional roles of incoming leaders.[140] The timeline in Table 1 details known arrests and detentions of journalists and researchers seeking more information.

Table 1 Incidents of censorship in Cabo Delgado

Date	Location	Incident Description
7 Apr 2017	Pemba	Independent investigative journalist Estácio Valoi detained while covering an event on International Women's Day; although released without charges, the army retained his work equipment[141]
Dec 2018	Palma	Three foreign journalists detained and questioned by army, although they had permission to work in Palma[142]
5 Jan 2019	Macomia	Amade Abubacar charged with violating 'state secrets' and arrested[143]
Jan – Mar 2019		Abubacar suffers maltreatment in prison, leading to symptoms of trauma and stress; denied medical treatment and family visits[144]
18 Feb 2019	Town not reported	Germano Daniel Adriano detained for covering attacks[145]
23 Apr 2019		Abubacar and Adriano released pending trial – after their rights to a trial within 90 days had been violated[146]

The police have also become involved in situations where people have talked about the attacks or trends in the attacks in Cabo Delgado during events, sports activities, cultural activities, and academic debates among civilians or in resorts frequented by tourists.[147] Anyone travelling in and out of districts affected by the attacks is rigorously interrogated.

After tense media responses to the government detention of journalists, the governor of Cabo Delgado, Júlio Parruque, called a press conference on 23 February 2019 and brazenly threatened journalists who continue to

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[137] Ibid., 18.
[138] Dang, 2019:1.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Omar, 2019c.
[141] Nhampossa, 2019.
[142] *LusaNews*, 2019a.
[143] *LusaNews*, 2019a; *Carta*, 2019b.
[144] *Carta*, 2019b; Amnesty International, 2019.
[145] *LusaNews*, 2019a.
[146] Nhampossa, 2019.
[147] Omar, 2019c.

publish information about the insurgency without allowing it to be reviewed by the government first.[148] Parruque said that journalists could not continue writing about attacks, corruption, illicit enrichment, drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and other social and political problems. He also said that anything related to the insurgency should not be discussed or commented upon anywhere. Apparently, the provincial government's censorship is more severe than national government responses.

Thus far, the provincial government in Nampula has not imposed the same silencing on media. However, some journalists were anonymously threatened and abused for election coverage in Nampula in 2018,[149] potentially setting a precedent.

In Tanzania, freedom of the press has decreased significantly in recent years.[150] Private media have been shut down, raided and fined. Journalists have been beaten or arrested for covering public events. In at least one case, a journalist has gone missing in connection to the attacks in Pwani. Azory Gwanda, a journalist for Mwananchi Communications, went missing in 2017 while reporting on killings in Pwani.[151] Before Gwanda disappeared, he approached his wife near his home accompanied by four strangers in a white Toyota Land Cruiser.[152] From the car, he asked for the keys to their house and said that he had a work emergency and would be back the next evening. When his wife got home, she found the house ransacked. She could not reach Gwanda, whose phone was off. She reported the disappearance to the police. Activists and media regularly called for him to be found, but authorities never substantially responded.[153] Gwanda's case remains unsolved.

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[148] Ibid.
[149] Human Rights Watch, 2018.
[150] Nyeko, 2019.
[151] Nyeko, 2019; AFP, 2017.
[152] Wekesa, 2018.
[153] Ibid.

3 Research Methodology

In light of the emerging insurgency in Northern Mozambique and an increase in extremist attacks in Tanzania, a survey to measure community resilience and risks of radicalization amongst the youth is useful in order identify sources of resilience as well as target vulnerabilities in need of attention. As such, the "Rapid risk assessment and the resilience of vulnerable communities against violence" survey (see appendix) was conducted in Pwani, Tanzania and Nampula, Mozambique with 882 participants living in peri-urban and rural environments. In this study ALPS Resilience sought to uncover the beliefs, perceptions and attitudes of communities in Pwani, Tanzania and Northern Mozambique that enable people, groups and communities to rebut and reject proponents of extremism and the ideology they promote.

Survey research was identified as the research tool for a number of reasons:

- It is a form of primary data collection from individuals or groups of people, which can be representative of a target population (through sampling of particular sizes and proportions).
- It is particularly useful when assessing public opinion, determining existing conditions in communities or regions, or documenting the characteristics of a population.[154]
- According to Nanes and Lau[155] surveys are an effective method in gathering systematic data about violent extremism, including the behaviors, attitudes and opinions of the general public, victims and/or potential perpetrators; the drivers of extremism; and the areas and individuals impacted.
- Systematically-collected, empirical data can effectively inform the co-design of preventative programs by community, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.

3.1   The BRAVE-14

Developed by Grossman et al, the Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE-14) is a validated measure to assess risk and protective factors for young people's resilience to violent extremism.[156] The measure presents a shift away from social and structural drivers of extremism and radicalization, focusing instead on the resources and capacities of communities to resist violent extremism.[157] BRAVE-14 adopts a community approach to countering and preventing violent extremism (C/PVE), utilizing an evidence-based, collective-impact approach to increase the role of the citizen in upholding public safety. Such safety-oriented approaches include intervening in the lives of individuals vulnerable radicalization and/or recruitment to extremist groups before they choose a path of violence.

The BRAVE-14 measure may be used as a diagnostic toolkit and resource that allows communities and government agencies to work together to:

- Identify what protective factors and capacities young people in specific communities may already possess and what can be preserved or further strengthened;
- Identify risk factors or needs to which effective responses can be designed;

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[154] Fowler, 2014.
[155] Nanes & Lau, 2018.
[156] Grossman et al., 2017.
[157] Ibid.

- Contextualize factors of resilience against violent extremism (rather than the typical factors of vulnerability to violent extremism);
- Monitor and evaluate interventions aimed at enhancing resilience capacities, by using BRAVE-14 as both a pre- and post-intervention measurement tool; and
- Provide a knowledge platform for developing effective strategies and programs that can strengthen resilience to violent extremism amongst young people in locally relevant, innovative, and contextually sensitive ways.[158]

3.1.1 Adapted Questionnaire

Despite the universal applicability of the BRAVE-14 measure, it is recommended to adapt as appropriate when being used in a new context.[159] For this study, the questionnaire was modified to include contextually-relevant questions sourced from Afrobarometer and, in some cases, translated into local languages. Afrobarometer is a pan-African research institution that conducts a comparative series of public attitude surveys surrounding views on democracy, governance, the economy and civil society. Since its inception in 1999, it has conducted 7 national survey rounds in a total of 36 African countries with the ultimate vision to operate across the African continent.[160] The information gained from these additional questions provided us with more extensive information about the resilience of communities who may be vulnerable to violent extremist behaviour and ideologies.

In order to contextualize the measure to the African (and, specifically, Tanzanian or Mozambican) experience, 27 questions from Afrobarometer's "The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa" survey were added to this round of the study's questionnaire. The questions were chosen to correspond to the five factors of the measure discussed in section 1.1. The selected questions had previously been used in multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer survey, including in Tanzania and Mozambique, and had therefore been proven effective and context-appropriate. These questions helped us to adapt the BRAVE-14 measure to the local context. For example, to more effectively measure respondents' levels of *bridging capital*, specific questions from Afrobarometer about whether they would like to have neighbours from other religious or ethnic groups were added. These types of questions have already been used in the surveyed regions and gave us a better idea of how to word questions in order for Tanzanian and Mozambican respondents to understand and respond in the clearest manner possible.

To make sure the additional questions worked well with the overall scale, a reliability test was conducted as part of the analysis of the results. In the event that these questions did not work well with the BRAVE-14, it was determined that they would either be analysed separately or removed from the survey entirely. More information about this analysis is discussed in section 5 and Annex 5.

The questionnaire is divided into six sections. These sections and their correspondence with the five factors within the BRAVE-14 are tabulated in Table 2. The number ranges of the questions within each section differed between the Mozambican and Tanzanian questionnaires due to variations in preliminary questions about location and demographics.

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[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Afrobarometer, 2017.

Table 2 Questionnaire sections

Section No.	Factor
1	Demographic data
2	Cultural identity and connectedness
3	Linking capital and political trust
4	Bridging capital (social trust)
5	Violence-related beliefs
6	Violence-related behaviours

With only 14 questions, the administration of the BRAVE-14 typically takes approximately 5 minutes, when administered in the participant's native language and if the participant does not have literacy or comprehension challenges. However, with the expansion of the questionnaire to about 42 questions, the duration of the was re-estimated to approximately 35-40 minutes per participant. When unsure of literacy levels, the survey teams were instructed to read the survey items out loud to participants while their responses were self-completed, in order encourage truthfulness. Otherwise, the survey was completed independently.

The BRAVE-14 scale can be scored by summing up the point values from each participant. The minimum score for the measure is 14, with a maximum of 70. Higher scores indicate greater levels of characteristics associated with resilience to violent extremism while lower scores indicate increased risks of radicalization. Currently, the BRAVE-14 does not prescribe thresholds for what constitutes as high or low resilience to violent extremism as this differs according to various contexts. Scores will be calculated lower if a participant skipped or missed an item, therefore, all items of the measure had to be completed.

3.2   Study Sample

Interviews were conducted in five districts across Tanzania (1) and Mozambique (4) with a specific focus on the youth. Both Mozambique[161] and Tanzania[162] define the youth as citizens between the age 15-35 The sample population for each country survey is indicated in Table 3 below:

Table 3 Sample size per study site

Country	Province	District	Number of Respondents
Tanzania	Pwani	Kibaha	315
Mozambique	Nampula	Memba	123
		Erati	129
		Lalaua	132
		Mecubúri	183
		Total number of respondents:	882

In Pwani, Tanzania, Kibaha District was selected out of seven districts as the site for the survey, given its experience of violent attacks between 2015 and 2017. Previously separated into two districts (Kibaha and Kibaha Town), Kibaha is oddly decentralized. The district was characterized by dispersed, insular communities in comparison to Kibaha Town which serves as the region's administrative capital. As of 2012, Kibaha consists

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[161] Republic of Mozambique, 1996.
[162] The United Republic of Tanzania, 2007.

of 70 209 people, of which 35 694 (50.8%) are women and 34 515 (49.2%) are men.[163] These are spread across the district, which is further divided into 11 municipal wards. The selected sample size of 315 represents 2.23% of the population in the district. The general confidence interval for responses within the Tanzania dataset is therefore 5.51 at a confidence level of 95% and 7.25 at a confidence level of 99%.[164]

Figure 1 Map of the wards of Kibaha district in Pwani, Tanzania. Source http://www.citypopulation.de

Accurate demographic information around religion in Kibaha is seemingly difficult to collect, as the Tanzanian government excludes religious identification in its census data and constrains it in research contexts, as well.[165] As will be discussed in section 3.3, this limitation affected the survey questionnaire for this study.

Section 4.1.1 details the challenges that necessitated relocation of this first round of the study to Nampula Province rather than Cabo Delgado Province. The four districts of Memba, Erati, Lalaua and Mecúbúri of Nampula province were selected as study sites due to their proximity to Cabo Delgado; their young populations, which have recruitment potential; the uneven wealth distribution that exists in the districts despite significant economic growth; and the presence of a large Muslim community. Each of these districts is described in more detail below.

- Memba is located in the northeast of the province of Nampula and borders the district of Mecúfi in the neighboring province of Cabo Delgado. According to census data, Memba District was comprised of 51.51% (118 392) women and 48.49% (111 432) men, of which 65.67% identified as Muslim, 30.88% Catholic and 3.10% Protestant, in 2007.[166]

- Drawing its name from Mount Erati, Erati is a mountainous district situated in the north of Nampula province. The district has a reputation for rich arable land with cash crops of rice, peanuts, beans, corn and cotton. The 2007 Census data indicates that Erati consisted of 133 331 (51.9%) women and 123 384 (48.1%) men, of which 53.4% belong to the Catholic faith and 40.3% Islam. It is the largest Mozambican district in this round of the study.

- The district of Lalaua is situated in the north-west of Nampula province with a population of 37 205 (50.6%) women and 36 331 (49.4%) men as of 2007. It is the smallest Mozambican district in this

[163] Census Info Tanzania, 2019.
[164] Calculated using The Survey System Sample Size Calculator available at https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm#one.
[165] United States Department of State, 2017.
[166] National Institute of Mozambique, 2019a.

round of the study. The majority of people in Lalaua are Catholic (67.5%), Islamic (10.5%) or semi-religious (10%).

- Like many of the areas in the region, agriculture is the primary activity of households in Mecubúri District. Primary crops include tobacco, rice, corn, cassava and beans while cotton and cashew nuts are commercialized. Notably, the district has not been declared mine-free which has hindered socio-economic activities including the free movement of people and goods. As of 2007, the population consisted of 79 228 (50.9%) women and 76 396 (49.1%) men, of which the majority was Catholic (41.7%), Islamic (21.3%) or maintained semi religious beliefs (20.8%).

The selected sample size of 567 in Nampula represents 0.07% of the 715 699-strong population in the four districts. The general confidence interval for responses within the Mozambican dataset is 4.11 at a confidence level of 95% and 5.42 at a confidence level of 99%.[167]

Photo 2 Survey participants in northern Nampula

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[167] Calculated using The Survey System Sample Size Calculator available at https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm#one.

Figure 2: Map showcasing Nampula province and the districts of Lalua, Mecubúri, Erati and Memba including. Source: https://www.citypopulation.de

3.3 Limitations to the Study

In Tanzania, the questionnaire was limited by government restrictions on requesting information regarding a respondents' religion. In fact, the 1967 national census was the last census to provide an ethnic and religious breakdown of the population.[168] Therefore, the questionnaire was not permitted to have the question "What is your religion, if any?". If we had been able to keep it, that question would have allowed us to draw deeper conclusions around responses related to religion among Tanzanian respondents and more accurately compare them with Mozambican respondents. Given the focus of the project on *walokole wa Kiislamu* in Tanzania, we opted to replace the question with: "Which additional languages do you speak, if any?" The assumption was that, if respondents selected Arabic, this could then serve as a proxy indicator, albeit an unreliable one, for whether respondents did or did not practice Islam. Unfortunately, not all Muslim Tanzanians learn how to speak Arabic in their religious education. Only one respondent indicated that they spoke Arabic as an additional language, confirming that the question could not serve as a proxy indicator for at least one religion.

Additionally, adapting the questionnaire to two different contexts has limited the study's geographical comparability. In Tanzania, data was collected at the ward level, from one district (Kibaha). In Mozambique, data was collected from four different districts within the province of Nampula. This limits our ability to consider the findings at a scale in Tanzania that is comparably as broad as that in Mozambique.

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[168] Tripp, A.M., 2013:43

4 Fieldwork reports

This section summarizes progress reports from the field teams in both Tanzania and Mozambique. However, extraordinary circumstances prompted drastic changes to the fieldwork ahead of its start in Mozambique, which are detailed in section 4.1.1. Fortunately, the first site choice of the study in Tanzania, Kibaha District, was not hindered, and the survey took place there without delay. Section 4.2 details the fieldwork in Kibaha District.

4.1　Mozambique Fieldwork

4.1.1　Site Selection Challenges

Initially, the survey was to be conducted in Pemba, Cabo Delgado. However, suggestions from our in-country partner, the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (CEEI-UJC), noted that the districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Montepuez, Nangade and Palma would provide better insights given that:

- Nangade and Palma district share a very porous border with Tanzania enabling the circulation of people and goods with limited state oversight.
- Mocímboa da Praia is a predominantly Muslim community which raises the potential for Islamists to recruit and mobilize sympathizers.
- The district of Montepuez is home to a young population dissatisfied by the opening of a ruby mining company which has led to their resettlement, consequently disrupting artisanal mining, and other pre-existing sources of livelihood.

These sites were selected and fieldwork preparation commenced accordingly. However, when insurgent attacks later occurred in Macomia District (which neighbours the above areas) the team had to work closely with the National Police Command in Mozambique to find another way for the researchers to enter northern Mozambique and collect survey data safely. Unfortunately, increasing threats of censorship and targeting of journalists and researchers for arrests and interrogation by the provincial government in Cabo Delgado (as described above) further impeded entry to the region in 2019. This made potential fieldwork in three of the above areas – Nangade, Mocímboa da Praia and Palma – increasingly dangerous. It was agreed between ALPS Resilience and CEEI-UJC that, should the safety situation improve, Nangade, Mocimboa da Praia and Palma would once again be considered as potential study sites in future, expanded phases of the study; in the meantime, the survey sites were once again changed to safer districts in Cabo Delgado: Mecufi, Pemba and Chiure, in addition to Montepuez.

However, during this time, the security situation in Cabo Delgado grew direr. Insurgent activities had also spread to the neighbouring province of Niassa in order to capitalize on opportunities in illicit trade offered by the Niassa Game Reserve and conservation areas.[169] This as well as recruitment efforts in the province demonstrate the geographical widening of the conflict.[170] This prompted increased monitoring from state security and local police forces who restricted access to communities.

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[169] Haysom, 2018.
[170] The Signal Room, 2018.

In light of increasing security concerns, our inability to gain access to Cabo Delgado and advice from government institutions, including the Provincial Government of Cabo Delgado and the Mozambican Ministry of Defence, ALPS Resilience and CEEI-UJC were faced with two options:

a) Conduct the survey in Cabo Delgado in conjunction with the General Police Command and the National Elections Committee; or
b) Relocate the survey to the neighbouring province of Nampula, which is also vulnerable to attacks by insurgents but was safer for researchers.

Option A would impact the quality of the responses given by participants and was thus abandoned. While Option B required more effort in terms of new fieldwork preparation (i.e. sampling, establishing relationships etc.), it would ultimately save more time while offering a safer environment to work in. Therefore, the four districts of Memba, Erati, Lalaua and Mecubúri in Nampula Province were selected as new sites for the first round of the study.

4.1.2 Field Reports per District

On April 27, 2019, in the aftermath of a cyclone that caused intense flooding and electricity outages in northern Mozambique, the CEEI-UJC team of researchers travelled to Nampula City, to conduct the survey with local fieldworkers. Over 18 days, a total of 567 households were interviewed in the Memba, Erati, Lalaua and Mecubúri districts of Nampula Province. The team used a combination of several tablet devices, equipped with the Geopaparazzi application, and three Garmin GPS devices, to locate participants and geo-reference the data collected.

Figure 3 Number of respondents per district in Nampula

Upon arrival in **Memba District**, the research team first visited the town of Cava, in the administrative post of Mazua. The team was received by the head of the locality, who warned that, given the heavy flooding and overall conditions of the roads following the cyclone, it was only possible to work in five areas. The team replaced households from storm-affected areas that had been selected in the original enumeration with others

in the accessible villages. They effectively covered all selected areas in Memba, reaching a total of 123 interviewees.

Photo 3 Road conditions in Nampula during fieldwork, after Cyclone Kenneth

In **Erati District**, work was carried out in nine enumeration areas, despite heavy rains affecting fieldwork. The supervisory team suggested interviewing all households, which resulted in 129 interviewees.

Lalaua District generated the most difficulties when conducting the survey. Firstly, local leaders were unable to help identify the locations of communities. Secondly, the team's tablet device and smartphone devices were also not functioning as well in this district. The team solved both of these problems by using all three available GPS devices. Thirdly, on a very rural road in bad condition, the vehicle transporting fieldworkers broke down, delaying the fieldwork for half of a day. Nevertheless, in this district, the team was able to conduct interviews in the 10 selected enumeration areas and reached 132 interviewees.

In **Mecubúri District**, the team collected data efficiently. However, they travelled long distances to reach some of the enumeration areas selected for this study, so they only reach 14 of the planned enumeration areas, which resulted in 183 participants

Photo 4 Fieldwork in Nampula

4.1.3 Fieldwork Challenges in Nampula

The team encountered the challenges related to accessibility, outdated information and technological malfunctions while carrying out fieldwork in Nampula.

Photo 5 Fieldwork in Nampula

The accessibility of the study sites was affected by the rural character of the areas and the recent natural disaster. Firstly, most of the enumeration areas were rural, requiring the fieldwork team to travel long distances. This also made it difficult to locate households identified during the enumeration. Secondly, in the wake of Cyclone Kenneth, heavy flooding and the subsequent damage to infrastructure, especially roads, prevented the survey team from accessing various communities within Memba and Erati Districts.

Photo 6 Flooding in Nampula during fieldwork, after Cyclone Kenneth

A lack of up-to-date information from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), which supplied the data that informed the enumeration process, impeded the identification of existing households. Throughout the fieldwork, the research team discovered that several households were no longer in the anticipated areas of enumeration due to changes of residence, death, etc. Additionally, INE data about household heads was found to be inaccurate in several cases. These data were subsequently updated for the purposes of the study.

Lastly the team persevered through technical difficulties while trying to locate communities in Lalaua District, when their tablet devices and mobile GPS applications malfunctioned.

Despite the resource constraints and challenges experienced when carrying out the survey, data collection in the districts of Memba, Erati, Lalaua and Mecubúri in Nampula was performed successfully.

Photo 7 Fieldwork in Nampula

4.2   Tanzania Fieldwork

On the November 23, 2018, our in-country partner, Ipsos, submitted a permit application and revised questionnaire to Tanzania's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The application was approved on December 11, 2018. This was a major step in the process, given the NBS's tight regulation of international researchers in Tanzania; if ALPS Resilience had submitted the application alone, the approval process would have taken much longer.

Before fieldwork commenced, from January 2 to 4, 2019, the Ipsos field team took part in a three-day training exercise in Dar-es-Salaam. This allowed the team to familiarize themselves with the survey background, research methodology and objectives. The training culminated in a pilot survey, enabling the field team to apply what they had learned in the training and identify any issues they may encounter in the field. Fieldwork in Tanzania was then conducted across 11 municipal wards in Kibaha District, Pwani Region between January 11 and 28, 2019. The field team interviewed 315 survey participants.

Photo set 1 Fieldwork in Kibaha District

Figure 4 Number of respondents per ward in Kibaha District

Challenges faced during data collection included suspicion of the survey, the use of anonymized photography, low levels of political literacy, political bias and gender discrimination. Each of these challenges is detailed below.

Survey suspicion

The majority of the respondents thought the field team was sent by the government in order to inspect the size of their farms/farming scale for tax purposes. Rumours of this 'farming audit' hindered the participation of cashew farmers, who were reluctant to answer the survey questions for fear of being taxed. In other instances, after completing the questionnaire, respondents would notify fellow community members of a team of "secret

service officers" passing through the area to question their trust in government. This rumor spread ahead of the field team, influencing the cooperation of subsequent participants.

In addition, suspicions were raised regarding the sampling method employed. In particular, why it was that the field team skipped houses and only targeted others. Some respondents thought that the field team was recruiting supporters of certain political parties for the upcoming election. This idea stemmed from the questions focusing on trust in government and local authority figures (Questions 17-32). Hence, potential respondents were hesitant or refused to participate in the study.

Picture-taking

Obtaining anonymized photographs during the interviews was the most challenging part of fieldwork in Kibaha. When photographs were mentioned, the respondents requested to either cancel the interview or not be interviewed at all.

Photo set 2 Fieldwork in Kibaha District

Opposition party areas

The Pwani region is predominantly affiliated to Chama Cha Wananchi (CCM) or the Civic United Front (CUF) party. Because of this, the field team faced a large number of refusals when responding to questions related to the government, as respondents opposed the ruling CCM party. This forced the interviewers to terminate many interviews and correspondingly increased the rejection ratio in the study.

Political literacy

While most of the respondents were literate in religious matters and informal religious education, their knowledge and understanding of common political issues varied. This proved challenging as it became necessary for the field team to have to explain many of the questions.

Gender discrimination

It was difficult to find female survey participants, due to pre-existing gender norms that prevent women's participation in political matters. It is believed that only men should offer political commentary; therefore, women were only able to participate at the behest of their husbands.

Despite these challenges, the police and local authorities proved very accommodating with regards to community access and overall support for the team throughout their stay in Kibaha. The team learned two key lessons, to be taken into account for rounds of the survey in Pwani Region. Firstly, fieldwork teams should meet with local leaders several days prior to the day the team visits a site to collect data, in order to avoid potential delays, foster trust and increase support. Secondly, future rounds should take into account the timing of elections and election campaigning and try to schedule fieldwork at a time when those activities are least likely to affect participation.

5 Results

The subsections below represent a concise review of the survey results.

5.1　Mozambique

For the Mozambique results, it is important to remember that the confidence interval is 4.11 (at a confidence level of 95%). In other words, it is 95% possible that demographic or BRAVE-14 index statistics for the entire population of Erati, Lalaua, Mecubúri and Memba Districts of Nampula may fall 4.11 percentage points above or below all indicated ratios.

In order to verify and validate the survey findings, a factor analysis (to test the suitability of the adapted BRAVE-14 measure), a reliability analysis, and bivariate correlation were conducted. These showed that the BRAVE-14 results are valid and reliable. The analysis is covered in detail in **Annex 5**.

5.1.1　Demographic Profile of Nampula Respondents

Tabulated below are the mean BRAVE-14 scores, compared within demographic/identity groups in Nampula.

Demographic	Mean	Count	Percentage %
Age			
15-24	53.70	211	37%
25-30	55.14	158	28.%
31+	54.48	198	35%
Sex			
Male	54.72	322	57%
Female	53.87	245	43%
Number of Years Lived in District			
4 or less years ago	52.48	23	6%
Over 4 years ago	53.70	97	18%
Since birth	54.61	439	77%
Religion of Respondent (condensed)			
None	54.20	17	3%
Islam	53.48	230	47%
Catholic	54.93	295	48%
District of Residence			
Erati	53.22	129	39%
Lalaua	55.41	132	10%
Mecuburi	55.11	183	20%
Memba	53.44	123	31%

Table 4 Tabulation of overall BRAVE-14 Scores disaggregated by identity or geographic group
Note: All figures in the following tables are percentages, rounded to whole numbers, therefore columns may not add up to exactly 100%.

Data was collected from four districts in Nampula: Erati, Lalaua, Mecubúri and Memba. As shown in Table 4 the majority of respondents live in Erati (39%) and Memba (31%). Twenty percent (20%) of respondents live in Mecubúri and the fewest respondents (10%) live in Lalaua. Nearly all of the respondents are originally from Nampula province. The population surveyed in the districts across Nampula were all very well established in the areas they lived in. Most respondents (77%) have lived in the above districts since birth. Eighteen percent (18%) have lived there for more than four years and the fewest (6%) have lived there for less than four years. It may be argued that the time lived in a particular area may be directly linked to the strength of social ties and community networks individuals form a part of.

According to Mozambique's current youth policy, the youth are defined as citizens between the ages of 15-35 years of age. All respondents were over the age of 15. Ten percent (10%) of respondents were between 15 and 17; 90% were between 18 and 35; and 1 respondent was over the age of 35. The sex of the participants (43% female; 57% male) were slightly skewed from Nampula Province's overall sex ratio, which is 51% female and 49% male. Seven percent (7%) of male respondents between the ages of 15 and 17 and 93% were between 18 and 35. Most female respondents were also older (86%), with only 14% between the ages of 15 and 17.

Figure 5 Ages of respondents by sex

Home Language of Respondents

1%

99%

■ Portuguese ■ Makhua

Ethnicity of Respondents

0,1% 0,2% 0,2%

99,5%

■ Makuwa

■ Only Mozambican

■ Other

■ Don't know

Figure 6 Home language of respondents   *Figure 7 Ethnicity of respondents*

Although, over 50% of the Mozambican population speaks the official language of Portuguese, Mozambique is linguistically diverse with more than 40 languages spoken within the country. Of these, the most popular and widely spoken language is the Makhuwa language. Notably, Nampula Province is almost completely ethnically Makhua with an estimated 4 million users.[171] Therefore it is not surprising that almost all respondents (99%) speak Makhua at home while one percent (1%) of respondents speak Portuguese. At the same time, nearly all respondents (99,5%) identified their ethnic group as Makhuwa. A handful of respondents were from another ethnic group, did not know their ethnicity, or preferred to identify as only Mozambican. This indicates a both an ethnic and linguistically homogenous society within the region.

Respondents' religious identities are split nearly 50/50 between Catholicism and Islam: 48% of respondents are Catholic and 47% are Muslim. Another 2% follow other religions and 3% are not religious. This data is consistent with the 47:45 ratio between Catholics and Muslims in Nampula. This is notable given that it is one of the only discernible categories in an otherwise homogenous society.

5.1.2   Overall Scores for Mozambique

High BRAVE-14 scores indicate that respondents have higher levels of traits linked to resilience to violent extremism. The median BRAVE-14 score is 54 and mean score is 54.35, indicating likely strong levels of resilience across the population of the four districts, given that the maximum score on the BRAVE-14 scale is 69 and the minimum score is 14 in this round of the questionnaire. However, as discussed in section 0, these results should be interpreted with caution: Afrobarometer questions replaced two of the questions within the bridging and linking capital questions, so those sub-dimensions are not borne out in the data in the factor analysis.

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[171] Kiprop, 2019.

Figure 8 Mozambique BRAVE-14 score averages

Figure shows the frequency of the BRAVE-14 scores across the Mozambique dataset. The frequency of the scores is skewed towards the right, peaking between 54 and 57. This indicates that the four districts in Nampula have a majority of high BRAVE-14 scores. This, in turn, indicates levels of resilience.

Figure 9 Frequency of Mozambique BRAVE-14 scores

Respondents' average scores are most varied across districts of residence, with a 2.19-point difference between Lalaua respondents' average score (55.41) and Erati respondents' average score (53.22). Mecubúri respondents have an average score of 55.11 and Memba respondents have an average score of 53.44. However, on a scale of 14 to 69, all four districts' average scores indicated strong resilience.

Map 1 Brave 14 scores across four districts in Nampula Province

Religion seems to be the demographic factor most closely linked with resilience scores in the four districts. Catholic respondents' resilience scores average at 54.93, or 1.45 points higher than Muslim respondents, which average at 53.48. However, even this difference is modest, considering the range of the scale (14-69). Be that as it may, rather than indicate religious tensions between Christians and Muslims, lower scores amongst the Muslim population may be associated with real or perceived notions of socio-economic marginalization in the north (Highlighted in section's **1.2.2** and **2**)

There were not enough respondents from other religions to conduct a statistical analysis, so conclusions cannot be drawn about the resilience of other religious groups.

Figure 10 BRAVE-14 score by religion

Age was also potentially linked with resilience scores. Respondents between the ages of 25 and 30, with an average score of 55.14, demonstrate greater resilience than those between the ages of 15 and 24, with an average score of 53.5 - or 1.44 points less. The oldest age group, 31 and up, has an average score of 54.48.

BRAVE-14 Score by Age

Age group	Score
31+	54,48
25-30	55,14
15-24	53,7

Figure 11 BRAVE-14 score by age

Few differences can be found in the resilience scores between males and females or between respondents who have lived in the region for a long or short time. This may be attributed to the ethnic homogeneity in the four districts of Nampula, which together with the social ties and community networks formed over long periods of time within communities, positively contributes to an individual's resilience.

BRAVE-14 Score by Sex

Male	Female
54,72	53,87

Figure 12 BRAVE-14 score by sex

BRAVE-14 Score by No. of Years Lived in Region

Figure 13 BRAVE-14 score by number of years lived in region

Tabulations of all disaggregated BRAVE-14 scores for Mozambique can be found in Annex 3: Mozambican BRAVE Index Score Tables. The differences between the subfactors, detailed in the following sections, are quite muted, given that they are all on either on a scale of 3 to 15 (Cultural ID & Connectedness, Bridging Capital, Violence related Beliefs), 2 to 10 (Violence related behaviour) or 3 to 14 (Linking Capital) scale.

5.1.3 Overall Subfactor Scores for Mozambique

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average **cultural identity and connectedness** subfactor score is 11.4, indicating strong cultural identity and connectedness among respondents in Nampula. Between the districts, some differences in cultural identity and connectedness apply. As Map 1 shows below, Lalaua District scored over one point higher in average cultural identity and connectedness score than Memba District.

Map 2 Cultural Identity and Connectedness across four districts in Cabo Delgado

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average **bridging capital** subfactor score is 10.85, indicating strong bridging capital. The results do not show differences of over one point between identity or geographic groups with over 30 respondents. We were unable to determine the reliability of these scores, as discussed in section 6.1. Map 2 shows about the same strength across districts.

Map 3 Bridging Capital across four districts in Cabo Delgado

On a scale of 3 to 14, the average **linking capital** subfactor score is 10.93, indicating strong linking capital. The results do not show differences of over one point between identity or geographic groups with over 30 respondents. These scores may not be reliable due to issues with the question about respondents' trust in police, as discussed in section 0. Map 3 shows the same strength across districts.

Map 4 Linking Capital across four districts in Cabo Delgado

On a scale of 2 to 10, the average **violence-related behaviours** subfactor score is 8.08, indicating relatively low levels of support and/or endorsement of violence-related behaviour. The results do not show differences of over one point between identity or geographic groups with over 30 respondents. Map 4 shows the same strength across districts.

Map 5 Violence related Behaviours across four districts in Cabo Delgado

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average violence-related beliefs subfactor score is 13.01, indicating very low levels of violence-related beliefs (or high levels of peaceful-related beliefs). The results do not show differences of over one point between identity or geographic groups with over 30 respondents. These scores may not be reliable due to issues with the question about respondents' familiarity to their cultures. Map 5 shows the same strength across districts.

Map 6 Violence related Beliefs across four districts in Cabo Delgado

Figure through Figure show the subfactor scores for each identity group. For all subfactors, higher scores indicate higher levels of resilience within each subfactor. Note that a high average score for violence-related beliefs or behaviours indicates that the average respondent had low levels of violence-related beliefs or behaviours.

Figure 14 Mozambican BRAVE-14 subfactor scores by age

Figure 15 Subfactor scores by sex

Figure 16 Subfactor scores by number of years lived in area

Figure 17 Subfactor scores by religious group

5.1.4   Responses to Afrobarometer Questions

As discussed in section 6.1, most of the questions added from the Afrobarometer survey were not compatible with other questions within the anticipated subfactors of the BRAVE-14. Nevertheless, these results provide us with a clearer picture of respondents' attitudes regarding their identity, other groups and fair treatment by authorities. For the Mozambican dataset, they are analysed separately from the BRAVE-14 scores below.

The majority of respondents are not actively involved in religious groups (75%) or other community groups (84%). Some respondents (21%) are active members of religious groups and a few (4%) are official leaders in their religious groups. Only 15% of respondents are active members or leaders of other community groups.

Figure 18 Mozambique religious and other group involvement

Most respondents indicated that their cultural identity guides their ways of life (66%), that they are familiar with their cultural traditions, beliefs, practices and values (81%), and that they believe it is important to maintain traditions (86%). Only 7% did not think that it was important to maintain cultural traditions and 8% were not familiar with their cultures. Slightly more people (18%) disagreed that their cultural identity guides their ways of life.

Figure 19 Importance of and familiarity with cultural identity, traditions and beliefs

Respondents demonstrated somewhat low feelings of safety in speaking about politics and low perceptions of having freedom of speech. While 46% of respondents said that they never have to be careful of what they say about politics, 43% said that they are not at all or not very free to say what they think. Interestingly, a relatively high proportion of respondents was unsure about their response to this question: 16% do not know whether they are free to say what they think and 21% do not know whether people must be careful of what they say about politics. Given the suspicions surrounding the nature of the survey, this could also mean that respondents were careful and chose to go with the 'safer' option of "Don't know."

## In this country, how free are you to say what you think?

Don't Know — 16,4%
Completely — 31,1%
Somewhat free — 10,0%
Not very free — 28,3%
Not at all free — 14,2%

Figure 20 In this country, how free are you to say what you think?

How often, in this country, do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?

Don't Know — 21,2%
Never — 45,5%
Rarely — 13,6%
Often — 17,7%
Always — 2,0%

Figure 21 How often, in this country, do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?

Respondents also reported perceptions of inequality in Mozambique. When asked, "How often, in this country, are people treated unequally under the law?" 43% of respondents said, "rarely." Twenty-nine percent (29%) said that people are always or frequently treated unequally and 22% do not know. Even more concerningly, a total of 91% of respondents said that their ethnic group was treated unfairly by the government. Similarly, concerning 54% of all respondents said that this occurs sometimes, 18% that it occurs often and 20% that it occurs always.

Figure 22 How often, in this country, are people treated unequally under the law?

Figure 23 How often, if ever, is your ethnic group treated unfairly by the government?

The respondents showed stronger levels of willingness to advocate for an issue in a group than they did confidence in the state of equality in Mozambique. Seventy percent (70%) said that, in the past year, they had joined others to raise an issue. Another 24% said that they would do so if they had the chance. Only 6% said that they would never join others to raise an issue. The willingness to advocate for an issue in a group may be attributed to ethnic homogeneity and shared experiences of what is perceived as unequal/unfair treatment from state actors.

Have you joined or would you join others to raise an issue?

Often	21%
Several Times	23%
Once or Twice	26%
Would if I had the Chance	24%
Would never do this	6%

Figure 24 Have you joined, or would you join others to raise an issue?

5.2 Tanzania

When interpreting these results, it is important to remember the confidence interval of 5.51 when using a confidence level of 95%. Therefore, it is 95% possible that demographic or BRAVE-14 index statistics for the entire population of Kibaha may fall 5.51 percentage points above or below all indicated ratios.

5.2.1 Demographic Profile of Respondents

Data was collected from all 11 wards in Pwani's Kibaha District. The most respondents came from Mlandizi (23%), Kikongo (14%), Gwata (10%) and Janga (10%). Kwala and Bokomnemela were the least represented; respondents from those districts made up only 3% each. With so many wards within the sample size, ward-level data would not be accurate enough to show geographic patterns in BRAVE-14 scores across the district. Therefore, the BRAVE-14 scores and subfactor scores are not mapped for Kibaha District in this report. However, comparisons in resilience scores can be drawn between the whole of Kibaha District and the four Mozambican districts, which are mapped above.

Figure 5 Kibaha District wards in which respondents resided

Most respondents (62%) were from Pwani, while 38% indicated that they were not. 80% of respondents had lived in Pwani for over 18 years. Only 8% of respondents had lived in Pwani for between 10 and 17 years, and 12% had lived in the region for less than 10 years, indicating highly established communities.


Figure 6 Time lived in Pwani

Forty-six percent (46%) of respondents are male and 54% are female. This is slightly skewed from Kibaha District's overall sex ratio, which is 49.2% male and 50.8% female.

Sex of Respondents

46% Male
54% Female

Figure 27 Sex of respondents

Given the focus of the survey on the youth as the group most at risk of violent extremism, all respondents were between the ages of 18 and 35 years old. Forty-one percent (41%) of respondents were between 18 and 24; 35% were between 25 and 30; and 24% were between 31 and 35 years old.

Ages of Respondents

24%
41%
18 - 24
25 - 30
31 - 35
35%

Figure 7 Ages of respondents

Male respondents skewed younger, with 45% between the ages of 18 and 24 and 83% younger than 30. Female respondents also skewed younger, but only 76% were below the age of 30.

Figure 8 Ages of respondents by sex

The 315 respondents spoke a total of 38 different languages indicating a high level of linguistic diversity evidenced by multilingualism. The most common home languages were Kizaramo (25%), Kikwere (18%) and Swahili (17%). Less than 5% of respondents grew up speaking the other 35 languages.

Figure 9 Top 10 home languages of respondents

The majority of respondents also spoke additional languages, most of them the same as the home languages as other respondents. Many respondents spoke more than one additional language. Figure 10 below displays the sum of these responses, rather than percentage. The most common additional language, spoken by 266 or 84% of respondents, was Swahili. Other common additional languages were Kizaramo and Kikwere. Only 6% of respondents did not speak an additional language. The high levels of linguistic diversity, and resultant dominance of Swahili as the most common additional language, indicate that individuals are able to connect beyond their linguistic group.

Figure 10Count of top 6 additional languages spoken by respondents

The majority of respondents identified their ethnic group as either Wazaramo (31%) or Wakwere (20%). Overall, 44 different ethnic groups were represented by the respondents. Figure 11 shows the top eight ethnicities of the respondents; all other ethnicities were represented by less than 2% of the sample.


Figure 11 Eight most common ethnicities of respondents

Unlike, the largely homogenous society within the four districts of Nampula, Mozambique, the single district of Kibaha, in Tanzania showcased high levels of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity.

5.2.2 BRAVE-14 Overall Scores in Kibaha

Overall, as with results from Nampula, BRAVE-14 results for Pwani were high, indicating higher levels of traits linked to resilience to violent extremism. On a scale of 14 to 70, the median BRAVE-14 score was 57 and mean score was 56.4, indicating strong levels of resilience across the population of Kibaha District.


Figure 12 Tanzania BRAVE-14 Score Averages

Figure 40 shows the frequency of the BRAVE-14 scores across the Tanzania dataset. The frequency of the scores is skewed towards the right but is far more evenly distributed between 53 and 63 than the Mozambique dataset. This indicates that Kibaha District has a greater variety among the majority of high BRAVE-14 scores. In other words, the results cover a greater spread in Pwani, indicating more varied levels of resilience.


Figure 13 Frequency of Tanzania BRAVE-14 scores

Home language seems to be the demographic factor most closely linked with resilience scores. Respondents who speak Swahili demonstrated far greater resilience than those who grew up speaking any other language, with averages of 3.61 to 5.24 more points on the resilience scale. This may be attributed to Swahili user's ability to forge relationships with individuals outside their immediate social or informal networks.


Figure 14 BRAVE-14 score by home language

People who were actively involved in social community groups scored a 2.58-point higher average on the resilience scale (58.19) than people who were not involved in such groups (55.61). Surprisingly, they also scored 1.55 points higher on average than people who were actively involved in religious groups (56.64), while those who were not involved in religious groups did not have a much lower score (56.32) than their involved counterparts.


Figure 15 BRAVE-14 score by involvement in groups

The number of years respondents have lived in Pwani also seem to correlate with their resilience scores. The 39 respondents who have lived in Pwani for fewer than 19 years scored two points lower on average than those who have lived there for 19 years or more. It may be argued that respondents who have lived in Pwani for four

years or fewer experience weaker forms of community cohesion which may reinforce perceptions of uncertainty and insecurity. This potentially weakens cultural connections

BRAVE-14 Score by No. of Years in Region

Category	Score
19+ years	57,08
5 to 18 years	55,38
4 years or fewer	54,72

Figure 16 BRAVE-14 score by number of years in region

Males scored an average of 1.72 points higher on the BRAVE-14 scale than females, with a mean score of 57.33 among 145 males and a mean score of 55.61 among 170 females.

BRAVE-14 Score by Sex

Category	Score
Female	55,61
Male	57,33

Figure 17 BRAVE-14 score by sex

Respondents from the Wazaramo ethnic group also seem slightly more resilient to violent extremism, with an average of 1,58 more points on the resilience scale than other ethnic groups. As per Figure 37, above, Wazaramo are also the dominant ethnic group at 31% of respondents. This suggests the interconnection between proportion of population (representation) and resilience.

Figure 18 BRAVE-14 average score of ethnicity groups

Tabulations of all disaggregated BRAVE-14 scores for Tanzania can be found in

Annex 4: Tanzanian BRAVE Index Score Tables.

The following subsection, showcases the disaggregated subfactor scores according to each identity group:

- **age,**
- **sex,**
- **place of origin,**
- **religious and civil society group membership,**
- **ethnic group**
- **Home language and number of additional languages spoken**

It must be noted that the data presented below only includes disaggregated data among groups with over 30 respondents in them. Furthermore, subfactor scores that did not demonstrate differences in average scores over one point, are not represented here graphically.

Tables of all identity group breakdowns for all subfactors, including those with under 30 respondents, can be found in

5.2.3   Cultural identity and connectedness

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average cultural identity and connectedness subfactor score was **10.6**, indicating strong cultural identity and connectedness in Kibaha District.

The home languages of respondents seem to correlate most strongly with cultural identity and connectedness; the average subfactor score for Swahili speakers (12.5) is between 1.54 and 2.66 points higher than speakers of Kizaramo, Kikwere and other languages. This is notable given that Swahili represents only 17% of the total respondents in the survey. Potential reasons for this may be traced back to historical linkages when following its colonial independence, Tanzania aggressively promoted Swahili as a means of state building in order to undermine tribalism and promote a unified, national identity through its *Ujamaa* (self-determination/reliance) policies.[172]


Figure 19 Tanzania cultural connectedness by home language

Respondents from the Wazaramo ethnic group also scored a little over one point higher in cultural identity and connectedness in comparison with Wakwere and other ethnic groups.

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[172] Njubi, 2009.

Figure 20 Cultural connectedness by ethnic group

Disaggregation by age group, sex, place of origin, religious and civil society group membership, and number of additional languages spoken - among groups with over 30 respondents in them - did not demonstrate differences in average cultural identity and connectedness scores over one point. Hence this were excluded from further analysis.

5.2.4   Bridging capital

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average bridging capital subfactor score was **11.2**, indicating strong bridging capital.

The home languages of respondents also seem correlated to their bridging capital scores. Those who speak Swahili at home showed greater levels of bridging capital than those who spoke Kizaramo, Kikwere and other languages by an average of 1.58 to 1.71 points. As the interconnecting language of the region, this is, perhaps, unsurprising.


Figure 21 Bridging capital by home language

Once again, disaggregation by age, sex, place of origin, religious or civil society group membership, additional languages spoken and ethnic group - among groups with over 30 respondents in them - did not demonstrate

differences in average bridging capital scores over one point. In addition, it is interesting that ethnic groups did not make a difference given that ethnicity in Pwani (often) overlaps with home language.

5.2.5　Linking capital

On a scale of 3 to 15, the average linking capital subfactor score was 11.7, indicating strong linking capital. Be that as it may. the scores for this subfactor may not be reliable, due to low correlation between responses to the question about trust in police with other questions in this subfactor.

As we might expect, respondents who had lived in Pwani for fewer than 18 years scored nearly one point lower in linking capital than those who had lived in the region for a long time, most likely due to the social ties and community networks formed over many years.


Figure 22 Linking capital by number of years lived in Pwani

5.2.6　Violence-related behaviours and beliefs

On a scale of 2 to 10, and 3-15, the average violence-related behaviour and violence-related belief subfactor scores were **8.8** and **14** respectively. This indicates high resilience to violence related behaviours and beliefs. Disaggregation across identity groups did not demonstrate differences in average violence related belief scores over one point.

6 Emerging Findings

Overall, the ALPS-adapted survey gave valuable information about the levels and types of resilience in Nampula, Mozambique and Pwani, Tanzania. While the BRAVE-14 measure and Afrobarometer questions do not directly inter-relate, and could not be analysed directly together, the two sets of data do provide complementary information from which to analyse the results. For example, while the BRAVE-14 questions give results on the *levels* of cultural connectedness, the Afrobarometer questions ask about the *forms* of cultural connectedness. When analysed in this way, the survey is reliable and useful. With limited adaptations, the survey can be utilised in other contexts in Mozambique, Tanzania and further afield.

6.1 Compatibility of Additional Questions with BRAVE-14

It was hypothesized that several questions added from the Afrobarometer survey questionnaire would correspond with three of the subfactors (cultural identity and connectedness, violence-related behaviours and violence-related beliefs). However, the additional questions did not map to the expected conceptual indices (this is explained further in **Annex 5**).

For the Tanzania dataset, the Afrobarometer questions are not very useful in complementing existing BRAVE-14 questions. They seem to tap into slightly different concepts from the three predicted subfactors. The questions instead seem to indicate two somewhat different dimensions: levels of passive trust into various institutions and levels of active civic engagement. The Afrobarometer results still provide us with a clearer picture of respondents' attitudes regarding their identity, other groups and fair treatment by authorities, they are analysed separately from the BRAVE-14 scores for the Mozambican dataset. However, since this is a pilot survey, and the first time the BRAVE-14 measure is being used on the African continent, these questions were, in part, meant to test how we might adapt the measure to the context. When ALPS conducts it again in other locations, this information will help aid in revising the questionnaire and its adaptation.

Overall, the BRAVE-14 scores in both countries showed medium to high levels of resilience in the communities surveyed. Since the overall resilience scores from Nampula peaked between 54 and 57, while the scores from Pwani had more than one peak across a wider range (53 to 64). Beyond the overall scores, the subfactors of the BRAVE-14 provided greater insight into factors of resilience against and risk of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremist groups among the sample population. As mentioned above, there is a 95% chance that accurate proportions of responses for each score are within 5.51 percentage points below or above those in the sample for all of Kibaha District and 4.11 percentage points below or above those in the sample for the whole population of the four Nampula districts.

6.2 Resilience Factors

Resilience factors pinpointed in the disaggregated and subfactor findings are linked to themes of religion, group membership and relationships between communities. These themes relate to the BRAVE-14 subfactors of bridging and linking capital and cultural identity and connectedness. Additionally, nonviolent beliefs and behaviours are identified as a source of resilience in the sample populations.

The data from Mozambique showed strong resilience factors, including **bridging capital**, occurring with the two dominant religions in the four districts. Muslims in Mozambique score slightly lower than Catholics on the overall BRAVE-14 scale; however, the contributing subfactors showed no differences greater than one point between Muslims and Catholics, suggesting that their levels of overall resilience are about the same. The aggregated Mozambican data showed strong bridging capital overall and when disaggregated by religion: Catholic respondents' average bridging capital score is 10.93 and Muslim respondents' is 10.72, on a 3 to 15 scale. Interfaith relations are a key part of bridging capital in a region where two dominant religious groups co-exist. Continued trust, confidence, mutual support and active engagement between Muslims and Catholics - as has been particularly common in the region in the aftermath of Cyclone Kenneth and through the trauma of the violent attacks[173] - will play a strong role in both groups' resilience during this challenging period in the four districts, especially in Memba and Erati.

While data on religion could not be collected in Tanzania, the aggregated data from Kibaha showed strong **bridging capital** (average 11.2 out of 15). When disaggregated, Swahili home language speakers showed the strongest bridging capital. This is a resilience factor because Swahili is one of the national languages of Tanzania; ease of communication with other groups from across the country in Kibaha can build inter-group harmony in the district, thereby strengthening resilience.

Strong **linking capital** scores in both regions (average 10.93 in Nampula and 11.7 in Kibaha) indicates that the sample populations have trust in authorities and community organizations; agency within their communities; and access to resources outside of their local communities. The disaggregated data showed that active members or leaders of community organizations in Kibaha have strong linking capital and very high overall resilience, with an average BRAVE-14 score of 58. However, when compared with people involved in religious groups or people not involved with either type of group, this did not play out into subfactor score differences over one point. Additionally, longer amounts time lived in Pwani correlated with a higher overall resilience score due to slightly higher levels of linking capital.[174] Lastly, in Mozambique, high levels of willingness to advocate for an issue in a group came through in the additional questions, when nearly all respondents (94%) said that they had joined others in the past year to raise an issue or would do so if they had the chance. This demonstrates that many respondents feel that they have agency in their communities, a component of linking capital. This may also be associated to high levels of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity in Nampula province which is dominated by the Makhuwa. This ethnic group may experience shared social ills which increases their ability to relate and thus their collective participation.

However, this finding did not correspond with particularly high levels of involvement in community groups in Mozambique. This reinforces the notion of weak state-society relations but does not explain the strong linking capital present in Nampula. This suggests that where state presence/governance is weak, particularly in rural areas, communities draw linking capital from alternative sources i.e. traditional authorities, religious leaders, teachers etc.

Both datasets showed strong **cultural identity and connectedness**, with average subfactor scores of 11.4 for the Mozambican districts and 10.6 for Kibaha. High levels of this subfactor came through in the BRAVE-14 scores of respondents from the Wazaramo ethnic group and Swahili home language speakers in Kibaha. This subfactor was the main driver of differences in BRAVE-14 scores among the various ethnic groups in Kibaha. In addition to high BRAVE-14 scores for this subfactor, Nampula respondents also demonstrated cultural identity and connectedness in their responses to the additional questions. The greatest majority believe that it

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[173] Associated Press, 2019.
[174] A similar calculation was not done for Mozambique because this factor should be not compared with variations in time lived in Nampula in the dataset, since most respondents had lived there since birth.

is important to maintain traditions, with most respondents also feeling familiar with their cultures and guided by their cultural identity.

The subfactor scores showing the strongest levels of resilience in both regions were those of **violence-related beliefs**, with the average Mozambican respondent scoring a 13.01 and the average Tanzanian respondent scoring a 14 out of 15. The sample populations' nonviolent beliefs particularly bolster their resilience against radicalization to violent ideologies. Similarly, Tanzanian respondents earned very strong **violence-related behavior** scores, showing strong resilience against recruitment into extremist groups or engagement in extremist activities. While slightly lower, Mozambique's subfactor scores for violence-related behavior also demonstrated solid resilience.

6.3   Risk Factors

Risk factors identified from the contextual analysis and data include the proximity of cyclone-affected areas to the epicentre of the attacks; involvement in group activities; censorship; and inequality in Mozambique.

As the districts with the lowest average overall BRAVE-14 scores, the closest proximity to areas affected by the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and the greatest affected by Cyclone Kenneth in Nampula, the Erati and Memba Districts may be the most vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization. Erati District scored the lowest in bridging capital and violence-related beliefs and behaviours, while Memba District scored lowest in linking capital and was not far above Erati in the other subfactors. This indicates that resilience-building in those four factors, especially bridging and linking capital, should be prioritized.

The additional questions in Mozambique also showed potential risk factors linked to low levels of group activity and human rights abuses. Firstly, the data showed low levels of involvement in community (15%) or religious groups (21%) in the four districts in comparison to the most recent round (Round 7) of the Afrobarometer survey in Mozambique. Secondly, Mozambican respondents pointed to inequality and potential censorship. Many respondents reported that they must be careful of what they say about politics and that they are not free to say what they think. In a context where, just above the provincial border, censorship by Cabo Delgado's provincial government has led to arrest and abuse of journalists, these results are concerning. Additionally, respondents reported unfair treatment at the country level: 91% said that their ethnic group was treated unfairly by the government. 29% said that people are always or frequently treated unequally under the law. 22% do not know whether this is the case, indicating a possible disconnect with national.

Finally, despite strengths in Wazaramo and Swahili speakers' cultural identity and connectedness, Wakwere and smaller minority groups in Kibaha had the lowest levels of this subfactor in comparison to all other respondents from both countries. However, the differences were not greater than 1.54, so this finding may not be reliable.

7 Recommendations

Based on the above emerging findings, the following programmatic and institutional responses are recommended for building resilience in the five study sites, which were identified as vulnerable to violent extremism at the outset of the research.

In both countries, it is recommended to:

1. Aim asset-based community development[175] at mitigating the threats and challenges (discussed in Section 0), in order to build upon the existing resources of resilience in communities in Kibaha (Pwani, Tanzania), and Lalaua, Mecubúri, Erati and Memba (Nampula, Mozambique).
2. Draw from each community's strong nonviolent tendencies for any programming aimed at preventing violence.

In northern Mozambique, it is recommended to:

1. Focus immediate asset-based community development in the Erati and Memba Districts of Nampula, in order to bolster resilience during their recovery following the cyclone and to provide alternative options to potential recruits to the insurgent group in Cabo Delgado.
2. Encourage continued trust, confidence, mutual support and active engagement between Muslims and Catholics in the four districts in Nampula, Mozambique. Draw upon these relationships to encourage greater involvement in both secular and religious group activities.
3. Work with the Provincial Government of Cabo Delgado and the National Police Command of Mozambique to safely expand the study to Cabo Delgado, in order to collect resilience data about communities that are likely more vulnerable to violent extremism than the northern Nampula districts studied in this round.
4. Bring or lobby for an end to the censorship in Cabo Delgado and increased freedom of speech across northern Mozambique.
5. Provide legal representation to ethnic and other groups experiencing unequal treatment in the Lalaua, Mecubúri, Erati and Memba Districts.

In Pwani, Tanzania, it is recommended to:

1. Consider fostering cultural identity and connectedness among the Wakwere population and smaller minority groups in Kibaha District, in order to build their overall resilience against violent extremism.
2. Given the heterogeneity of communities in Tanzania, programmatic responses should focus on building cultural interconnectedness between ethnic/linguistic/religious groups by promoting national unity.
3. Work with the local and regional government and civil society organizations in Pwani in order to increase the presence/visibility and activities of the government. In turn, this will develop linking between local populations and government through the design of programs intended to reduce real or perceived feelings of unequal treatment by the government.

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[175] Asset-based community development is a methodology for the sustainable development of communities based on their strengths and potentials.

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Annex 1: Questionnaire used in Pwani, Tanzania

Demographic Information

1. What is your date of birth?
   [MM/DD/YYYY]

2. Which Tanzanian language is your home language?
   [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: What is the language of your group of origin?]
   Swahili = 1
   Kizaramo = 2
   Kisambaa = 3
   Kiyao = 4
   Kigogo = 5
   Kikwere = 6
   Other = 0

3. Which additional languages do you speak, if any?
   [Interviewer: prompt to select more than one, if applicable.]

Swahili = 1	English = 8
Kizaramo = 2	Makonde = 9
Kisambaa = 3	Haya = 10
Kiyao = 4	Sukuma = 11
Kigogo = 5	Yao = 12
Kikwere = 6	Other = 0
Arabic = 7	

4. Are you from Pwani?
   3a. Where in Pwani do you live?
   [Requires multiple-choice responses based on the national gazetteer.]

5. How many years have you lived in Pwani?

6. People practice their religion in different ways. Asides from weddings and funerals, how often do you personally engage in religious practices like prayer, reading a religious book, or attending a religious service or a meeting of a religious group? Would you say you do so:
   Never = 0
   A few times a year = 1
   About once a month = 2
   About once a week = 3
   A few times a week = 4
   About once a day = 5
   More than once a day = 6
   Respondent has no religion [Do not read out loud] = 7
   Don't Know = 9

Cultural Identity and Connectedness

7. Do you agree with the following statement: It is important to maintain cultural traditions.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

8. Do you agree with the following statement: I am familiar with my cultural traditions, beliefs, practices, and values.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

9. Do you agree with the following statement: My cultural identity guides the way I live my life.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

10. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group that meets outside of regular worship services
    0 = Not a member, 1 = Inactive member, 2 = Active Member, 3 = Official Leader

11. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: Member of voluntary association or community group
    0 = Not a member, 1 = Inactive member, 2 = Active Member, 3 = Official Leader, 9 = Don't know

12. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance. Attend a community meeting
    Would never do this = 0
    Would if I had the Chance = 1
    Once or Twice = 2
    Several Times = 3
    Often = 4

13. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Join others to raise an issue
Would never do this = 0
Would if I had the Chance = 1
Once or Twice = 2
Several Times = 3
Often = 4

14. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?
[Do not read options: Code Response]
Wachaga = 540; Wakwere = 541; Wagogo 542; Waluguru = 543; Wandegereko = 544; Wazaramo – 555; Tanzanian Only, or "doesn't think of self in those terms" = 9990; Refused to answer = 9998; Don't know = 9999; Other [Specify]

15. How often, if ever, are _____s (R's Ethnic Group) treated unfairly by the government?
If respondents did not identify any group in q.12 – that is, if they refused to answer (9998), didn't know (9999), or said "Tanzanian Only" (9990) – then circle 7
Never = 0
Sometimes =1
Often = 2
Always = 3
Not Applicable = 7
Don't Know = 9

16. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Tanzanian and being a _____ (Ethnic Group). Which of the following best expresses your feelings?
[If respondents did not identify any group in q.12 – that is, if they refused to answer (9998), didn't know (9999), or said "Tanzanian Only" (9990) – then circle 7.]
I feel only Tanzanian. = 5
I feel more Tanzanian than _____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 4
I feel equally Tanzanian and _____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 3
I feel more_____ [insert R's ethnic group] than Tanzanian. = 2
I feel only_____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 1
Not applicable = 7
Don't Know = 9

Linking Capital (Political Trust)

17. Do you agree with the following statement: I trust authorities/law enforcement agencies.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

18. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust President
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

19. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Parliament
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

20. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust your local government council
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

21. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust the ruling party
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

22. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust the opposition political parties
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

23. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Police
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

24. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Army
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

25. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Religious Leaders
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

26. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Traditional Leaders
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

27. In this country, how free are you: To say what you think?
Not at all free = 1
Not very free = 2
Somewhat free =3
Completely = 4
Don't Know = 9

28. In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?
Always = 3 ; Often = 2; Rarely = 1; Never = 0; Don't Know = 9

29. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel confident when dealing with government and authorities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

30. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel that my voice is heard when dealing with government and authorities.
Strongly disagree = 1

Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

31. In your opinion, how often, in this country: Are people treated unequally under the law?
Always = 3; Often = 2; Rarely = 1; Never = 0; Don't Know = 9

Bridging Capital (Social Trust)

32. Do you agree with the following statement: In general, I trust people from other communities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

33. For each of the following type of people, please tell me whether you would like to have people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care: People of different religions [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]
Strongly dislike = 1
Somewhat dislike = 2
Would not care = 3
Somewhat like = 4
Strongly like = 5
Don't Know = 9

34. For each of the following type of people, please tell me whether you like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care: People of different ethnicities [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]
Strongly dislike = 1
Somewhat dislike = 2
Would not care = 3
Somewhat like = 4
Strongly like = 5
Don't Know = 9

35. Do you agree that you engage in conversations with people from different religious/cultures and beliefs?
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

36. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel supported by people from other communities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

Violence-Related Beliefs

37. Do you agree with the following statement: Being violent helps earn the respect of others.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

38. Do you agree with the following statement: Being violent helps show how strong I am.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

39. Do you agree with the following statement: My community accepts that young people may use violence to solve problems.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

Violence-Related Behaviors

40. Do you agree with the following statement: I am willing to speak out publicly against violence in my community.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

41. Do you agree with the following statement: I am willing to challenge the violent behavior of others in my community.
   Strongly disagree = 1
   Disagree = 2
   Neutral = 3
   Agree = 4
   Strongly Agree = 5

The Following Questions should be answered by the interviewer after the interview is concluded.

42. Respondent's Gender
   Male = 1
   Female =2

Annex 2: Questionnaire used in Nampula, Mozambique

Portuguese-Language Questionnaire

AREA ID |__|___|___|___|___

Exclusivo para Habitações

Questionário aos Agregados Familiares

IDENTIFICAÇÃO DO QUESTIONÁRIO:

Nome da Area de Enumeração _____

Nº Questionário: |__|__|__| *(a preencher pelo supervisor)*   Código do Inquiridor: |_|

Código do AF (Ficha de Listagem e Cartografia): |_|_|_|

Data: |__|__|/|_|__|/2019   Hora do início da entrevista (HH:MIN):____:____

INSTRUÇÕES AO INQUIRIDOR:
- Pedir para falar com o(a) Chefe do Agregado Familiar a fim de obter autorização para realizar a entrevista.
- De preferência, a entrevista deverá ser feita ao integrante do Agregado Familiar com idade dos 15 aos 35 anos. Se a pessoa a ser entrevistada não se encontrar disponível, tal deverá ser comunicado ao supervisor e este deverá avaliar a possibilidade de um encontro num outro local ou num outro dia.
- Preste atenção às perguntas de avaliação numa escala Likert (1 a 5 pontos) podem ser parecidas ao ouvido do inquirido. Tenha muita calma e paciência até que o inquirido perceba o essencial do estudo. São perguntas de percepção, não são perguntas para avaliar o conhecimento em si.

Bom dia/boa tarde. O meu nome é (DIZER O NOME E APRESENTAR O CRACHÁ). Sou inquiridor do Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais e estamos a realizar um estudo sobre a opinião das pessoas a cerca dos conflitos que começaram desde o ano passado. O ISRI quer saber como é que a população e a comunidade em geral consegue se adaptar ou se recuperar de situações adversas, seja desastre ambiental, conflito ou radicalização. A nossa conversa vai durar pouco tempo, 15 ou 20 minutos. Este AF foi seleccionado por sorteio. O seu nome não será divulgado, servirá somente para facilitar esta conversa. Esteja a vontade, on ISRI e a sociedade civil pretende saber dos motivos desses conflitos armados. Outros meus colegas estão noutro distrito a fezer o mesmo trabalho nesta província.

Toda a informação a ser recolhida será confidencial e somente usada para o estudo, não se vai divulgar nome de pessoas.

Podemos começar...

IDENTIFICAÇÃO GEOGRÁFICA DA CASA DO AGREGADO FAMILIAR:

Coordenadas da Casa do Agregado Familiar seleccionado	Latitude (x) |_|_|_|_|_|_| Longitude (y) |_|_|_|_|_|_|_| Altitude (h) |_|_|_|
1. Província	*Cabo Delgado*
2. Distrito	
3. Posto Administrativo	
4. Localidade/Vila	
5. Aldeia	
6. Bairro	
7. Nome da Área de Enumeração (do local do trabalho de campo)	
8. Nome do chefe do agregado familiar (CAF)	
9. Contacto telefónico do CAF	
10. Nome do entrevistado	
11. Relação de parentesco com o CAF	1. Chefe 2. Cônjuge 3. Filho / filha 4. Pai / mãe 5. Outro parente 6. Sem parentesco

12	Quantos anos completos tem? [INQUIRIDOR: SE O/A RESPONDENTE FOR MENOR DE 15 ANOS OU MAIOR 35 ANOS, PÁRE A ENTREVISTA E ESCOLHE OUTRO/A RESPONDENTE]	|___|___|
13	Qual é a língua que você fala com frequência em casa? (Ao entrevistador: ajude se for necessário): **Isto é, a língua do seu grupo de origem, a sua língua materna]**	1. Português 2. Emakhuwa 3. Makonde 4. Kimwani 5. Suwahili 6. Outra
14	Qual é a sua religião? [***CODIFIQUE COM BASE NA RESPOSTA. NÃO LEIA AS OPÇÕES***]	0. Nenhuma 1. Islâmica 2. Sunita 3. Católica Romana 4. Anglicana 5. Sião / Zione 6. Evangelica /Pentecostal 7. Outra _____
15	As pessoas praticam a sua religião de forma diferente. Para além de casamentos e funerais, com que frequência o (NOME) se empenha em práticas religiosas, como por exemplo orações, ler um livro religioso ou ir a um serviço religioso ou uma reunião com um grupo religioso? [***LEIA AS OPÇÕES***]	0. Nenhuma vez 1. 1-2 vezes por semana 2. 3-4 vezes por semana 3. 5-7 vezes por semana 4. Só às 6ªs-feiras 5. Nos dias festivos 6. Ocasionalmente 7. Outra _____

CÓDIGOS DA PERGUNTA 16: 1-Não concordo fortemente; 2-Não concordo; 3-Nem concordo, nem discordo; 4-Concordo; 5-Concordo fortemente

	Você concorda com as seguintes declarações:	1	2	3	4	5
16	A. É importante manter tradições culturais.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	B. Você está familiarizado com suas tradições, crenças, práticas e valores de sua cultura.......	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	C. A sua identidade cultural guia a maneira em que você vive a sua vida.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

17	Vou agora ler uma lista de grupos onde as pessoas podem participar ou simplesmente assistir. Em cada caso, diga-me se você é um dirigente oficial, um membro activo, um membro inactivo, ou se não é membro: Grupo religioso (exemple: igreja, mesquita, ...)	3. Dirigente oficial 2. Membro Activo 1. Membro inactivo 0. Não é membro 9. Não Sabe
18	Vou agora ler uma lista de grupos onde as pessoas podem participar ou simplesmente assistir. Em cada caso, diga-me se (NOME) é um dirigente oficial, um membro activo, um membro inactivo, ou se não é membro: 'Alguma outra associação voluntária ou grupo comunitário'.	3. Dirigente oficial 2. Membro Activo 1. Membro Inactivo 0. Não é membro 9. Não Sabe
19	Eis a seguir uma lista de actos que as pessoas por vezes praticam na sua qualidade de cidadãos. Em cada um dos casos, diga-me, por favor, se (NOME) pessoalmente realizou algum destes actos durante o ano passado: 'Participou num encontro da comunidade'	4. Muitas vezes 3. Várias vezes 2. Uma ou duas vezes 1. Gostaria de ter essa oportunidade 0. Nunca o faria
20	Eis a seguir uma lista de atos que as pessoas por vezes praticam na sua qualidade de cidadãos. Em cade um dos casos, diga-me, por favor, se você pessoalmente realizou algum destes atos durante o ano passado: Reuniu-se com outros para tratar de algum assunto	4. Muitas vezes 3. Várias vezes 2. Uma ou duas vezes 1. Gostaria de ter essa oportunidade 0. Nunca o faria
21	**NÃO LEIA AS OPÇÕES** Qual é o seu grupo étnico, comunitário, cultural ou tribal?	540. Makua 541. Makonde 542. Mwani 9990. Moçambicano(a), se o entrevistado se identifica dessa maneira 9996. Outro (especifique) _____ 9998. Recusou responder 9999. Não sabe
22	Com que frequência, se alguma, os _____ [grupo étnico] são tratados de forma justa pelo governo? [Se o respondente não identificou algum grupo em Q21 ou SE RECUSAR em responder (9998), NÃO SABE (9999), ou mencionar "somente	0-Nunca 1-As Vezes 2-Muitas vezes 3-Sempre

	moçambicano" (9990) – então, assinale a opção 7 e continue com a questão Q24]	7-Não se aplica [não leia] 9-Não sabe
23	Imaginemos que você tenha que escolher entre ser moçambicano e ser_____[Grupo Étnico]. Qual das seguintes declarações expressa melhor os seus sentimentos? [Se o respondente não identificou nenhum grupo em Q21 – isto é, SE RECUSAR em responder (9998), NÃO SABE (9999), ou mencionar "somente moçambicano" (9990) – então assinale a opção 7 = Não aplica e continue com a questão Q24]	5. Sinto-me somente moçambicano 4. Sinto-me mais moçambicano que _____[Inserir grupo étnico do respondente] 3. Sinto-me igualmente moçambicano e _____[Inserir grupo étnico do respondente] 2. Sinto-me mais_____[Inserir grupo étnico do respondente] que moçambicano 1. Sinto-me somente_____[Inserir grupo étnico do respondente] 7. Não aplicável 9. Não sabe

CÓDIGOS DA PERGUNTA 24: 0-Não confia nada; 1-Confia só um pouco; 2-Confia razoavelmente; 3-Confia muito; 9-Não sabe/Não ouviu o suficiente

24	Até que ponto você confia em cada uma das seguintes entidades /instituições, para dar a sua opinião? **[LEIA AS OPÇÕES]**	1	2	3	4	5
	A. O Presidente da República?........................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	B. A Assembleia da República?........................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	C. O Governo municipal ou distrital?..............	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	D. O Governo provincial?................................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	E. O partido no poder?....................................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	F. Os partidos políticos da oposição?..............	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	G. A polícia? (PRM e ou Municipal)..................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	H. O exército?...	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	I. Os líderes religiosos?..................................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	J. Os líderes tradicionais?..............................	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

25	Neste país, até que ponto se é livre para: Dizer o que se pensa: [**LEIA AS OPÇÕES**]	1-Nada livre 2-Pouco livre 3-Relativamente 4-Totalmente livre 9-Não sabe
26	Neste país, com que frequência as pessoas têm de ter cuidado com o que dizem sobre política?	3-Sempre 2-Frequentemente 1-Raramente 0-Nunca 9-Não sabe
27	Você concorda com a seguinte declaração: *«Você tem confiança quando está a falar com o governo e as autoridades».*	1-Não concordo fortemente 2-Não concordo 3-Nem concordo, nem descordo 4-Concordo 5-Concordo fortemente
28	Você concorda com a seguinte declaração: *«Você pensa que o governo e as autoridades ouvem as suas preocupações».*	1-Não concordo fortemente 2-Não concordo 3-Nem concordo, nem descordo 4-Concordo 5-Concordo fortemente
29	Neste país, com que frequência as pessoas são tratadas de forma igual perante a lei?	3-Sempre 2-Frequentemente 1-Raramente 0-Nunca 9-Não sabe
30	[**INQUIRIDOR: SONDE COM O INQUIRIDO DA CONVICÇÃO DA RESPOSTA**] Para cada um dos seguintes grupos de pessoas, por favor diga se gostaria, não gostaria ou não se importaria em ter estes grupos de pessoas como vizinhos: Pessoas de uma religião diferente.	1-Não Gostaria nada 2-Não gostaria tanto 3-Não se importaria 4-Gostaria um pouco 5-Gostaria muito 9-Não sabe
31	[**INQUIRIDOR: SONDE COM O INQUIRIDO DA CONVICÇÃO DA RESPOSTA**] Para cada um dos seguintes grupos de pessoas, por favor diga se gostaria, não gostaria ou não se importaria em ter estes grupos de pessoas como vizinhos: Pessoas de um grupo étnico diferente.	1-Não Gostaria nada 2-Não gostaria tanto 3-Não se importaria 4-Gostaria um pouco 5-Gostaria muito 9-Não sabe

		CÓDIGOS DA PERGUNTA 32: 1-Não concordo fortemente; 2-Não concordo; 3-Nem concordo, nem descordo; 4-Concordo; 5-Concordo fortemente					
32	Você concorda com as seguintes declarações:		1	2	3	4	5	
	A. *Você conversa regularmente com pessoas de religiões/culturas e crenças diferentes que suas.*		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	B. *Você sente-se apoiado pelos membros das outras comunidades*		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	C. *Ser violento ajuda você a ganhar respeito dos outros.*		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	D. *Ser violento ajuda mostrar como forte você é.*		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	E. *A sua comunidade aceita o facto de que os jovens possam utilizar violência para resolver os problemas deles........*		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	F. *Você está disposto a falar em público contra violência na sua comunidade*...		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
	G. *Você está disposto a desafiar os comportamentos violentos dos outros membros na sua comunidade*..............		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
33	Sexo do respondente	1. Masculino 2. Feminino						
34	Qual é a sua naturalidade?	1. Niassa 2. Cabo Delgado 3. Nampula 4. Zambézia 5. Tete 6. Manica 7. Sofala 8. Inhambane 9. Gaza 10. Maputo provincia 11. MaputoCidade 12. Fora do País _____						

35	Há quanto tempo o (NOME) vive aqui ?	0. Deste que nasceu 1. Há 1 ano (desde 2018) 2. Há 2 anos (desde 2017) 3. Há 3 anos (desde 2016) 4. Há 4 anos (desde 2015) 5. Há mais de 4 anos 6. Chegou este ano 2019

FIM DE ENTREVISTA

Hora do Fim da entrevista (HH:MIN):_____:_____

CARO INQUIRIDOR:
NÃO SE ESQUEÇA DE PREENCHER **O CÓDIGO IDENTIFICADOR DA ÁREA (AREA ID) NO TOPO, IDENTIFICAÇÃO GEOGRÁFICA** E, TODAS AS PERGUNTAS POSTERIORES DEVEM SER PREENCHIDAS PELO INQUIRIDOR DEPOIS DA ENTREVISTA CONCLUÍDA. SE TIVER ALGUMA DÚVIDA SOBRE O SEXO DO INQUIRIDO, PEÇA LICENÇA E PERGUNTE-O, DE NOVO, COM ALGUMA DELICADEZA

8   A nossa conversa já terminou, estou a rever ver se não terei deixado pergunta não respondida. Muito obrigado pelo tempo que me dispensou durante estes minutos. Esta conversa fica entre nós os dois, não vou partilhar com mais ninguém. Fique sossegado. Mais uma vez, muito obrigado por colaborar connosco.

Já vou a casa de outro AF seleccionado! Estamos aqui na aldeia estes dias. Qualquer assunto sobre o estudo, estou por aqui!

Muito obrigado. Com licença!

English-Language Questionnaire

Demographic Information

1. What is your date of birth?
    [MM/DD/YYYY]

2. Which Mozambican language is your home language?
    [Interviewer: Prompt if necessary: What is the language of your group of origin?]
    Portuguese = 1
    Makua = 2
    Makonde = 3
    Mwani = 4
    Other = 5
    Don't Know = 9

3. Are you from Pemba?
    3a. Where in Pemba do you live?
    [Requires multiple-choice responses based on the national gazetteer.]

4. How many years have you lived in Pemba?

5. What is your religion, if any?
    Islam = 1
    Catholic = 2
    Anglican = 3
    Evangelical = 4
    Other Religion = 5
    No Religion = 6
    Unknown = 9

6. People practice their religion in different ways. Asides from weddings and funerals, how often do you personally engage in religious practices like prayer, reading a religious book, or attending a religious service or a meeting of a religious group? Would you say you do so:
    Never = 0
    A few times a year = 1
    About once a month = 2
    About once a week = 3
    A few times a week = 4
    About once a day = 5
    More than once a day = 6
    Respondent has no religion [Do not read out loud] = 7
    Don't Know = 9

Cultural Identity and Connectedness

7. Do you agree with the following statement: It is important to maintain cultural traditions.
    Strongly disagree = 1
    Disagree = 2
    Neutral = 3
    Agree = 4
    Strongly Agree = 5

8. Do you agree with the following statement: I am familiar with my cultural traditions, beliefs, practices, and values.

Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

9. Do you agree with the following statement: My cultural identity guides the way I live my life.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

10. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group that meets outside of regular worship services
0 = Not a member, 1 = Inactive member, 2 = Active Member, 3 = Official Leader

11. I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: Member of voluntary association or community group
0 = Not a member, 1 = Inactive member, 2 = Active Member, 3 = Official Leader, 9 = Don't know

12. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance. Attend a community meeting
Would never do this = 0
Would if I had the Chance = 1
Once or Twice = 2
Several Times = 3
Often = 4

13. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Join others to raise an issue
Would never do this = 0
Would if I had the Chance = 1
Once or Twice = 2
Several Times = 3
Often = 4

14. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?
[Do not read options: Code Response]
Makua = 540; Makonde = 541; Mwani 542; Mozambican Only, or "doesn't think of self in those terms" = 9990; Refused to answer = 9998; Don't know = 9999; Other [Specify]

15. How often, if ever, are _____s (R's Ethnic Group) treated unfairly by the government?
If respondents did not identify any group in q.12 – that is, if they refused to answer (9998), didn't know (9999), or said "Mozambican Only" (9990) – then circle 7
Never = 0
Sometimes =1
Often = 2
Always = 3
Not Applicable = 7

Don't Know = 9

16. Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Mozambican and being a _____ (Ethnic Group). Which of the following best expresses your feelings?
[If respondents did not identify any group in q.12 – that is, if they refused to answer (9998), didn't know (9999), or said "Mozambican Only" (9990) – then circle 7.]
I feel only Mozambican. = 5
I feel more Mozambican than _____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 4
I feel equally Mozambican and _____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 3
I feel more_____ [insert R's ethnic group] than Mozambican. = 2
I feel only_____ [insert R's ethnic group]. = 1
Not applicable = 7
Don't Know = 9

Linking Capital (Political Trust)

17. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust President
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

18. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Parliament/National Assembly
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

19. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust your elected local government council
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

20. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Provincial Government
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

21. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust the ruling party
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

22. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust the opposition political parties
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

23. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Police
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

24. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Army
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

25. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Religious Leaders
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

26. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Trust Traditional Leaders
Not at all = 0; Just a little = 1; Somewhat = 2; A lot = 3; Don't Know/Haven't Heard = 9

27. In this country, how free are you: To say what you think?
Not at all free = 1
Not very free = 2

Somewhat free =3
Completely = 4
Don't Know = 9

28. In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?
Always = 3 ; Often = 2; Rarely = 1; Never = 0; Don't Know = 9

29. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel confident when dealing with government and authorities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

30. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel that my voice is heard when dealing with government and authorities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

31. In your opinion, how often, in this country: Are people treated unequally under the law?
Always = 3; Often = 2; Rarely = 1; Never = 0; Don't Know = 9

Bridging Capital (Social Trust)

32. For each of the following type of people, please tell me whether you would like to have people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care: People of different religions [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]
Strongly dislike = 1
Somewhat dislike = 2
Would not care = 3
Somewhat like = 4
Strongly like = 5
Don't Know = 9

33. For each of the following type of people, please tell me whether you like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care: People of different ethnicities [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]
Strongly dislike = 1
Somewhat dislike = 2
Would not care = 3
Somewhat like = 4
Strongly like = 5
Don't Know = 9

34. Do you agree that you engage in conversations with people from different religious/cultures and beliefs?
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

35. Do you agree with the following statement: I feel supported by people from other communities.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

Violence-Related Beliefs

36. Do you agree with the following statement: Being violent helps earn the respect of others.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

37. Do you agree with the following statement: Being violent helps show how strong I am.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

38. Do you agree with the following statement? My community accepts that young people may use violence to solve problems.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

Violence-Related Behaviors

39. Do you agree with the following statement? I am willing to speak out publicly against violence in my community.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

40. Do you agree with the following statement? I am willing to challenge the violent behavior of others in my community.
Strongly disagree = 1
Disagree = 2
Neutral = 3
Agree = 4
Strongly Agree = 5

The Following Questions should be answered by the interviewer after the interview is concluded.
41. Respondent's Gender
Male = 1
Female =2

Annex 3: Mozambican BRAVE Index Score Tables

Tabulated below is the frequency of BRAVE-14 Scores across all respondents in Tanzania.

1. Frequency of Overall BRAVE-14 Scores

BRAVE-14 Scores	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
36.00	1	.2	.2	.2
37.00	3	.5	.6	.8
38.00	1	.2	.2	1.0
39.00	1	.2	.2	1.2
40.00	5	.9	1.0	2.2
41.00	3	.5	.6	2.8
42.00	2	.4	.4	3.2
43.00	6	1.1	1.2	4.3
44.00	10	1.8	2.0	6.3
45.00	8	1.4	1.6	7.9
46.00	6	1.1	1.2	9.1
47.00	14	2.5	2.8	11.8
48.00	9	1.6	1.8	13.6
49.00	15	2.6	3.0	16.6
50.00	15	2.6	3.0	19.5
51.00	28	4.9	5.5	25.0
52.00	29	5.1	5.7	30.8
53.00	26	4.6	5.1	35.9
54.00	32	5.6	6.3	42.2
55.00	61	10.8	12.0	54.2
56.00	42	7.4	8.3	62.5
57.00	42	7.4	8.3	70.8
58.00	41	7.2	8.1	78.9
59.00	30	5.3	5.9	84.8
60.00	27	4.8	5.3	90.1
61.00	22	3.9	4.3	94.5
62.00	11	1.9	2.2	96.6
63.00	7	1.2	1.4	98.0
64.00	5	.9	1.0	99.0
65.00	3	.5	.6	99.6
67.00	2	.4	.4	100.0
Total	507	89.4	100.0	
Missing	60	10.6		
Entire Total	567	100.0		

Tabulated below are mean BRAVE-14 scores, compared within demographic/identity groups in Nampula. Given the low number of respondents for some of the variables, conclusions should not be drawn for groups with fewer than 30 respondents.

2. Tabulation of Scale and Mean of Sub-Factor Scores

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Cultural ID Connectedness	567	3.00	15.00	11.4004
Bridging Capital	553	3.00	15.00	10.8499
Linking Capital	526	3.00	14.00	10.9335
Violence related behaviour	566	2.00	10.00	8.0777
Violence related beliefs	560	3.00	15.00	13.0054
Valid N (listwise)	507			

3. Subfactor Scores by age

	Cultural ID Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs	Count
15-24	11.30	10.81	9.88	7.75	12.96	211
25-30	11.56	11.02	10.16	8.16	13.01	158
31+	11.38	10.75	9.82	8.36	13.05	198

4. Subfactor scores by sex

	Cultural ID Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence related behaviour	Violence related Beliefs	Count
Male	11.41	10.82	9.92	8.36	13.09	322
Female	11.39	10.89	9.95	7.71	12.90	245

5. Subfactor scores by number of years lived in district

	Cultural_ID_Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence related behaviour	Violence related beliefs	Count
4 or less years ago	10.57	10.45	9.36	8.17	12.74	23
Over 4 years ago	11.43	10.63	9.57	8.02	13.01	97
Since birth	11.45	10.91	10.05	8.07	13.00	439

6. Subfactor scores by religion

	Cultural ID Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence related behaviour	Violence related beliefs	Count
None	11.00	10.62	10.63	7.94	12.24	17
Islam	11.12	10.72	9.75	8.00	12.89	230
Catholic	11.62	10.93	9.98	8.18	13.13	295
Anglican	12.17	11.83	10.00	7.67	13.50	6
Pentacostal	11.00	11.33	11.00	8.33	12.93	15

Other	13.25	9.67	10.00	5.75	13.50	4

7. **Subfactor scores by district**

	Cultural ID Connected ness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence related behaviour	Violence related beliefs	Count
Erati	11.26	10.63	9.66	7.58	12.78	129
Lalaua	11.79	11.31	9.89	8.20	13.17	132
Mecuburi	11.69	10.74	10.36	8.28	12.96	183
Memba	10.71	10.75	9.64	8.17	13.13	123

Annex 4: Tanzanian BRAVE Index Score Tables

Tabulated below is the frequency of BRAVE-14 Scores across all respondents in Tanzania.

BRAVE-14 Score	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
39.00	2	.6	.6	.6
40.00	1	.3	.3	1.0
41.00	3	1.0	1.0	1.9
42.00	1	.3	.3	2.2
43.00	1	.3	.3	2.5
44.00	2	.6	.6	3.2
45.00	3	1.0	1.0	4.1
46.00	4	1.3	1.3	5.4
47.00	4	1.3	1.3	6.7
48.00	7	2.2	2.2	8.9
49.00	11	3.5	3.5	12.4
50.00	11	3.5	3.5	15.9
51.00	10	3.2	3.2	19.0
52.00	20	6.3	6.3	25.4
53.00	18	5.7	5.7	31.1
54.00	18	5.7	5.7	36.8
55.00	27	8.6	8.6	45.4
56.00	14	4.4	4.4	49.8
57.00	20	6.3	6.3	56.2
58.00	13	4.1	4.1	60.3
59.00	23	7.3	7.3	67.6
60.00	19	6.0	6.0	73.7
61.00	10	3.2	3.2	76.8
62.00	19	6.0	6.0	82.9
63.00	15	4.8	4.8	87.6
64.00	13	4.1	4.1	91.7
65.00	10	3.2	3.2	94.9
66.00	7	2.2	2.2	97.1
67.00	5	1.6	1.6	98.7
68.00	4	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	315	100.0	100.0	

Tabulated below are mean BRAVE-14 scores, compared within demographic/identity groups in Pwani. Given the low number of respondents for some of the variables, conclusions should not be drawn for groups with fewer than 30 respondents.

1. Overall Scores by Age

	Mean	Count
18 - 24	56.14	129
25 - 30	56.10	110
31 - 35	57.28	76

2. Overall Scores by Sex

	Mean	Count
Male	57.33	145
Female	55.61	170

3. Overall Scores by Place of origin

	Mean	Count
From Pwani Region	56.68	196
Not from Pwani Region	55.93	119

4. Overall Scores by Group membership

	Mean	Count
Not in or inactive member of a religious group	56.32	238
Active member or leader of a religious group	56.64	77
Not in or inactive member of a community group	55.61	218
Active member or leader of a community group	58.19	97

5. Overall Scores by Home Language

	Mean	Count
Kikutu	64.00	1
Swahili	60.33	52
Kinyasa	60.00	1
Kihehe	60.00	6
Kimatumbi	59.33	6
Kikinga	59.00	1
Kisambaa	58.50	2
Kihaya	58.50	2
Kimakua	58.50	2
Kisukuma	58.29	14
Wandondi	57.00	1
Kikidunda	57.00	1
Kizaramo	56.72	79
Kinyaturu	56.50	4
Kinyakyusa	56.33	3
Kikulya	56.00	2
Kindengereko	55.83	6
Kiluguru	55.43	7
Kikwere	55.28	57

	Mean	Count
Kimasai	55.00	2
Kibena	55.00	2
Kigogo	54.75	8
Kimwera	54.67	3
Kipogoro	54.60	5
Kichaga	54.00	1
Kimakonde	53.88	8
Kiyao	53.00	1
Kifipa	53.00	1
Kizigua	52.89	9
Kinyamwezi	52.56	9
Kingindo	52.00	7
Kirangi	51.00	2
Kingoni	51.00	1
Kiha	50.75	4
Mwanji	49.00	1
Kikagulu	48.00	1
Msegeji	45.00	1
Kisafwa	45.00	2

6. Overall Scores by Speaking Additional Languages

No. Additional Languages	Mean	Count
1.00	56.21	213
2.00	56.59	81
3.00	57.74	19
4.00	56.50	2

7. Overall Scores by Ethnic Group

	Mean	Count
Wakwere	55.90	63
Wazaramo	57.48	98
Other	55.92	154

8. Overall Scores by Number of years lived in Pwani

	Mean	Count
4 years or fewer	54.72	18
5 to 18 years	55.38	21
19+ years	57.08	157

9. Subfactor Score Averages

Subfactors	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Brave-14 Index	**56.4**	**14**	**70**
Cultural Identity and Connectedness	10.6	3.00	15.00
Bridging Capital	11.2	3.00	15.00
Linking Capital	11.7	3.00	15.00
Violence Related Behaviour	8.8	2.00	10.00
Violence Related Beliefs	14.0	3.00	15.00

10. Subfactor Scores by Age

Age Group	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
18-24	129	10.57	11.08	11.88	8.84	13.78
25-30	110	10.65	11.12	11.43	8.77	14.13
31-35	76	10.54	11.66	.86	8.92	14.30

11. Subfactor Scores by Gender

Gender	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
Male	145	10.63	11.57	12.02	9.08	14.03
Female	170	10.56	10.95	11.45	8.62	14.02

12. Subfactor Scores by Place of Origin

Are you from Pwani?	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
Yes	196	10.85	11.30	11.74	8.81	13.98
No	119	11.12	11.12	11.67	8.88	14.09

13. Subfactor Scores by Involvement in Religious Groups

Religious Group Member	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
No/Inactive Member	238	10.61	11.20	11.72	8.81	13.98
Active Member/ Leader	77	10.53	11.32	11.70	8.92	14.16

14. Subfactor Scores by Involvement in Civil Society Groups

Civil Society Group Member	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
No/Inactive Member	218	10.39	11.07	11.57	8.76	13.81
Active Member/ Leader	97	11.04	11.59	12.03	9.01	14.52

15. Subfactor Scores by Involvement in Home Language

Home Language (Condensed)	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence-Related Behaviour	Violence-Related Beliefs
Swahili	52	12.50	12.62	12.00	9.40	13.81
Kizaramo	79	10.96	10.95	11.97	8.78	14.05
Kikwere	57	10.02	11.07	11.60	8.68	13.91
Other	127	9.84	10.91	11.49	8.70	14.15

16. Subfactor Scores by Additional Languages

Additional Language	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
1	213	10.40	11.18	11.76	8.86	14.01
2	81	10.93	11.35	11.62	8.72	13.99
3	19	11.26	11.32	11.68	9.16	14.32
4	2	11.50	11.50	11.50	7.50	14.50

17. Subfactor Scores by Ethnic Groups

Ethnic Groups	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
Wakwere	63	10.29	11.24	11.68	8.78	13.92
Wazaramo	98	11.33	11.34	11.93	8.88	14.01
Other	154	10.25	11.16	11.59	8.83	14.08

18. Subfactor Scores by Years in Pwani

Years in Pwani	Count	Cultural Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
4 or less	18	11.39	11.56	10.22	8.11	13.44
5 to 18	21	10.86	10.52	11.57	8.43	14.00
18+	157	10.79	11.38	11.94	8.94	14.04

Annex 5: Suitability of the Adapted BRAVE-14 Measure

Factor analysis

The 12 items of the BRAVE-14 scale and the two Afrobarometer variables[176] for Mozambique and the 14 items of the BRAVE-14 scale were subjected to Principal Components Analysis with Direct Oblimin rotation using a statistical analysis program (SPSS). Prior to performing the Principal Components Analysis, the suitability of the data for factor analysis was assessed. For the data from Mozambique, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .68 and for Tanzania it was .65 - both exceeded the recommended value of .6. For both sets of data, the Barlett's Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the use of factor analysis.

To perform the factor analysis, six factors with Eigenvalues above one were initially extracted for the Pwani data. These explained 18.6%, 15.3%, 9.9%, 8.7%, 8.1% and 7.1% of the variance respectively. However, given the Grossman et al. previous analysis of this set of indicators, only five factors should be extracted. For ease of analysis it was decided to extract only their recommended five factors. After rotation, these five factors explained a total of 60.7% of the variance with Component 1 contributing 18.6%, Component 2 contributing 15.3%, Component 3 contributing 9.9%, Component 4 contributed 8.7%, and Component 5 contributed 8.1%.

For factor analysis of the Nampula data, four factors with Eigenvalues above one were initially extracted. These explained 19.1%, 19.1%, 13%, and 9.2% of the variance respectively. After rotation, five factors explained a total of 67.4% of the variance. The last factor explained 7% of the variance and was below the recommended threshold (Eigenvalue = .985, instead of 1). The theorized Bridging Capital as well as the Linking Capital sub-dimensions are not borne out in the data. This could be due to the fact that these two sub-dimensions included the Afrobarometer replacement variables.

Annex 5: shows the factor loadings for the five components in each dataset.

Reliability analysis

A reliability analysis (Cronbach's Alpha) was conducted for each of the three-item subfactors of the BRAVE index for both the Tanzania and Mozambique data. Additionaly, a bivariate correlation was conducted to analyse the relationship between the two question items of the violence-related behavior subfactor. This analysis tests how related the responses of each question item is to the other items within each subfactor.

The reliability of the both datasets was analysed using the Cronbach Alpha for questions within the first four subfactors, and bivariate correlation for the two questions within the violence-related behavior subfactor. This analysis tests how related the responses were to their counterparts within each of the five factors.

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[176] The BRAVE Q6 was replaced with the Afrobarometer question about Trust in the police. Alternative ways of substituting this question were considered, however, creating a factor did not seem appropriate given as only the Police and Army items of the Afrobarometer 'trust' battery of questions created a factor. The BRAVE Q7 was replaced by a simple index created based on the Afrobarometer 'neighbourhood' questions. The average of the answers for 'different religion' and 'different ethnic group' were calculated.

For the Tanzania data, the analysis showed that the results posed no reliability issues for the BRAVE-14 measure's bridging capital, violence-related beliefs and cultural identity and connectedness subfactors. Additionally, it showed that the linking capital subfactor would be more reliable if the question regarding trust in institutions and enforcement agencies was removed. This is unsurprising, as the substantive meaning of this type of question is difficult to interpret as illustrated by Mattes and Moreno[177]. This issue could be further analysed using the Afrobarometer questions. Lastly, it showed only moderate correlation between the two questions for the violence-related behaviour subfactor. Overall, the analysis showed that the 14-item / 5 sub-factor framework is transferable to the Tanzanian context for the most part.

For the Mozambique data, the reliability analysis had different results. It showed that the results posed no reliability issues for the BRAVE-14 measure's cultural identity and connectedness and violence-related behavior subfactors. In fact, the two questions for the latter were highly correlated. It also showed the linking capital subfactor would be more reliable if the question regarding trust in police were removed. This was slightly different from the unreliability of a seemingly similar question on the Tanzania questionnaire, because several Afrobarometer questions probing trust in political parties, government institutions and police replaced the singular question about trust in institutions and enforcement agencies (see Annex 2 for questionnaire). For this dataset, there is a substantial difference between the Cronbach Alpha value with the trust in police question (0.698) and without it (0.754), making this question potentially problematic. This is not too surprising given the change in phrasing of the original question as recommended by Grossman et al, and the issues that emerged in the Tanzania survey. Similarly, the reliability analysis showed that the violence-related beliefs subfactor would be more reliable if the question regarding familiarity with cultural traditions, beliefs, practices, and values were removed. There is a substantial difference between the Cronbach Alpha value with the familiarity with culture question (0.788) and without it (0.871), also making this question potentially problematic. Lastly, we were unable to determine the reliability of the measure's bridging capital subfactor, because the question about trusting other communities was replaced with two questions about trust in other religious and ethnic groups. This is likely due to data cleaning or coding issues. Overall, these flaws in reliability are more problematic in the Mozambican dataset than those in the Tanzania dataset.

This suggests that most of the concepts represented by the subfactors work relatively well in the Tanzanian context. Some questionnaire related issues (i.e. some questions of the BRAVE index were not asked) which prevents us from making similar claims about the Mozambican survey data. The following sections provide additional information about the relationship between the different subfactors.

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[177] Mattes & Moreno, 2018.

Bivariate correlation

Bivariate correlation between each of the five BRAVE subfactors was calculated. The resulting Pearson coefficients showed that, in the Tanzania dataset, the various dimensions are correlated with each other. It is noteworthy that the cultural identity and connectedness variable seems somewhat distinct from the other subdimensions of the BRAVE Index within the dataset. In comparison to the Tanzania dataset, the bivariate correlations between the indices in the Mozambique dataset is weaker. It is likely, however, that this is due to technical differences (i.e., replacements of some questions). Thus, it is not possible to pinpoint substantive differences.

Annex 6: Bivariate Correlations shows the Pearson correlation between the different indices for both datasets.

Table 1 shows the factor loadings for the five subfactors within the Mozambique dataset. Variables are ordered and grouped by size of loading to facilitate interpretation.

1. **Mozambique Pattern Matrix***

Component	Bridging Capital (1)	Violent-related beliefs (2)	Cultural ID and connecte dness (3)	Violence-related behaviour (4)	Linking Capital (5)
Q2_Index_reversed	.911				
Q4_Index_reversed	.873				
Q8_Index_reversed	.809				
Q13 Index I feel confident when dealing with government and authorities		.888			
Q14 Index I feel that my voice is heard wen dealing with government and authorities		.882			
Q12 Index I am willing to challenge the violent behaviour of others in my community			-.827		
Q9 Index I am willing to speak out publicly against violence in my community			-.817		
Q7_Index_Religion EthnicGroup_Categ orical			-.581		
Q11 Index I regularly engage in conversations with people f multiple religions/cultures and beliefs			-.519		.480
Q3 Index I am familiar with my cultural traditions, beliefs, practices, and values				-.850	
Q1 Index It is important to				-.811	

maintain cultural traditions					
Q5 Index The cultural identity guides the way I live my life				-.680	
Q10 Index I feel supported by people from other communities					.828
Q6_Index_TrustPolice_Recode		.374			.458

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

*Rotation converged in 9 iterations.

Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the five components. Variables are ordered and grouped by size of loading to facilitate interpretation.

2. Tanzania Pattern Matrix*

Component	Bridging Capital (1)	Violent-related beliefs (2)	Cultural ID and connectedness (3)	Violence-related behaviour (4)	Linking Capital (5)
Q10 I feel supported by people from other communities.	.780				
Q7 In general, I trust people from other communities.	.663				
Q11. Do you agree that you engage in conversations with people from different religious/cultures and beliefs?	.423				
Q4 Being violent helps show how strong I am (inverted)		.802			
Q2 Being violent helps me earn respect		.798			
Q8 My community accepts that young people may use		.778			

violence to solve problems					
Q1 It is important to maintain cultural traditions.			.849		
Q3 I am familiar with my cultural traditions, beliefs, practices, and values.			.764		
Q5 My cultural identity guides the way I live my life.			.652		
Q9 I am willing to speak out publicly against violence in my community.				.889	
Q12 I am willing to challenge the violent behaviour of others in my community.				.641	
Q13 I feel confident when dealing with government and authorities.					.871
Q14 I feel that my voice is heard when dealing with government and authorities.					.859
Q6 I trust authorities/law enforcement agencies.					.342

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

*Rotation converged in 11 iterations.

Annex 6: Bivariate Correlations

1. **Pearson Correlation between Subfactors within the Mozambique Dataset**

	Cultural ID & Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence-related Behaviour	Violence-related Beliefs
Cultural ID & Connectedness	1				
Bridging Capital	.161**	1			
Linking Capital	.236**	.340**	1		
Violence related Behaviour	-.016	.202**	.050	1	
Violence related Beliefs	.028	-.022	-.145**	.282**	1

N= 520 to 567; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

2. **Pearson Correlation between Subfactors within the Tanzania Dataset**

	Cultural ID & Connectedness	Bridging Capital	Linking Capital	Violence Related Behaviour	Violence Related Beliefs
Cultural ID Connectedness	1				
Bridging Capital	.223**	1			
Linking Capital	.086	.291**	1		
Violence related Behaviour	.059	.198**	.215**	1	
Violence related beliefs	-.116*	.120*	.119*	.139*	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

N=315

Annex 7: Letter from the Provincial Government of Cabo Delgado

República de Moçambique
GOVERNO DA PROVINCIA DE CABO DELGADO
Gabinete do Governador

Ao:

Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais
- Pemba -

Nota nº 123 /GG-CD/ASGAP/017   18 /01/2019

ASSUNTO: **Comunicação do Despacho**

O Gabinete do Governador recebeu através da Ref. nº01/GD/CEEI/ISRI/2019, a comunicação da Realização da Pesquisa sobre "Avaliação de Riscos e da Capacidade de Resiliência das Comunidades Vulneráveis contra a Violência no Norte de Moçambique (Cabo Delgado)".

Sobre este assunto, cumpre-me comunicar a V.Excia para articular com o Ministério da Defesa Nacional e o Ministério do Interior a fim de colher sensibilidade destes, face ao ambiente em que se vive nos distritos onde o estudo será realizado".

Cordiais saudações.

O Chefe do Gabinete do Governador,

Casimiro Lourenço Pedro Calope
(Técnico Prof. Adm/ção Pública)